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ABSTRACT 
Increasingly stringent equipment performance and reliability requirements are 
being specified to the aerospace industry by aircraft manufacturers, driven by 
the expectations of both certification authorities and operators. The reality is 
that aircraft system and equipment reliability in service can fail to meet the 
design expectations. 
This thesis details the problem areas within the current analysis process, 
describing the procedures currently in use and showing what can go wrong. It 
goes on to propose action that can be taken to ensure safety levels are 
maintained and details a new approach that is unique to this thesis. The author 
has devised a new System Safety Compliance Model (SSCM) for ensuring that 
aircraft system safety standards can be better maintained. Evolved from his 
earlier highly successful database system at TRW Lucas Aerospace, SSCM will 
be: 
" 
Demonstrably cost effective 
"A step change in process capability, offering "something new" 
" 
Instantly accessible at shop floor level to everyone in the business 
" 
Easy to use and as automated as possible to minimise staff training 
requirement 
" 
Capable of performing instant re-assessment of safety performance 
down to system level and including consideration of a variety of 
operating environments and conditions 
" The industry standard repository of component reliability data 
" 
"Centrally" owned by a world-wide recognised industry body 
SSCM is the first system to operate in such a way, and will ensure that the 
original system safety analysis performed at the design stage, is continually 
assessed for accuracy throughout its in-service life. If the new methods 
detailed in this thesis are adopted and acted upon, there is a high probability of 
a reduction in the risk of aircraft systematic failure in service, leading to 
increased safety in aviation. The model can be equally applied to other areas of 
transportation such as railways. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
- 
INTRODUCTION 
1.0 THE AIR TRANSPORT ACCIDENT RATE 
The air transport industry remains the safest form of mass transportation. A 
comparison with other transport types 111, as reported by the International Civil 
Aviation Organisation (ICAO), shows that the fatality rate in the United Kingdom 
per one billion kilometres travelled in each case is approximately as follows: 
motorcycle 49, bicycle 34, car 6.7, train 0.7, airline 0.1. 
Thus the current high-level of safety within the commercial aviation industry can 
easily be demonstrated, and this is further born out by looking at the World hull 
loss and fatal aircraft accident rates reported by ICAO. Expressed as the rate 
per 1,000,000 scheduled departures, the hull loss rate was down to 1.0 in 2000, 
and declined further to 0.78 in 2004. The fatal accident rate per 100,000 flying 
hours has similarly declined as follows: 1975 0.17,1985 0.13,1995 0.08,2002 
0.07. However, in 2003 it increased again to 0.315. 
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Figure 1- Forecast Air Traffic & Accident Rate Growth (ICAO) 
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Figure 1 illustrates not only this low accident rate, but also the effect that a 
widely forecast air transport traffic annual growth rate of 4% over the next few 
years (illustrated by the dotted lines) may have on the total number of major 
aircraft accidents each year. Some evidence suggests the real situation may 
not be this serious, but nonetheless, there remains the possibility that a 
doubling of air traffic movements will, as a result, double the number of 
accidents. Even though such events as the terrorist's attacks in the United 
States on 11 September 2001, the second Gulf War, etc., caused short-lived 
slowing of the industry's growth, from which it quickly recovered, this still means 
the industry could start to suffer a catastrophic accident involving a large (more 
than 7,500 kg empty weight) commercial airliner on average once a week. The 
picture is further complicated by forecast growth patterns in such parts of the 
World as China and South America, which are already seeing much higher 
rates of growth, in what statistics still show are riskier areas of airspace. 
This potential elevated accident rate will clearly not only be increasingly 
financially unsustainable by the industry, but is also likely to be unacceptable to 
the travelling public, placing considerable strain on an industry which is already 
struggling to survive as margins shrink to levels not previously seen. This 
downturn has resulted in all but one of the six major US carriers having periods 
in Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection over the last two years. A study by the 
NLR in the Netherlands 12), calculated that the average cost to the airline 
industry of a single passenger fatality in a commercial flight was $3.2 million. 
There will also be further pressure to improve aircraft system technical 
performance, in order to accommodate the needs of ever more congested 
airspace. This is particularly true in Europe, where initiatives such as the Single 
Sky, which is planned to permit so-called "free flight" direct aircraft routing from 
approximately 2009, coupled with the recent introduction of Reduced Vertical 
Separation Minima (RVSM) to allow closer spacing of aircraft in already 
crowded controlled airspace, are simply adding to the complexity of on-board 
avionics. In this regard ICAO, in particular, has been taking the initiative with 
its Air Traffic Management (ATM) philosophy, which aims to integrate a global 
ATM system, with states and industry working together to design and implement 
an increased-capacity system with improved safety levels at its core. 
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While it is true that, in recent times, the years 2003 and 2004 both 
demonstrated some progress in further reducing the overall accident rate, there 
is no room for complacency, as was demonstrated by an upward trend in total 
numbers of fatal accidents and passengers killed in 2005. In that year there 
were 34 fatal accidents (28 in 2004), killing 1,050 people (466). Of these 
accidents, no fewer than 11 had technical or maintenance causal factors. 
Some accident categories, such as Controlled Flight In to Terrain (CFfT), with 
seven accidents in 2005, and those associated with the approach and landing 
phase of a flight, stubbornly refuse to go away or to demonstrate any significant 
and sustained improvement. Against this is an International Air Transport 
Association (IATA) target to reduce the accident rate to 0,65 per million 
departures by the year 2010. 
1.1 HUMAN FACTORS VERSUS ENGINEERING FAILURES 
Another frequently quoted statistic states that of the total number of accidents 
(and indeed of non-catastrophic Incidents), something approaching three- 
quarters are either due to, or have a contributory causal factor of, human error. 
For example, in a June 2002 Statistical Summary t3l, Boeing examined a sample 
of 210 hull loss accidents from 1992 to 2001, and identified the flight crew as 
the primary cause in 66% of these. Regardless of whether the "human factor" 
as it is now universally known, originates on the flight deck, in the hangar, on 
the ramp or in the air traffic control tower, this extraordinarily high rate has 
become the major focus for air safety improvement effort around the globe. 
Many organisations, including both advisory and regulatory bodies, aircraft 
manufacturers, systems suppliers, aircraft operators, maintenance 
organisations and air traffic control service providers, are involved in substantial 
and on-going efforts to find ways of understanding and reducing the percentage 
of human factors events. These include the US Commercial Aviation Safety 
Team (CAST) and in Europe, the Joint Safety Strategy Initiative (JSSI), both 
accident reduction target driven groups, concentrating primarily on such high 
profile accidents as approach and landing accidents and runway incursions. In 
this thesis, the author will show that the statistics for aircraft system and 
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component failure issues are such that continued effort is also needed in these 
areas. 
Industry bodies including the Flight Safety Foundation agree, however, that 
compared with all other forms of transportation, airline flying is both relatively 
and acceptably safe. Furthermore, most agencies, such as the Flight Safety 
Foundation in its annual review of airline accidents 141 also agree that the 
primary causes of fatal accidents are generally in the ratio of 80% due to human 
factors and 20% due to "system" failures. Interestingly, the JSSI team looking 
at key safety areas on which to focus, has prioritized the top four as CFIT, 
approach and landing, loss of control, and design, showing that at least in some 
quarters, concern is starting to be expressed on technical issues. 
1.2 WHAT IS BEING DONE TO IMPROVE IT? 
Today there are many good reasons to focus on reducing the accident rate still 
further. As has already been said, given the predicted growth in air travel over 
the next decade, unless something significant is done, there may be something 
like one major aircraft accident every week within the next decade. This is 
obviously an unacceptable situation both for the industry at large and the 
travelling public, as well as affecting those who are already reluctant to fly. 
Furthermore, with the coming of even larger aircraft such as the Airbus A380 
and Boeing 747-8, the aviation insurance industry is rightly concerned at the 
potential for very large compensation payments, way beyond anything that has 
been seen to date, in the event that one of these types suffers a major accident. 
Pressures on the airline industry such as environmental concerns about 
atmospheric pollution, and ever-increasing fuel prices, coupled with the impact 
of low-cost carriers, has lead to erosion of profit margins to very low levels. 
Thus it can be seen that any significant addition to the operators' overall cost 
burden through the knock-on effects of increasing accident numbers, may have 
a very serious effect on the survivability of at least some carriers. 
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1.3 WHY THE INDUSTRY SHOULD BE WORRIED ABOUT SYSTEM 
FAILURES 
100 
10 
I 
f- Accidenb< 
- -Design 
-+- Maintenance 
Figure 2- Total Fatal Accidents And Design / Maintenance Primary 
Causes 
Figure 2 looks at the total fatal accident numbers from 1999 to 2005 and 
considers those with design or technical failures and also maintenance errors, 
as a primary cause. From this it can be seen that these causes are increasing 
as a percentage of the total accidents. 
Many organisations are actively concentrating their efforts on those 75-80% of 
accidents for which the major causal factor was considered to be "human error". 
Another driver for this focus is coming from the industry regulators, including the 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), which has stated that: 
"Since most aircraft accidents are caused by something other than equipment 
failures, increasing the reliability of the installed systems to try to improve safety 
will have little positive effect on reducing aircraft accidents when compared with 
reducing accidents due to pilot error" 
Is this true, or is the issue of aircraft system safety in danger of being 
overlooked as the focus remains on human factors? Has the industry perhaps 
become lulled into a false sense of security by a perception that the system 
22 
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safety analytical process must be working efficiently, since there has not been a 
significant number of accidents directly attributable to system failures? The 
emphasis on human factors events must be taken into account in the system 
safety arena too, as is evidenced by the increasing incidence of maintenance 
errors, which may in turn be driven, on occasion, by poor design. The issue 
with design is that efforts to make systems increasingly reliable obviously costs 
money and with systems generally performing very well now, the point of 
diminishing return on design cost and effort can be reached. This is the basis of 
the principle of As Low As Reasonably Practical (ALARP), whereby the balance 
of cost against performance improvement is measured, and which takes into 
account such mitigating issues as human skill and competence in the face of 
unusual situations. Despite this, there are still additional steps that can be 
taken to improve the situation throughout the product life cycle from start of 
design to final withdrawal from service, and to do so in a cost effective manner, 
as this thesis will show. 
"A systematic event is one that can be due to faults in the specification, design, 
construction, operation or maintenance of the system or its components 
undesired state of a system, that is not associated with physical degradation of 
a component, that results from a given set of conditions being satisfied. " 151 
A recent study (61 into causal factors in aircraft accidents between 1985 and 
2004 showed that out of 728 accidents with the potential to have been 
prevented by the elimination of one causal factor, design was identified as the 
factor in 47 cases (6.45%). Had those design-related accidents been prevented 
it was postulated that no fewer than 3,303 lives would have been saved. 
The main objective of the thesis is to demonstrate that there is a need to 
change the way in which industry currently goes about monitoring system safety 
performance in service, and propose an approach for monitoring and 
communication back to the points of origin within the design and manufacturing 
sector. This in turn should lead to a significant change in not only the 
methodology used for system safety assessment, but also its efficacy. 
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Attempts have been made in recent years to look at commonality of processes, 
but so far they tend just to highlight the different approaches adopted by various 
sectors of the industry, without offering solutions. Furthermore, there seems to 
have been no attempt to co-ordinate these initiatives and pull them together into 
an overall "game plan" for future systems analyses. A key issue is that while 
there are many systems in place to capture in-service event data at operator 
level, and allow the sharing of that data with both other airlines and the aircraft 
manufacturers (in itself often affected by data sensitivity issues), there is no 
similar system for getting relevant and vital failure and event data back to the 
system suppliers 
- 
the people well placed to understand what is going on 
- 
and 
thus initiate any safety enhancements which may be required as a result. 
1.4 THESIS OBJECTIVES 
Failure to understand the part on-going safety analysis has to play in 
establishing the optimum levels of aircraft safety, can lead to over- 
engineered/over-complex systems, ineffective built-in test capability, 
unexpected operational effects in service and safety margins being eroded. At 
best this might lead to expensive and time-consuming equipment re-design or 
modification, or perhaps equipment life constraints with an inevitable loss of 
confidence and rising cost. 
When in-service event data is collected, the effects of varying operational and 
environmental scenarios are not always considered, communicated to those 
who need to know about them, or even understood at all. Thus the concept of 
in-house reliability databases based on empirical data remains in its infancy. A 
failure to notice problems, to listen to the equipment maintainers, to seek 
feedback from all the operators or to learn the lessons of history is still far too 
prevalent. 
The industry needs to recognise this lack of effective feedback. Aircraft 
manufacturers,, equipment manufacturers and their suppliers, operators and 
repair organisations should be encouraged through regulation to share 
experiences with each other in the interests of safety, and many attempt to do 
so already, with some limited success. 
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The objective of this thesis is therefore to develop a new methodology for 
establishing such a feedback loop, which will ensure that the required data is 
captured, analysed and acted on in a timely and robust manner. 
1.5 HYPOTHESIS 
The main constraint on maximising the effective use of vital in-service data is 
the lack of an effective, easy-to-use and universally adapted data collection, 
analysis and feedback method, which carries information back from an event on 
an aircraft to parts reliability and human factors events databases and a linked 
automated system safety analysis. 
The principle theme of this thesis is that a reliable, robust, and rapid feedback 
mechanism from an aircraft incident arising from a systems failure to a 
manufacturer will reduce failures that cause systems incidents and hence 
improve aircraft safety and airline business performance. 
The thesis is a complimentary activity to the research work completed in 2005 
by fellow City University PhD student Mark Pierotti m, who has recommended a 
range of revised aircraft maintenance schedule design procedures. 
1.6 RESEARCH METHOD 
The thesis looks at a considerable number of aircraft accidents and major 
incidents, analysing them for evidence of technical defects that are not always 
immediately apparent in investigation report summaries. Furthermore, it 
contends that a number may have been either completely prevented, or at least 
reduced in their impact, had the SSCM model at the core of this thesis, been 
available. 
It is also contended that there are substantial potential financial benefits to the 
industry in terms of: 
" 
Safety enhancement through a better understanding of system 
performance, failure modes and overall reliability 
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" 
Cost savings through a reduction in undesired events 
" 
Cost savings through improved reliability 
Mathematical techniques were investigated, but it was found that due to the 
degree of subjectivity in data capture and analysis, mathematical models would 
be difficult to calibrate and therefore the results could be unreliable. 
Nevertheless, it is estimated that significant savings may be achievable 
following introduction of SSCM and this is demonstrated in Chapter 5. 
In order to facilitate a comprehensive understanding of the objectives of the 
proposal, the research methodology has been broken down into the following 
key areas: 
"A detailed literature review 
"A study of the origins of formal safety analysis 
" An overview of the current analysis system, including the background 
legislation 
" 
Current in-service data capture and analysis systems 
"A study of commercial aircraft accidents and incidents, defining accident 
rates, with particular emphasis on those which have design, reliability, 
system safety and / or human factors contributors 
"A review of case studies illustrating possible flaws in aircraft design or 
in-service performance analysis 
" 
Surveys of industry professionals to illicit their views on aircraft safety 
performance 
In each case, the origins of source material used will be detailed, with 
amplifying information contained in a number of appendices. The detailed 
research work carried out under each of the above headings is described 
below. 
The primary issues to be addressed are: 
" The degree of reliance by industry on obsolete, irrelevant or incomplete 
reliability data when building their safety cases for certification 
26 
AIRCRAFT SYSTEM SAFETY ASSESSMENT 
-A NEW APPROACH 
" 
The unsatisfactory level of feedback from actual in-service equipment 
performance in order to validate the safety level assumptions made at 
the design stage 
As a result of this research, recommendations in a number of key areas for 
possible action by industry will be made, such as: 
"A mandatory safety analysis process 
" New industry-wide equipment and component reliability databases 
" 
Global aircraft and system event data capture and analysis systems, 
communicated and made available to the widest possible audience in all 
sectors of the aviation industry 
This thesis addresses all of these issues and, in addition, identifies two further 
areas of required action: 
" 
Increased training of safety practitioners 
" 
Management-level education of the need for and cost-effectiveness of 
meaningful and on-going safety analysis. 
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1.7 STRUCTURE OF THESIS 
Chapter 1 
Problem j-ý Introduction 
Aircraft system &e mrt 
Accident statistics 
Hornen v system f es 
reliability in service does not 
s yst Why worry about ems? 
always meet design expectations trade-offs s 
-the analysis system appears areas Research a and methods to be flawed 
Data & what to do with it 
Value of guidance material 
Need for data recording 1 
Current systems & drawbacks 
Human factors 
Legislation 
.5 
Safety 
Proposed solution 
System architecture 
Event types & data 
Action requirements 
Ownership 
Regulatory issues 
cost / benefit analysis 
Trial programme 
2 
Of 
Understanding reliability 
Industry efforts 
FAR/JAR25 
Standardisation attempts 
Recommended practices 
Legislation 
Chapter 3 
Safety Analysis Today & 
How It Is Going Wrong 
: 
Current initiatives Manufacturers' problems 
Basic SSA cycle Regulators' view 
Current process & tools Accidents & incidents 
Data sources Can studies & analysis 
The need for change Lack of the right legislation 
Chapter 6 
Z'ummary & Solution 
Conclusions 
Where the industry should go SSCM supported by Why SSCM will help dosed further work Feedback & education 
Proposals for Arture work 
Figure 3- Thesis Structure 
The overall structure and sequence of the thesis is illustrated in figure 2 above, 
while the content of each chapter is as follows. 
Chapter 2- The Origins Of System Safety Analysis, explains how today's 
safety analysis process has evolved and how current legislation has been 
formulated. It also makes it clear that equipment and component reliability is at 
the heart of all the regulatory requirements and the design team analysis in 
order to demonstrate the necessary safety levels. It describes the formulation 
of recommended practices, indicating their shortfalls in terms of legislative 
requirements and the consequent freedom given to manufacturers with regard 
to how much or how little of the recommended analysis processes they use. 
Chapter 3- The Safety Analysis Process And How It Is Going Wrong, 
describes the key tools used by system design analysis teams. It will 
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demonstrate how complex the process is, and reinforce the view that much of it 
remains open to interpretation, due to such issues as a lack of the resources 
required to do the analysis and the absence of supporting legislation. The 
unsatisfactory nature of much of the basic reliability data, which tends not to be 
supported by in-service feedback, which is a fundamental issue throughout this 
thesis, is also highlighted. Finally, the chapter analyses a range of both design 
analysis and aircraft accident case studies to illustrate the problems being 
encountered and which provide substantial support for the SSCM proposal. 
Chapter 4- Data Gathering Systems, examines the use of commercially 
available data gathering systems to collect and analyse commercial aircraft in- 
service event data, and comments on the usefulness of the data captured and 
the effectiveness of the analysis. Regulatory guidance material is considered, 
and is coupled with the standard processes for formulating aircraft maintenance 
programmes and the associated reliability monitoring requirement. Wider 
issues discussed include Flight Data Monitoring (FDM), Mandatory Occurrence 
Reporting (MOR), maintenance error reporting, human factors issues, and the 
effectiveness of various industry responses. The chapter concludes with a 
detailed look at the key areas of system safety that need to be addressed, 
concentrating on clear demonstration of the need for far more accurate and 
meaningful event data capture and feedback than is currently available. 
Chapter 5- The System Safety Compliance Model (SSCM), introduces the 
central innovation in the thesis, an incident and event data capture and 
analysis tool that will provide near real-time assessment of aircraft system 
reliability and safety performance against certification requirements. The 
rationale behind the inclusion of additional key data including operating 
environment considerations is explained. Other main issues discussed include; 
interfaces with existing systems, the necessary regulatory input, database 
ownership and implementation, and a cost benefit analysis. 
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Chapter 6- Summary and Conclusions, includes a final overview of the key 
issues and recommendations, including conjecture on the likely overall benefits 
of SSCM implementation. It also highlights some areas for proposed future 
work. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
- 
ORIGINS OF SYSTEM SAFETY ANALYSIS 
2.0 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter explains how todays safety analysis process has evolved and how 
current legislation has been formulated. It also makes it clear that equipment 
and component reliability is at the heart of all the regulatory requirements and 
the design team analysis in order to demonstrate the necessary safety levels. It 
describes the formulation of recommended practices, indicating their shortfalls 
in terms of legislative requirements and the consequent freedom given to 
manufacturers with regard to how much or how little of the recommended 
analysis processes they use. 
2.1 UNDERSTANDING RELIABILITY 
"Reliability for any organisation is not a destination 
- 
it is a journey. " [8] 
In essence, the safety analysis process we have today has evolved in an 
incremental way over several decades, and therefore it is not easy to put an 
accurate starting point on it. A clearly significant step was the introduction of 
the US Military-Standard 882 System Safety Programme Requirements, first 
issued in 1969, and still in common use to this day. Given that aircraft system 
safety levels must be demonstrated analytically, this approach requires 
quantification of failure probabilities against the severity of the outcome of that 
failure. Failure effects on the aircraft are categorised as follows: 
" 
Catastrophic 
- 
may cause death or loss of the aircraft 
" 
Hazardous 
- 
may cause severe injury, major property damage, or major 
system damage resulting in mission loss 
" Major 
- 
may cause minor injury, minor property damage, or minor 
system damage resulting in delay or loss of availability or mission 
degradation 
" 
Minor 
- 
not serious enough to cause injury or damage, but results in 
unscheduled maintenance or repair (in addition to delays and frustration 
for the passengers) 
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It is generally accepted that the foundation upon which safety performance of 
any system is built is the component and equipment reliability. Reliability 
analysis is thus the science of predicting, estimating, or optimising the life 
distribution of components of systems (91" However, a number of definitions of 
reliability have been proposed, such as: 
. 
"The ability of an item to perform a required function fora stated period of 
time. "1101 
" "The duration of failure free performance understated conditions. "t"1 
" 
"The allowable number of faults in a given time. " 1121 
" "The inherent characteristic of an item related to its ability to maintain 
functionability when used as specified. " 1131 
" 
it is reliable when the number of breaks during a specified time is at an 
acceptable level, or if it does not break fora specked period of time. " [141 
Although it is generally accepted today that reliability must be defined in a way 
that includes statements about acceptable performance under a given set of 
conditions over a set period of time, the fact that so many definition variations 
exist simply demonstrates the lack of rigour which can lead to confusion. Out of 
the various definitions, it can be argued that the following one is more precise 
and complete, since it clearly states both the need for adequate performance 
and conditions of use over time: 
"The probability of a product (or system) performing its purpose satisfactorily for 
a specified period of time given specified operating conditions. " 
In his conference paper The Evolution of Reliability, ('q Paul Barringer goes on 
from this point to list a number of key sub-principles involved in this definition: 
" 
Probability (chances) for survival 
" 
Components, systems, and processes 
" Functioning without failure 
" Functioning for a given time period 
" 
Duty cycles under the concept of prescribed duty 
" 
Correct operation is a key element for survival 
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" 
Design for use in the correct environment 
"Designing reliability into the component, system or process is the best practice. 
Designing for reliability means you must be able to specify the details. If you do 
not know what you want, how will you ever know if you get it? If you cannot 
specify what you want, you will be stuck in a take what you get environment and 
that usually involves high cost and much suffering. " 1161 
However, a note of caution must be sounded here since there has been and still 
exists a tendency to think that reliability numbers alone are the answer to 
understanding system safety performance. As Geoffrey McIntyre says in his 
book Patterns In Safety Thinking 1171 : 
"Like any estimate, a reliability number has both an expected value (mean) and 
an estimated variance. The variance is often ill defined and hard to estimate. 
When it is left unstated, it is tempting to read the offered reliability figure (e. g., r 
= 
. 
999) as a firm promise rather than the midpoint of a range. 
Objective data of past system performance reveal ample evidence of systems 
whose promised level of reliability greatly overestimated the actual reliabilities. 
Experience also reveals that it is next to impossible to forecast all inevitable 
circumstances that may lead to a well-designed system to "fail", even given the 
near boundless creativity of the system engineer. " 
2.2 THE START OF SAFETY ANALYSIS 
It should be made clear at this point, that there seems to be no single 
breakthrough study of safety analytical processes that can be considered as the 
benchmark for today's investigation. Whilst many people, such as Harold Urey 
in his 1934 study of the efficiency of gaseous diffusion cascades 1181, and later A 
DS Carter at Shrivenham College laid the foundations for understanding the 
fundamentals of reliability, the same cannot be said for the probabilistic 
approach to system safety analysis. Many experts have spoken in general 
terms in this area, such as Charles Latino, President of Reliability Center Inc., 
(A who was involved in early attempts to rationalise maintenance periods for 
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manufacturing machinery based on vibration readings taken over time. As a 
result of this work, they were able to predict component failures and take 
equipment off-line in time to prevent more catastrophic machine failures. "The 
benefit was measured in millions of 1970 dollars. * Pol Nevertheless, the key 
point is that the safety analysis process we use today has evolved gradually in 
an uncoordinated fashion. 
The starting point for today's processes for the reliability and safety analysis of 
aircraft systems was the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA) Apollo moon-landing programme of the 1960s. Having been committed 
by President Kennedy to a very tight time schedule to achieve a manned 
landing on the moon "by the end of the decade", NASA quickly recognised that 
achievement of this ambitious goal would demand a very significant speeding 
up of the design, build and test effort across the board. Added to this was the 
fact that the entire Apollo project, including the Saturn V launch vehicle, and the 
lunar modules, were highly complex systems that were pushing the limits of 
engineering expertise and know-how; all were brought together in a very high- 
profile operation. At the time it was quickly recognised that some new method 
of confirming design safety levels had to be found, and thus the notion of 
assessing design failure probabilities against acceptable risk levels was 
initiated. The subsequent evolution of the process is discussed in Chapter 3. 
However, some specific programmes and events stand out as key milestones, 
and it may be useful to mention some of them at this stage 
2.3 A TEST CASE: THE CONCORDE EXPERIENCE 
Safety analysis as applied to commercial aircraft systems, as practised today, 
has its roots in the Anglo-French Concorde supersonic transport programme 
that started in the 1960s 121). It was recognised by the joint manufacturers (the 
British Aircraft Corporation (BAC), now BAE Systems, and the French 
Aerospatiale) quite early on in the programme that, due to the advanced nature 
of the aircraft, far more detailed analytical work needed to be performed than 
hitherto in order to provide confidence to the overall safety levels of the design. 
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To help understand and develop the process, the Concorde team drew quite 
extensively on the experience and methodologies employed by NASA in the 
United States for various aspects of the space programme. However, the 
NASA activity was focused on identifying failure modes and effects, and did not 
extend beyond the basic understanding of failure mechanisms by taking the 
next step of trying to quantify failure probabilities. As a consequence, 
discussions were held with the Air Registration Board (later became the Civil 
Aviation Authority, hereafter referred to as CAA) in the United Kingdom to 
formulate the specific requirements for the analysis of the Concorde aircraft. 
As an example of how these requirements were formulated in these early days, 
it is worth taking a look at the origin of the 1x 10"9 probability requirement for 
the occurrence of a failure with a catastrophic consequence, which is a 
standard specification in Functional Hazard Assessment requirements for 
equipment certification. In the late 1950s, the aircraft industry in the United 
Kingdom was leading the field in the development of automatic landing systems 
(more widely referred to simply as autoland). The companies involved sought 
assistance from the CAA in the form of reliability requirements for the 
development of such systems. Over the years the CAA had accumulated a 
great deal of statistical data on the causes of landing accidents, and was keen 
to support this initiative by setting appropriate performance objectives in the 
form of one of the very first probability requirements. 
The CAA data1 revealed that the contemporary accident rate due to all 
causes was approximately 1x 10-6, i. e. one accident in every one million flying 
hours. Since contributory causes due to a system failure stood at Ix 10'7, the 
target for new systems was set at a failure rate of less than 1x 10'7. In the 
case of Concorde, it was assumed during the early design stages that there 
were likely to be a total of approximately 100 system failure conditions across 
the aircraft that were potentially catastrophic. It was therefore taken as a design 
aim that the aircraft should be capable of achieving a 102 improvement in safety 
levels, so that each catastrophic failure condition has a probability of occurrence 
of better than 1x 10'9. 
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BAC formed a Reliability, Safety and Maintainability Group, which in many ways 
pioneered the basic analysis that is commonplace today. One of the early 
lessons they learned was to beware of the risk of becoming what was known as 
"probability happy': This meant that initially the team was perhaps excessively 
focused on "the numbers game", that is to say on the use of failure probabilities 
in system reliability studies almost to the exclusion of engineering judgement. 
The danger in this was the possibility that number manipulation to achieve 
overall reliability requirements targets could be masking more fundamental 
questions on systems performance and interaction. 
According to an aeronautical engineer and former NTSB investigator 1231: 'The 
industry needs to be constantly reminded of the past so that they can be ever 
vigilant in the future. Believe me, as one who makes his living in the 
environment, I'm acutely aware that neat little 10-° probabilities are not worth 
(much) if you are on the airplane when the numbers don't workout " 
Interestingly, Concorde Type Certificate Data Sheet No. A45EU, issued by the 
Department of Transportation at the Federal Aviation Administration, (hereafter 
referred to as FAA) in January 1979 in the Service Information section, partly 
addresses the not previously defined issue of safety performance in service: 
"Any modification to a system or component that is the subject of special 
maintenance requirements must be evaluated with respect to reliability in a 
manner consistent with the Concorde's certification safety analyses, and the 
airplane's maintenance program must be amended as necessary to ensure the 
declared level of reliability in service for the modified system or component. " 
This proves that, even then, there was some recognition of the need to re-visit 
the original system safety analysis in the light of service experience, although it 
only refers to modification action rather than the more general monitoring of 
day-to-day equipment reliability, which, as we shall see later, is crucial to safety 
success. 
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2.4 INDUSTRY SPREADS THE WORD 
The experience of the Concorde team was fortunately not lost on other major 
players in the commercial aircraft business. For example, the Boeing 747 and 
Douglas DC-10 airliner programmes started to follow similar methods of system 
analysis, as did the Airbus Industries consortium from the early days of their 
initial programme, the A300. Furthermore, this increasing focus on trying to 
establish some basic standardised system also came to the attention of the 
Fokker company in the Netherlands, who sought help in this direction as they 
entered the twin jet airliner market with the F. 28 Fellowship, which later 
evolved, into the Fokker 70 and Fokker 100 aircraft series. 
2,5 THE EVOLUTION OF FAR I JAR 25 
As these moves were developing, in Europe the JAA was establishing a Joint 
Airworthiness Requirement (JAR) Study Group to review the existing basic 
regulatory requirement document overlooking this area. First issued in 1974 by 
the FAA in the United States in the form of a Federal Airworthiness 
Requirement (FAR), it was entitled: FAR 25 
- 
Airworthiness standards for the 
certification of multi engine turbine-powered aeroplanes with a maximum take- 
off weight greater than 5,700 kg (the standard certification categorisation for 
large commercial aircraft). 
Specifically, the JAR Study Group was tasked with reviewing in detail FAR 25 
to assist in'the formulation and publication of the parallel European JAR 25 
requirement. Active members of the study group included representatives from 
the national airworthiness and certification authorities of the United Kingdom, 
France, West Germany (as it then was) and the Netherlands, and it was agreed 
that there should be a system allowing some degree of national variance. 
Of particular relevance to system safety, a technical sub-group of the CAA's 
Design and Construction Group was formed specifically to review the content of 
FAR 25 (section 25.1309), which was'concemed with system reliability, and the 
effects of failure on aircraft safety. To illustrate the result of this activity, the 
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key parts of section 25.1309 in both FAR 25 and JAR 25 are summarised in 
table 1 below. 
Section Description 
25.1309. (a) The equipment, systems, and installations whose functioning is 
required by the JAR and national operating regulations must be 
designed to ensure that they perform their intended functions 
under any foreseeable operating conditions. However, 
systems used for non-essential services need only comply so 
far as is necessary to ensure that the installations are neither a 
source of danger in themselves nor liable to prejudice the 
proper functioning of any essential service 
25.1309. (b) The aeroplane systems and associated components, 
considered separately and in relation to other systems, must be 
designed so that 
- 
25.1309. (b)(1) The occurrence of any failure condition which would prevent 
the continued safe flight and landing of the aircraft is extremely 
improbable, and 
25.1309. (b)(2) The occurrence of any other failure condition which would 
reduce the capability of the aircraft or the ability of the crew to 
cope with adverse operating conditions is improbable 
25.1309. (c) Warning information must be provided to alert the crew to 
unsafe system operating condition, and to enable them to take 
appropriate corrective action. Systems, controls, and 
associated monitoring and warning means must be designed to 
minimise crew errors which would create additional hazards 
Table 1- Key Sections Of FAR I JAR 25 
What this work essentially set in place, was the recognition that systems could 
only be certified on the basis of probability, using in-service data. Although 
numerical probability requirements were not specified in FAR / JAR 25, they 
were listed in Advisory Circular Joint (ACJ) publications as a means of defining 
to industry the levels of reliability expected against different hazard categories 
to permit certification of the system. 
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At this stage the FAA also accepted the need for probability numbers to be 
specified, while the CAA wanted to go a stage further and introduce a code of 
practice for the aerospace industry on both sides of the Atlantic. Accordingly, a 
new study group, chaired by the JAA, was established to explore this possibility, 
with the intent being to issue an Advisory Circular Joint (ACJ) that would go 
beyond the overall scope of FAR / JAR 25.1309. Regrettably, the industrial 
representatives in the group could not agree to a single regulated code of 
practice, officially citing the desire for some flexibility in their analysis 
methodologies as their reason for rejection. Unofficially, there was a strong 
feeling from some parts of the industry that they did not like the initiative, seeing 
it as an attempt to dictate to them how to do their job. Furthermore, it was felt 
that difficulties with the FAA system, whereby it was a requirement to discuss all 
such issues in public meetings, would only serve to drag out the process with a 
danger of a resultant loss of focus. Despite this, the regulatory agencies have 
done some work to improve their guidance material. A harmonised version of 
FAR 25.1309 was submitted to the FAA for review in 2001, with the intent of 
harmonising the FAR and JAR versions, which as has been shown, differ in 
some respects. Since that time, however, the new European Air Safety 
Agency (EASA) has started to take over the formulation of air safety 
requirements from the JAA, and by early 2005 was in the early stages of 
producing an Implementing Rule (IR) 25, which will eventually replace JAR 25. 
Regrettably, the indications are that it may not be fully aligned with the FAA 25 
requirements, which is considered to be a retrograde step. 
2.6 ESTABLISHING A RECOMMENDED PRACTICE 
Having thus failed in the attempt to gain industrial acceptance of a standard 
procedure, it was suggested that the only way ahead was to try for a 
recommended code of practice, which might be more palatable since it would 
not be enforceable. The intent was quite clear, to produce a set of guidelines 
and methods for performing safety assessment to show compliance with 
FAR/JAR 25.1309. An example, looking at the specific detail of the 
requirement for an electrical system, is shown at Appendix A. 
39 
AIRCRAFT SYSTEM SAFETY ASSESSMENT 
-A NEW APPROACH 
There is evidence that much of this requirement was not and still is not 
performed to a satisfactory standard, if at all, but the fact that the methodology 
for analysing systems was not mandated, meant that there was no incentive for 
some manufacturers to pay full attention to what they were being asked to do. 
In particular, sub-paragraphs d(1) and d(2) (part) relating to damage from 
external sources and undetected failures, are frequently ignored during the 
course of a system safety analysis, often because they are considered to be 
either too difficult, too time consuming, or both. 
2.7 AEROSPACE RECOMMENDED PRACTICES 
In the early 1990s the CAA approached the Society of Automotive Engineers 
(SAE), a body highly respected for its technical expertise and frequently 
actioned by the FAA to produce recommended practice and Technical Service 
Orders (TSO). Therefore, a group known as the S-18 Committee was 
established to formulate the new documents. This committee included 
representatives from: 
" 
Aerospatiale 
" Allied Signal 
" Allison Engines 
" Boeing Commercial Aircraft Group 
" British Aerospace 
" 
Civil Aviation Authority 
" Daimler Benz Aerospace 
" 
Federal Aviation Administration 
" 
Honeywell 
" 
Rockwell Collins 
" 
Rolls-Royce 
" 
SAE 
As a result of the establishment of the committee, two Aerospace 
Recommended Practices (ARP) were issued by the SAE in 1996: 
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ARP4754 
- 
Certification Considerations for Highly-Integrated or Complex 
Aircraft Systems 
ARP4761 
- 
Guidelines and Methods for Conducting the Safety Assessment 
Process on Civil Airborne Systems and Equipment 
At the time of issue, these ARPs superseded two earlier practices, ARP1834 
and ARP926A which contained information about fault and failure analysis. 
The new ARPs were intended for periodic updates in light of feedback from 
industry and technological changes, with the first such update of ARP4761 
expected to be issued in 2008. 
The processes for assessing safety standards of software are contained within 
standard D0178B (a new version DOI78C was in preparation in 2006, but it still 
will not identify any methods available to assign quantification values to 
software failures or errors). 
In December 2003, the SAE issued a new standard, ARP 5150 Safety 
Assessment of Transport Airplanes in Commercial Service, which addresses 
the safety assessment of aircraft after delivery and throughout their operational 
life. It is associated with showing compliance with the regulations, and also with 
assuring a company that it meets its own internal standards. 
John C Dalton 1241 of Boeing, who also chairs the relevant SAE committee that 
formulates these standards, has said: 
You are correct in stating that the present standards are not as good as they 
should be. Safety is never as good as it should be. That is why we must 
constantly struggle to advance the art and science of safety assessment. 
However, ARP4761 remains the standard for new airplane safety assessment 
against which all others are measured at this point. " 
2.8 THE AIRCRAFT CERTIFICATION AUTHORITIES 
The airworthiness certification authorities, as expected, demand the highest 
possible levels of aircraft and system safety commensurate with achievable 
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design and manufacture. This is done by specifying the maximum acceptable 
rates of equipment failure dependent on the severity of the outcome of that 
failure. In the case of a failure with the potential for a catastrophic effect, i. e. the 
loss of the aircraft and/or death or serious injury to its occupants, the 
requirement is that the probability of occurrence is better than Ix 10"e failures 
per million flying hours. Less serious failure effects will have lesser 
requirements, stepping down to Ix 10'3 for minor events that have no 
operational effect on the aircraft and usually result in an unscheduled 
maintenance activity at the next convenient time on the ground. In military 
programmes, it used to be traditional to just specify the Mean Time Between 
Failure (MTBF), or the equipment removal rate per 1,000 flying hours, but the 
defence ministries are also becoming smarter customers and are tending to fall 
into line with civil requirements, especially so as more military aircraft are now 
derivatives of existing civil designs. 
FHA SYSTEM FAA/JAR CALCULATED COMPLIANCE 
NO FAILURE REQUIRED PROBABILITY WITH FAA/JAR 
PROBABILITY PER FLT HR REQUIREMENT 
PER FLT HR 
I Loss of AC bus 1 I E-3 2.75E-4 (ACPC) Yes 
(in ACPC or 2.76E-4 (CCBP) 
CCBP) 
8 Loss of AC bus 4 I E-5 2.28E-7 Yes 
and AC bus 1 (in 
ACPC) 
46 Lossof2 IE-7 4.72E-9 Yes 
Electrical 
Management 
System Control & 
Display Units 
(EMS CDU). 
47 Loss of all 4 DC IE-9 5.34E-11 Yes 
busses (including 
loss of both 
batteries). 
Table 2- Typical Functional Hazard Analysis Table (Goodrich aerospace) 
lt is worth noting that in its response to the UK Department for the Environment, 
Transport and the Regions (DETR) Consultative Document on the Future of 
Aviation, the Royal Aeronautical Society (RAeS) 1251 has called for "International 
regulation for the safe design and operation of aircraft'. 
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2.9 THE AIRCRAFT AND EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURERS AND THEIR 
CUSTOMERS 
Overall, the aircraft manufacturer's view is that they expect these safety levels 
from their equipment suppliers at both minimum cost and maximum reliability. 
Although the trend today is for aircraft manufacturers to increasingly bring 
equipment suppliers onto their programmes as risk-sharing partners, 
nevertheless many suppliers retain a natural interest in maximising their profit 
margins and, in many cases, protecting their "after-market" spares sales and 
support businesses by not designing equipment that is so reliable that, once in 
service, returns for repair or overhaul are rare. In other words whilst meeting 
the safety requirements, they will be looking to strike a balance of what is 
achievable given the other constraints of development cost, selling price, time to 
market, manufacturability, repairability and other similar factors. 
The aircraft operators want a low purchase price with minimal maintenance 
activity and thus the lowest possible operating costs. Reliability must be high, 
and demonstrably so, failure diagnosis simple, removal and replacement time 
minimal, repair costs and turn-round time low. The reliability and safety 
performance must extend throughout the long life of the aircraft, for example 
values well in excess of 100,000 hours airframe life, or 25 plus years in revenue 
service are not uncommon. 
2.10 LEGISLATION 
The lack of regulatory guidance regarding the detailed system safety analysis 
methodology is a very significant problem. The existing legislation framed by 
the airworthiness authorities to ensure that aircraft systems are fit for purpose 
and safe, is inadequate. This is primarily because it does not specify in 
sufficient detail, the optimum processes to be adopted for achieving design 
safety confidence, but tends to simply require unspecified "analysis. " Whilst 
the specific requirements for system performance, failure effect severity and 
failure probability are well defined, the required methodology is thus 
insufficiently defined and policed to ensure adequate adherence. Even the 
newly established EASA appears thus far to have failed to grasp this issue. 
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The anticipated issue in 2006 of a new IR 21, to replace the existing JAR 21 
Design Standards requirement, appears in its draft form to be relaxing the 
requirements by making them more generic; this is potentially a major lost 
opportunity. 
The FAA states in Advisory Circular 23.1309-1C Equipment, Systems and 
Installations in Part 23 Aircraft, that: 
"This advisory circular provides guidance and information for an acceptable 
means, but not the only means, for showing compliance with the requirements 
of 23.1309. This material is neither mandatory nor regulatory in nature and 
does not constitute a regulation. " Perhaps it should? In chapter 3 the various 
conflicting views that lead to the posing of this question are discussed. 
The authorities response to questions in this regard, is to highlight the need for 
adequate training of system analysts. However, this may not be true, since 
most of the safety analysts working in the industry today are highly skilled 
professional engineers who are generally familiar with the various guidance 
documents and standards. However, issues such as commercial pressures 
and lack of resources, continue to harass the safety analyst and all too often 
result in the line of least resistance being taken. Experience within the aircraft 
system industry over many years has resulted in the following observations: 
> Analysis started too late to adequately impact on design 
> Analysis results "tailored" to fit the expectations or design requirements 
> Incomplete analysis 
-the minimum to satisfy the requirement 
> Suspect data which may not be supportable 
- 
e. g. failure rates 
> Limited objectivity in the analysis 
- 
the designer does it himself 
The result of this may be that a potentially unsafe system enters service. 
2.11 THE APPROACH TO SAFETY ANALYSIS 
On the basis of the above it seems that the approach to design essentially 
becomes a risk assessment, trading off reliability and safety requirements 
44 
AIRCRAFT SYSTEM SAFETY ASSESSMENT 
-A NEW APPROACH 
against cost of manufacture, time to market and the need to protect future 
business such as spares sales. However, the present system followed in both 
the UK and overseas is too open to misinterpretation, primarily because the 
aircraft manufacturers themselves are often unclear and not very specific in 
their programme requirements to suppliers, leaving the door open to the 
analysis that best suits the need of the supplier, rather than that which best 
suits the needs of the certification authorities. Indeed, recent moves by the US 
Department of Defense to delete much analysis as a new programme 
deliverable, relying instead on the view that the manufacturer is expected to do 
it anyway, only compounds the problem. 
The system further suffers from a lack of direction, in that the few existing 
guidance standards and documents are either becoming out of date or have no 
weight because they are not mandatory. Surprisingly, despite some 
discussions in the 1990s between regulators and industry to try and agree 
formalisation in this arena, it now seems to be the view of the certification 
authorities that mandating safety analysis procedures is unnecessary because 
there are training courses available in the tools and techniques most commonly 
used 1261. This misses the fundamental point that, while possessing the ability 
to perform the work correctly is obviously vital, without the support of procedural 
requirements the use of the hard-won skill of performing robust safety analysis 
will remain at best variable and at worst completely absent. 
To illustrate these points, there are what the author considers to be the three 
main barriers to system safety analysis; internal company pressures to trade-off 
robust safety analysis, poorly understood or applied analytical methods, and 
unsatisfactory regulations. These can be referred to as The Three Layers of 
Conflict, as shown in figure 3 below, which are preventing industry from 
reaching the desired levels of meaningful analysis. 
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Figure 4- "The Three Layers of Conflict" 
2.12 DEPTH OF ANALYSIS 
It is apparent that in some sections of the aerospace industry, there is a lack of 
appreciation of both the value of the system analysis process, the point in the 
equipment life-cycle at which it should be started and the depth to which it 
should be taken for failure mechanisms to be properly understood. Too often it 
is the case that failures are analysed by the manufacturer as single events and 
effects with little consideration for either previous events, or what subsequent 
chain of events may occur. The more detailed investigation tends to be 
reactive to events, such as the excellent work done by the Air Accident 
Investigation Branch (AAIB) on the A340 incident described in Chapter 3. 
This raises the issue of how well zonal, cross-system or whole aircraft analysis 
is performed (see section 3.22 onwards). Recent initiatives to establish 
extensive combined designer/customer teams during new aircraft development 
(as, for example, with the Boeing 777 and 787), plus the continued 
enhancement of computer-aided design and computer simulation of aircraft 
systems and interfaces, are all useful aids to design refinement. Nevertheless, 
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while it can be argued that, for instance, the circumstances surrounding the 
unexpectedly high number of similar MD-11 landing accidents (see section 
3.29.4) were so extreme that no amount of analysis could have accurately 
predicted the actual failure progression, there is no excuse for the fact that the 
analysis of the interaction of different systems has not always been as thorough 
as it should be. 
It can be argued that the two major airworthiness authorities, FAA and JAA, 
must shoulder some responsibility for this, as during the course of this research 
programme it has been stated on several occasions that there is a distinct lack 
of regulatory guidance from them. The authorities have tended to rely almost 
exclusively on the sense of regulation FAR / JAR 25.1309 (see section 2.5), 
without providing details of the processes they expect the industry to use, thus 
leaving the door open to misinterpretation, lack of understanding, or too much 
room for flexibility and short-circuiting of analytical processes as a replacement 
for industry experience. 
2.13 OTHER SAFETY PROCESS STUDIES 
The regulatory body taking a detailed look at the whole question of safety in 
aircraft certification is the FAA. The Associate Administrator for Regulation and 
Certification has conducted a lengthy study of the commercial aircraft 
certification process, the results of which were published late in 2002 under the 
title Commercial Aircraft Certification Process Study: An Evaluation of Selected 
Aircraft Certification, Operations and Maintenance Processes. In brief, this 
document examines: 
" Safety assurance processes 
" 
Safety data management 
" 
Maintenance, operations and certification interfaces 
" 
Safety oversight processes 
The findings of the study are discussed in Chapter 3. 
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2.14 SUMMARY 
The system safety analysis process has evolved in an incremental way over a 
considerable number of years. Although some sound efforts have certainly 
been made to steer the process in a systematic and robust manner, especially 
through the efforts of the SAE, the continuing lack of focus in this area by the 
certifying authorities leaves the system exposed. It is time the disparate 
threads were pulled together into a far more cohesive approach, truly reflecting 
the capabilities and fallibilities of 21'd century aircraft systems. 
What is needed is a regulatory confirmation of an acceptable and robust 
analysis standard, such as ARP 4761, and for a standard such as this to be 
embedded in regulatory requirement. With the emergence of EASA, whose 
Implementing Rules are binding on all European Union member States, this 
provides an excellent opportunity to initiate this cohesion effort. 
In the chapters that follow, the reader will be taken through the various 
methodologies involved in what has become a highly complex analytical 
process. Due to this complexity and the various side issues involved, it is not 
possible to present all the material in a sequential way. However, it will all be 
brought together again to demonstrate both the linkages and the flaws in the 
current system, at the end of Chapter 4. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
- 
THE SAFETY ANALYSIS PROCESS AND 
HOW IT IS GOING WRONG 
3.0 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter describes the key tools used by system design analysis teams. It 
will demonstrate how complex the process is, and reinforce the view that much 
of it remains open to interpretation, due to such issues as a lack of the 
resources required to do the analysis and the absence of supporting legislation. 
The unsatisfactory nature of much of the basic reliability data, which tends not 
to be supported by in-service feedback, which is a fundamental issue 
throughout this thesis, is also highlighted. 
Finally, the chapter analyses a range of both design analysis and aircraft 
accident case studies to illustrate the problems being encountered and which 
provide substantial support for the SSCM proposal. 
3.1 SAFETY TRADE-OFFS 
With the global air transport industry going through a period of major expansion, 
it is inevitable that without change, the occurrence of both human and system- 
based safety related incidents will increase. Since the travelling public rightly 
expects the highest possible levels of aircraft safety, this is reflected in 
regulatory requirements placed on the industry by the airworthiness certification 
authorities around the world. 
The equipment design cycle is a balancing act, trading off the demands of 
safety against those of performance, cost, weight, manufacturability, 
supportability, time to market and so on. In addition, looking beyond fatal 
accidents to less serious events, unscheduled aircraft maintenance, much of 
which potentially, may result from unsatisfactory system and equipment 
reliability levels, imposes considerable extra cost and the potential for 
expensive delays. 
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Today, increasingly stringent equipment performance and reliability 
requirements are being specified to the aerospace industry by both certification 
authorities and operators. The demands of dispatch reliability and operations 
such as Extended Operations (ETOPS) and Long Range Operations (LROPS), 
place much emphasis on system configuration and design, resulting in 
extremely complex analyses of projected reliability and safety performance. 
The reality is that aircraft system and equipment reliability in service can fail to 
meet the design expectations, if not on entry into service, then perhaps later in 
life. This could result in the certification safety levels being compromised, quite 
possibly without anyone realising it until something serious goes wrong. 
3.2 ORIGINS OF FORMAL SAFETY ANALYSIS 
In essence, the safety analysis process we have today has evolved almost 
piecemeal over several decades and therefore putting an accurate starting point 
on it, or assigning credit for so doing, is not straightforward. However, some 
specific programmes and events stand out as key milestones, and these are 
identified and put into perspective in the overall context of the thesis. The basis 
of safety analysis lies in equipment reliability with account being taken of the 
consequences of failure on the continued safe conduct of the flight, as will be 
explained later, and the way in which an understanding of this has been 
promulgated is presented and discussed. 
The emergence of industry standards, both in terms of reliability and safety 
targets, and the necessary processes to demonstrate compliance will be 
described. The way in which the necessary supporting legislation has 
developed will also demonstrate some of the potential pitfalls in the process as 
it is carried out today. 
3.3 OVERVIEW OF THE CURRENT SYSTEM 
A discussion is included of how the current system of safety analysis is 
specified, including a detailed breakdown of how it is actually being put into 
practice (with examples), and consideration of the individual methodologies in 
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order to focus on any shortcomings and difficulties. The strong need to 
adequately address human factors issues, and the ways in which this is being 
attempted, are also looked at, as are the regulations covering safety analysis, 
both current and emerging. 
This chapter also indicates those areas where the safety analysis process could 
result in flawed system design. In the worst cases, this may lead to 
catastrophic events, but even at the other end of the scale, such design flaws 
can have, for example, a significant impact on maintenance cost. 
3.4 CURRENT INDUSTRY INITIATIVES 
Even with today's excellent airline industry safety record (as discussed in 
Chapter 1), the pressure is still on to reduce the accident rate still further. It 
was stated by the UK CAA in April 2005, that the world airline fleet is currently 
running at an accident rate of 1x 10$, which does not justify the perception that 
we are operating with a comfortable margin over the 10"9 requirement for 
certification of potentially catastrophic failure events. As we have already seen, 
given the predicted growth in air travel over the next 20 years, unless a 
significant accident rate reduction can be achieved, it 
, 
is statistically 
demonstrable (see Figure 1), that, despite some recent improvements, there 
could be major aircraft accidents occurring at a frequency which will put a 
significant strain on the industry's ability to survive in its current form. 
In early 1998 the JAA agreed to launch the Joint Safety Strategy Initiative 
(JSSI). The purpose of JSSI was to devise an agenda to achieve the JAA's 
stated aim for future flight safety, which is: 
"The JAA aims at continuous improvement of its effective safety system leading 
to further reductions of the annual number of accidents and the annual number 
of fatalities irrespective of the growth of air traffic" 
In order to try and maintain an accident rate of 1x 10$, or better still to improve 
it against a background of forecast annual traffic growth of 5.1% 1273, the main 
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focus of the JSSI approach is analysis of past accidents, which has led to the 
identification of an initial list of seven areas for attention; 
" 
Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT) 
- 
aircraft which have not suffered 
any kind of system failure, but which are for example, allowed to fly into 
high ground due to loss of situational awareness by the flight crew. Most 
frequently occurs during the approach and landing phase 
" 
Approach and landing 
- 
statistically the most dangerous sector of a 
commercial flight, when either through human error, system failure, or a 
combination of multiple factors, the aircraft is unsuccessfully brought 
through its final descent and subsequent landing 
" 
Loss of control 
- 
aircraft that have not suffered a system failure, but are 
allowed to enter irrecoverable flight situations, mainly but not exclusively, 
due to mishandling. This type of accident may also be caused by control 
due to an external cause, such as encountering wake turbulence from a 
preceding aircraft 
" 
Runway incursions 
- 
aircraft entering runways or taxiways in direct 
conflict with other traffic 
" 
Design related issues 
" 
Weather 
- 
the effect of poor or rapidly deteriorating weather on the ability 
of aircraft and their crews to continue with a safe conduct of the flight 
" 
Occupant safety and survivability 
What is meant by an aircraft accident? ICAO favours the following definition: 
'An occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft which takes place 
between the time when any person boards the aircraft with the intention of flight 
and such time as all persons have disembarked there from, in which: 
a) any person suffers death or serious injury while in or upon the aircraft or by 
direct contact with any part of the aircraft (including any part which has become 
detached from the aircraft) or by direct exposure to jet blast, except when the 
death or serious injury is from natural causes, is self-inflicted or is inflicted by 
other persons or when the death or serious injury is suffered by a stowaway 
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hiding outside the areas normally available in flight to the passengers and 
members of the crew of the aircraft, or 
b) the aircraft incurs damage or structural failure other than: 
(i) engine failure or damage when the damage is limited to the engine, its 
cowling or accessories 
(ii) damage limited to propellers, wing tips, antennae, tyres, brakes, fairings, 
small dents or punctured holes in the aircraft skin which adversely affects its 
structural strength, performance or flight characteristics and which would 
normally require major repair or replacement of the affected component, or 
c) the aircraft is missing or is completely inaccessible, or 
d) significant damage is caused to the property of the Company or any third 
party. Significant damage in this respect may be taken to mean any damage 
caused which maybe subject to an insurance claim. " 
In addition, we should not forget the less serious incidents, since they not only 
have significant impact on operating economics, but should also be a rich 
source of information for both operators and manufacturers. ICAO defines an 
incident as: 
"An occurrence other than an accident, associated with the operation of an 
aircraft, which affects or could affect the safety of operation. " 
3.6 A CLOSER FOCUS ON TECHNICAL FAILURES 
Many organisations are actively concentrating their efforts on those 75-80% of 
accidents for which, as has already been stated, the major causal factor was 
considered to be "human error". Another driver for this focus is coming from 
the industry regulators, including the FAA, which has stated 1281 that 
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"Since most aircraft accidents are caused by something other than equipment 
failures, increasing the reliability of the installed systems to try to improve safety 
will have little positive effect on reducing aircraft accidents when compared with 
reducing accidents due to pilot error" 
There is a need to investigate whether this is true, or whether the whole issue of 
aircraft system safety is in fact °an accident waiting to happen"? The industry 
has become lulled into a false sense of security with the perception that the 
analytical process must be working, since there has not been a significant 
number of accidents directly attributable to failures which had not been correctly 
predicted 
- 
either during the design stage or during in-service event monitoring. 
However, neither assumption is strictly true, as we shall see later. It can thus 
be argued that something should be done now to improve our system safety 
analysis processes, in order to minimise the potential for future catastrophic 
events. 
uln a risk mitigation strategy, low reliance on pilot mitigation requires high 
mitigation by system design; high reliance on pilot mitigation requires high 
mitigation by pilot training. The increasing rate of introduction of new 
technologies increases the likelihood of encountering unexpected situations. 
Threat and error management is critical. " 1293 
Ten years experience in the field of Integrated Logistic Support (ILS), including 
reliability, maintainability and safety analysis across a wide range of military and 
civil aircraft and equipment programmes, has led to the inescapable conclusion 
that there is an urgent need to rationalise the way these safety analysis 
procedures are carried out across the industry. A number of attempts have 
been made in recent years to look at common processes for small areas of ILS 
activity, since this is a key function addressing not just the ability to support 
systems, but "supportability" based on the establishment and justification of the 
required reliability and safety performance levels. However, such attempts 
have so far only highlighted the different approaches adopted by various 
aerospace companies. Furthermore, there has been no attempt to co-ordinate 
these initiatives and pull them together into an overall plan for future systems 
analyses. 
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"Very little standardisation currently exists between agencies or even between 
the directives, regulations, and standards that implement the (system safety) 
requirement. " 1301 
3.6 ENGINEERING RESOURCE ISSUES 
With the global air transport industry already going through a period of major 
expansion in the second half of the first decade of the 21st Century, it is 
inevitable that without change the occurrence of safety related incidents will 
increase. The industry continues to experience serious shortages of skilled 
aircraft maintenance engineers, which leads to increased pressure on those 
who are already in the profession. The situation may be eased somewhat 
through improvements in system safety performance from new technology, 
such as "glass cockpits", better on-board diagnostic/prognostic systems, and 
built-in-test capabilities, all of which, together with training, should aid the 
engineer to make better informed fault diagnosis and achieve faster and more 
effective repair of the faulted system or component. 
Working against this is the fact that, at present, maintenance is largely being 
carried out by those who have learned their skills on earlier generations of 
aircraft and have thus had to transfer their expertise to glass cockpit aircraft. 
What has yet to be discovered is what will happen once the maintenance 
organisations are manned by licensed engineers who have only had exposure 
to the modem aircraft. 
The travelling public rightly expects the highest possible levels of aircraft safety 
(albeit at a price), and this is reflected in regulatory requirements placed on the 
industry by the airworthiness certification authorities around the world. 
Accordingly, the equipment design cycle treads a difficult and complex path, 
trying to balance the demands of safety with those of performance, cost, weight, 
manufacturability and supportability. The engineering skills shortage felt by the 
aircraft operators is just as pronounced in the aircraft and equipment 
manufacturing industry, none more so than in the areas of design analysis. In 
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addition, looking beyond fatal accidents to less serious events, unscheduled 
aircraft maintenance, much of which potentially results from unsatisfactory 
system and equipment reliability levels, imposes considerable extra cost and 
unnecessary delays affecting both the company and the passengers. 
While there have been and continue to be, some serious attempts to educate 
engineers with, at least, an overview of the demands of safety analysis, once 
they have completed that education and returned to their workplace, it is all too 
often the case that the procedural support they need in order to be fully effective 
is simply non existent. 
The reality is that aircraft system and equipment reliability in service can fail to 
meet the design expectations if not on entry into service, then perhaps later in 
life; this could result in the certification safety levels being compromised, quite 
possibly without anyone realising it until something goes wrong. Indicators such 
as failure to meet dispatch requirements may be poor predictors of significant 
system loss in flight due perhaps to the previously unrecognised occurrence of 
a dormant failure. 
"Capital projects are justified by business units with too little budget for both 
time and money. The businesses expect that 'engineering will find a way... ' 
Engineers do wonders. Engineers do not perform miracles! Projects are 
justified on a weak foundation and implemented poorly for lack of funding 
- 
the 
homework is usually deficient. The SAE advocates more preliminary design 
effort to avoid poor implementation of plans that result in unreliable systems. 
Better homework results in projects that cannot survive the return on investment 
criteria. In the manufacturing world, the most important tool for reliability is the 
Pareto distribution based on money (not based on things). Manufacturing 
quickly teaches that money, time, and successes are key performance 
indicators. You cannot make on time and on quality deliveries from a low 
reliability system. " 1311 
This is a view expressed in a similar way by the National Aerospace Laboratory 
(NLR) in Holland 1321: 
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'For most stakeholders (apart from the international regulators) there is no fixed 
process for decisions on safety measures. Often the decision is made by one 
person or a board based mainly on 'gut feeling' with multiple input. Some 
stakeholders perform a separate safety assessment, but this is not common 
practice. " 
When in-service event data is collected, confidence levels and the effects of 
varying operational and environmental scenarios are not always considered or 
even understood. Thus the concept of in-house reliability databases based on 
empirical data remains in its infancy. A failure to notice problems, to listen to 
the equipment maintainers, to seek feedback from all the operators or to learn 
the lessons of history is commonplace. Associated with this is the fact that 
once a product enters the in-service Post Design Support (PDS) phase of its life 
cycle, the original design team disbands or moves onto the next project. Thus 
over a period of time the corporate knowledge of the product in terms of its 
design rationale gradually becomes lost. 
The industry as a whole needs to recognise the problem that in-service 
reliability and, hence, safety performance, is not being properly monitored. 
Aircraft manufacturers, equipment manufacturers and their suppliers, operators 
and repair organisations should all be prepared to share experiences with each 
other in the interests of safety. Many will claim that they do so already, but the 
fact is that take-up of such data sharing initiatives is at best patchy, as we will 
see later, and needs to be reinforced. 
3.7 THE BASIC SYSTEM SAFETY ANALYSIS (SSA) CYCLE 
The current system safety analysis process is already highly complex, with 
many different analytical tools combining to produce an overall safety case, by 
which the manufacturer can demonstrate to the regulatory authorities that his 
design satisfies their requirements. What is currently called for is a number of 
core activities including Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA), Fault Tree 
Analysis (FTA), Failure Mode and Effects Criticality Analysis (FMEA / FMECA), 
Common Cause Analysis (CCA), zonal analysis, Preliminary System Safety 
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Assessment (PSSA), maintenance task analysis, minimum equipment lists, 
safety case, etc. Manufacturers traditionally perform all, or most, of this activity 
in-house, most commonly by the system designers. Occasionally the work is 
contracted out to specialist reliability houses, far removed from the design and 
production effort. 
All this effort is directed towards the completion of a safety case, which is one of 
a suite of documents that the system and aircraft manufacturers must present to 
the certification authorities in order to gain approval. To give an indication of 
the complexity of the documentation demanded, the breakdown of a typical 
system reliability and safety report is as follows: 
SECTION 1- Introduction, system overview, system boundaries interfaces 
SECTION 2- System description, Line Replaceable Unit (LRU) description & 
function, system architecture, system logic and control, system redundancy, 
system interfaces, fault indication 
SECTION 3- Applicable regulations 
SECTION 4- Method of compliance 
SECTION 5- Summary and conclusions 
SECTION 6- Safety Analysis, including single significant failure events, multiple 
significant failure events, software certification considerations, EMI and lightning 
tests, design verification analysis and tests, failure rate justification (i. e. the 
sources used) 
SECTION 7- Periodic ground checks, dormant failures 
SECTION 8- Aircraft Flight Manual (AFM) Requirements 
SECTION 9- Master Minimum Equipment List (MMEL) 
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SECTION 10 
- 
Document references 
Extensive appendices contain all the analytical detail including Functional 
Hazard Assessment compliance tables, Failure Mode and Effects Analysis 
tables, Fault Tree Analysis and Functional Block Diagrams. Let us now look at 
some of the specific analyses in more detail. 
3.8 THE CURRENT ANALYSIS PROCESS 
It should be noted that in the Safety Requirements Compliance Cycle, there is 
an apparent disagreement between what is and is not acceptable, depending 
on whether or not the system being analysed is to be fitted to a single or multi- 
engine aircraft, with further complexity now coming in with the on-going debate 
over certification standards for twin and four engine airliners. 
The way in which a company should outline its design analysis programme is 
defined in Military Standard (Mil-Std) 882C System Safety Programme 
Requirements. That document defines the essential contents of a System 
Safety Programme Plan (SSPP): 
"lt shall describe in detail tasks and activities of system safety management and 
system safety engineering required to identify, evaluate, and eliminate/control 
hazards, or reduce the associated risk to an acceptable level throughout the 
system life cycle. " 
However, while requiring analytical techniques and formats to be specified by 
the manufacturer, Mil-Std-882C does not prescribe any preferred 
methodologies. 
3.9 FUNCTIONAL HAZARD ASSESSMENT (FHA) 
FHA is the first and potentially the most significant stage in the development of 
what is and what is not acceptable in terms of the reliability and safety 
performance of a new aircraft system. Once the initial system requirements and 
provisional architecture are known, it is the responsibility of the aircraft 
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manufacturer and the relevant certification authority to review all the predicted 
system failures and categorise the severity of their effects against the following 
standard definitions: 
eve y a egonsa on Probability ot occurrence 
a as op is <1x 10- 
11 Hazardous <1x 10-1 
III Major <1x 10 
Minor <1 X10 
Table 3- Failure Severity Categorisations 
Thus for each system failure, the manufacturer now has a "target" to reach in 
order to design and produce a system which will ultimately be certified. 
Already, the temptation to manipulate component reliability values to achieve 
the desired top-level probability is in place. 
3.10 FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS 
Central to this activity is the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), and 
Failure Mode Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA), well defined and long 
established "bottom up" processes for analysing the effects of component 
failures, and one that is generally performed following the recommendations laid 
out in US Military Handbook (MIL-HDBK) 1629A. It is absolutely critical to the 
success of the safety case presented for certification, that the FMEA has been 
performed thoroughly, preventing any unidentified failure modes appearing at a 
later date. 
One of the key features of FMEA is the identification of so-called dormant and 
latent failures. A dormant failure is one which has no safety effect on its own 
and, when it occurs, has no system effect and is undetectable by the flight-crew 
until a second linked failure occurs. An example might be a lightning-strike 
protection device such as an electrical contactor designed to open and break a 
circuit should a lightning strike occur, in order to protect the equipment in the 
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circuit from an excessive over-current. As the contactor is normally in the 
closed position to make the circuit, it is possible that over time the current flow 
may weld the contacts together, thus preventing the contactor from opening to 
perform its protection function should the aircraft suffer a lightning strike. This 
initial welding of the contacts thus becomes a dormant failure. 
Certification authorities are rightly concerned about the nature of dormant 
failures, and will require the manufacturer to take one of a number of possible 
mitigating actions: 
1. Demonstrate by analysis that the probability of the dormant failure 
occurring is so low that it could be considered dormant for the life of the 
aircraft 
- 
most unlikely. 
2. Demonstrate by analysis an acceptable time interval during which the 
failure can be considered to be unlikely to have occurred, at which point 
some corrective action is taken, such as scheduled maintenance or 
component replacement. 
3. Introduce a built-in test to ensure the failure has not occurred, either at 
first power-up or possible at intervals during flight. In this case, what was 
a dormant failure is now referred to as latent. 
To get the analysis right for cases 1 and 2, it is essential to correctly identify the 
second most probable or critical independent failure upon which the dormant 
failure can have an effect, given that it has occurred. An assessment is then 
made of the overall impact on both the system and the aircraft as a result of this 
combination of failures. 
Where the analysis shows that there is no effect on either, or that no second 
failure could be linked to the dormant failure, it is assumed to be dormant for the 
life of the aircraft. The total expected in-service life of an aircraft could be in 
the order of 4,000 flying hours a year over 25 years, which equates to 100,000 
hours or more, and it is clear that accurate reliability predictions are essential to 
give confidence over such a long period, (or even for establishing a lesser 
acceptable period between scheduled maintenance); yet this is one of the 
hardest things to predict, given the current state of reliability data systems. 
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Central to adequate and effective address of undesirable failure effects, is the 
FMECA carried out in the later stages of the analysis. As part of this effort, the 
predicted probability of a failure event occurring is typically compared with the 
consequences of its effect and presented in a matrix. The numbers contained 
within the matrix are unique failure mode identifiers drawn from the FMEA / 
FMECA analysis. The matrix is a very useful tool for prioritising where the 
corrective design effort should start, i. e. in the top right hand comer of the 
matrix, where failures are both most likely to occur and will have the most 
detrimental effect when they do happen. 
Subsequent design effort should then work its way diagonally down the matrix 
towards bottom left, until a point is reached at which the effort to correct the 
problem no longer justifies the level of risk it will remove. However, in systems 
which have already been shown to be compliant with safety requirements, there 
will be a strong temptation to view any further re-design effort as uneconomical. 
3.11 FAULT TREE ANALYSIS (FTA) 
The origins of FTA can be traced to a number of parallel efforts in the United 
States during the 1960s. In one case, as the Minuteman Intercontinental 
Ballistic Missile (ICBM) design matured, concerns centered on the highly 
undesirable possibility of an uncommanded launch, and it was recognised that 
no reliable model existed to satisfactorily and methodically predict the likelihood 
of such an event. At about the same time Charles Latino of the Reliability 
Center, was working for a company where they began to employ logic trees, 
which were used to understand the causes of catastrophic failures. Thus was 
born Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), which draws on data from FMEA. FTA is a 
deductive approach which involves graphical enumeration and analysis of the 
ways in which a system failure can occur and the probability of its occurrence. 
This "top down" technique is designed to ensure complete understanding of all 
the events that can lead to an undesirable system failure. Fault trees are the 
primary tool used to demonstrate compliance with FHA requirements to the 
certification authority, and are subject to close scrutiny. However, an 
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assumption is generally made that the analyst has got his raw data right, i. e. all 
the possible base events leading to systematic failure have been identified and 
included on the fault trees. The other problem here relates once again to the 
failure probability rates which, unless they appear to be outrageously optimistic, 
will rarely be challenged during the certification review. 
From a data analysts standpoint, the mathematical calculations undertaken in 
FTA are quite complex. The analysis must consider not only probability rates, 
but also what is known as "exposure time", i. e. the equipment operating time 
period being analysed usually being based on the average flight duration. For 
these reasons, it is universally acceptable (and understandable) for analysts to 
use various software packages to perform FTA rather than "hand cranking the 
numbers". The danger here is that in an environment where there are too few 
skilled analysts, such software is being used routinely by engineers of 
inadequate skill, training and experience, who may not recognise analysis 
anomalies should they occur. In this regard, it is worth pointing out that a few 
years ago a commonly used FTA software package was found to have a 
programming error, which was leading to incorrect top event probability 
calculations. 
Over reliance on the expediency of commercial software without possessing a 
basic understanding of the analysis methodology to enable sensible checking to 
be carried out, can be a serious issue. 
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Let us look at an example, by referring to a maritime aircraft electrical system 
issue (discussed in more detail in section 3.29.6). Using FTA, the original 
prediction for the loss of all four a. c. generators, considered to be a catastrophic 
event, and therefore having an FHA probability requirement of less than Ix 10- 
9), is shown in Figure 5 below. 
Requiremert Loss of all 4 AC 
1 e-009 Generators 
R- 1e-020 
1 -7 
Loss of AC Lose of AC Loss of AC Loss of AC 
Generator No. 1 IF Generator No. 2 Generator No. 3 Generator No. 4 
R= le-005 R= le-005 R= le-005 R= 1e-005 
Figure 5- FTA Analysis Of The Loss Of All Four Generators 
It can be seen therefore that, on this basis, the calculated probability (although 
for simplicity no account is taken here of the exposure time), was approximately 
Ix 10-20, which is well within the compliance requirements. 
Now let us look at the two engines, hence two generators, shutdown case. 
Assuming the remaining two on-line generators still have the same probability of 
failure as they did when all four engines were running, the fault tree now looks 
like the one in Figure 6. 
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Requirement Loss of AC 
1 e-009 Generators 2&3 
R= le-010 
Loss of AC Loss of AC 
Generator No. 2 Generator No. 3 
R=1 e-005 R=1 e-005 
Figure 6- FTA Analysis Of The Loss Of Two Remaining Generators 
This shows that the probability of total generating power loss is still compliant 
with the FHA requirements at 1x 10.10. Now we look again at the same two 
engines/generators shutdown case, but this time using the alternative two 
generators, which it should be noticed, have a much higher probability of failure 
when they are the only two still on-line. 
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Requirement Loss of AC 
le-009 Generators 2&3 
AleR08 
Loss of AC Loss of AC 
Generator No. 2 Generator No. 3 
R= 1e-004 R= le-004 
Figure 7- FTA Analysis Of The Loss Of Two Remaining (Alternative) 
Generators 
In this case, it is evident that the system is no longer compliant with the FHA 
requirements, since the probability of total system loss is in fact Ix 10$, i. e. 
above the 10'9 limit for a catastrophic failure. Challenging the generator 
manufacturer's original reliability assumptions along these lines has forced a 
fundamental re-think of strategy, but ultimately, the design process was too far 
advanced to enable any significant changes to be made. 
3.12 ZONAL ANALYSIS 
Once all the equipment suppliers have delivered their individual safety cases to 
the aircraft manufacturer, the latter must conduct a series of analyses of 
potential system interactions within different sections of the aircraft. This zonal 
analysis, where major sections of the aircraft are defined to enable assessment 
of co-located systems, is intended to identify any potential interaction problems, 
such as routing of independent systems, the possible effect of a failure of one 
system upon another, the susceptibility of systems and components to damage 
from an external event, such as a bird-strike, and other similar problems. 
The need for zonal analysis was brought into sharp focus by the accident to a 
United Airlines DC-10 at Sioux City, Iowa some years ago. During the cruise, 
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the centre engine suffered an uncontained fan failure (actually as a result of 
maintenance error), but the key point here was that as the failed fan disc exited 
the engine cowling, it impacted the upper surface of the aircraft's right horizontal 
stabiliser. This caused major damage to all three of the independent hydraulic 
systems, since the hydraulic lines were routed adjacent to each other in that 
zone. As a result, the aircraft lost all flight controls and could only be kept in the 
air by the use of asymmetric throttling on the remaining two engines. It diverted 
to Sioux City airport but crashed during a very high-speed landing and killed a 
significant percentage of those on board. Had zonal analysis been more refined 
and mandated during the design stage of the DC-10 (which occurred during the 
early 1970s), it would have been recognised that adjacent routing of the 
hydraulic lines was not a good idea, and they would have been separated, as 
Lockheed had in fact done with their competing L-1011 Tristar design. 
More recently, an Enhanced Zonal Analysis Procedure (EZAP) has been 
introduced which brings in more emphasis on wiring systems. This has come 
about as a result of yet another accident, this time to a Swissair MD-11, which 
suffered an uncontrollable wiring fire in the area behind the cockpit overhead 
panel, and subsequently suffered a fatal crash. Developed by an industry team 
working on behalf of the US Ageing Transport Systems Rulemaking Advisory 
Committee, EZAP has four stages: 
1. For a given aircraft zone, such as the centre section, left wing, tail, etc., 
the analyst identifies all systems (including wiring systems), structures, 
components, and any present or possible combustible materials (e. g., 
fuel vapour, dust particles, contamination) 
2. It is determined if the zone contains both wiring and combustible 
materials 
3. If it does, an applicable and effective maintenance task is defined where 
possible, with an appropriate interval to remove or minimise the build-up 
of combustible materials in the zone (e. g., a cleaning task to remove 
dust) 
4. An applicable and effective task for inspecting the zone is then defined 
67 
AIRCRAFT SYSTEM SAFETY ASSESSMENT 
-A NEW APPROACH 
For zonal analysis to be effective, it is obviously vital that the analyst has direct 
access to the aircraft. This allows the determination of what is installed in the 
zone, access and system interface issues, and other key features such as size 
and environmental effects. Therein lies the problem with making zonal analysis 
truly predictive rather than reactive. Effective analysis cannot be completed 
until the aircraft design, systems layouts, etc., are mature, so if any significant 
changes are required, they can be extremely difficult, expensive and/or time 
consuming to affect at a later date. 
3.13 RECOMMENDED PRACTICES AND STANDARDS 
As mentioned in section 2.7, the guiding documents for safety analysis are SAE 
standards ARP 4754 and ARP 4761, both originally issued in 1996, as well as 
Mil-Std-882C, and the FAA System Safety Handbook. Beyond these, it is 
really left to individual companies to draw up their own safety and reliability 
analysis procedures, based around the SAE standard structure; no other 
standard has yet emerged into common use. The military sector has produced 
a number of guidance documents for industry, which tend to mirror aspects of 
ARP 4761. These military standards include Mil-Std-882D Department of 
Defense Standard Practice for System Safety. 
3.14 RELIABILITY DATA SOURCES 
Information on core reliability data in the form of component failure rates, has 
historically been available in two universally recognised documents produced by 
the Reliability Analysis Centre and the Rome Laboratory at Griffiss Air Force 
Base in the United States and published by the US Department of Defense: 
3.14.1 Military Handbook 217 
- 
Reliability Prediction of Electronic 
Equipment 
The Mil-Hdbk 217 handbook contains failure rate models and data for various 
components used in electronic systems. These include capacitors, connectors, 
diodes, transistors, relays, switches, etc., and the failure rates listed were based 
on the best field data that could be obtained at the time of compilation. 
68 
AIRCRAFT SYSTEM SAFETY ASSESSMENT 
-A NEW APPROACH 
Originated in November 1956 as a model for predicting computer failure rates, 
the first formal issue of Mil-Hdbk-217 was made by the United States Navy in 
December of the same year. Responsibility for maintaining and updating the 
document passed to the US Air Force Rome Laboratories in July 1973, and in 
February 1995 the latest, and as it turned out final issue, Mil-Hdbk-217F Notice 
2 was released. 
Mil-Hdbk-217 includes the ability to perform a parts count analysis or a part 
stress analysis. A parts count analysis provides a simpler reliability figure, and 
is normally used early in a design when detailed information is not available, or 
a rough estimate of reliability is all that is required. A part stress analysis takes 
into account more detailed information regarding the components, and therefore 
offers a more accurate estimate of failure rate. These functions were included 
in an early software model made available to industry and known as Milstress. 
The basic data was subjected to the testing of various assumptions based on 
application, operating environment, etc., but the handbook gradually became 
discredited over time, especially when it was realised just how small some of 
the component populations analysed were. Indeed Mr Seymour Morris, the 
point of contact and spokesman for Mil-Hdbk-217 at the Rome Laboratories, 
has said 1331; 
"Mil-Hdbk-217 is not intended to predict field reliability and, in general, does not 
do a very good job at it an absolute sense. " 
To further illustrate Mil-Hdbk-217's inability to predict component reliability, in 
1987 the United States Army conducted a survey 1341 of a common design radio 
that had been supplied by nine different manufacturers, comparing their 
predicted reliability (all using Mil-Hdbk-217), with their observed reliability in the 
field. 
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Manufacturer MIL-HDBK-217 MTBF Observed MTBF 
1 7247 1160 
2 5765 74 
3 3500 624 
4 2500 2174 
5 2500 51 
6 2000 1056 
7 1600 3612 
8 1400 98 
9 1000 472 
Table 4- Reliability Assessment Versus Reality 
The MTBF reliability requirement in the specification was 1,250 hours, with an 
80% confidence level. While it should be pointed out that there is likely to be a 
significant element of human factors events impacting the results, such as 
mishandling and field damage, nevertheless it is clear that relying on Mil-Hdbk- 
217 was invalid in this case. 
The handbook 217 progressed through a number of revisions and updates until 
it reached Issue F Notice 2 in February 1995, following which it was withdrawn, 
due to a lack of funding for further development. Since that time, no 
replacement has emerged from either the Rome Laboratories or any other 
official agency. Nevertheless, to this day Mil-Hdbk-217F is still a frequently 
quoted source of data for electronic parts reliability estimates. 
3.14.2 Telcordia 
AT&T Bell Labs originally developed the Telcordia reliability prediction model in 
the 1970s, modifying the equations in Mil-Hdbk-217 to better represent what 
their equipment was experiencing in the field. The main concepts in Mil-Hdbk- 
217 and Telcordia are very similar, but Telcordia added the ability to take into 
account bum-in, field, and laboratory testing. Telcordia also allows the analyst 
to perform a parts count or part stress analysis, but the model has seen most 
widespread use outside the aviation industry, mainly in the United States. 
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3.14.3 Non-Electronic Parts Reliability Database (NPRD) 
The NPRD document followed a similar format to Mil-Hdbk-217, and 
encompassed a very wide range of mechanical and electro-mechanical 
components, such as actuators, fasteners, springs, valves, etc. Useful though 
it was for many years as the only generally available tool, it regrettably suffered 
from the same limitations in the core data that afflicted Hdbk-217, and 
eventually it was withdrawn from any further update and re-issue following the 
release of NPRD-95 in 1994. Since the demise of these two US Military 
documents, a number of others have started to emerge on the scene, some 
offered as replacements with added functionality. One of the most significant 
of these is the Bellcore model. 
3.14.4 Bellcore 
The Bellcore reliability prediction model was developed by AT&T Bell 
Laboratories in an attempt to better represent their own in-service experience of 
equipment performance, than had previously been possible with Mil-Hdbk-217. 
The basic concept was very similar, but Bellcore moved on a stage by taking 
account of such factors as bum-in and testing and their impact on reliability. 
This model also included the ability for parts count and parts stress analysis. 
3.15 IN-SERVICE RELIABILITY DATA 
uln an imperfect world, all hazards may not be identified in this (design analysis) 
process. Others can and will be identified when the system is exercised 
through test and operational use. Any occurrence of an accident or Incident is 
(should be) examined critically to determine causes and evaluate effects. The 
causes and effects could range from something already predicted as possible or 
even probable under certain conditions, to something entirely new and 
surprising. ' 
The obvious alternative to using either Mil-Hdbk-217 or NPRD as a source of 
reliability information is empirical data from actual in-service events. Taken at 
face value, this would seem to be the most logical and potentially, the most 
71 
AIRCRAFT SYSTEM SAFETY ASSESSMENT 
-A NEW APPROACH 
accurate data source not least because it automatically takes account of 
changing situations. Not least in this regard are the effects on reliability levels 
as an aircraft and its systems age. 
There are a great many aircraft still in service beyond the 15 year-since-delivery 
Flight International definition of an ageing aircraft. This situation is not expected 
to fundamentally change in the medium term at least, so it is perhaps among 
the most critical factors affecting reliability that need to be understood. 
However, the whole approach to the gathering and use of empirical data is 
fraught with difficulty and is discussed in more detail in section 3.19. 
3.16 COMMERCIAL SOFTWARE TOOLS 
In recent times, the market has seen a proliferation of commercially available 
software, aimed at simplifying the analysis procedure. This proliferation, while 
expected, can lead to confusion amongst analysts who may be uncertain about 
the relative merits of each package. No generally available advice to guide the 
analyst has been identified. 
Concept Preliminary Design Detailed Design 
Development Design Validation & 
Verification 
Aircraft functions, System functions, Detailed Tests 
architectures, architectures, functions, Analyses 
requirements requirements architectures, 
requirements 
Aircraft FHA System FHA 
- 
Functions 
- 
Functions 
- 
Hazards 
- 
Hazards 
- 
Effects 
- 
Effects 
- 
Classifications 
- 
Classifications 
PSSAs SSAs 
Aircraft FTAs System FTAs System System FTAs 
FMEA 
- 
Qualitative 
- 
Qualitative 
- 
Quantitative 
- 
Subsystem 
- 
Subsystem 
- 
Failure 
budgets budgets rates 
- 
Intersystem 
dependencies 
CCAs 
Particular risk Common mode Zonal safety 
analysis analysis anal sis 
Table b- The Safety Analysts Process (ARP4761) 
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An alternative version is offered by N Leveson et al in their paper 
Demonstration Of A Safety Analysis On A Complex System. Here it can be 
seen that more detailed consideration is now being given to, for example, the 
effects of in-service use on reliability and safety levels. This model is 
embedded in their Safeware analysis system, primarily intended for use in air 
traffic management, but easily adaptable to any other complex system. 
SYSTEMS SAFETY PROGRAM 
ANALYSIS 
Wrte Safety Program Plan 
PHA 
Identity goals N Hazard List 
Fault Tree Analysis 
WnP requirements ý. Safety Requirements and and constraints constraints 
Generate attemative 
Operations system designs 
-- Research 
Modeling and 
Analysis 
Ol? w Wes of 
Evaluate 
designs 
Syeb aAns ° and identfytradeoffs 4 
Design and construct 
components 
Verskation 
Operatmal Use 
S HA and SS HA 
Como et en e ss/ Con e ixte n cy 
Analysis 
Simulation and Animation 
Operator Task Analysis 
State Machine Hazard 
Analysis 
Deviation Anaysis (FMECA) 
Mode Confusion Analysis 
Human Factors Evaluation 
Other safety constraint 
evaluations 
Safety Venhicahon 
Safety Testing 
Software FTA 
S 
A 
F 
E 
T 
Y 
1 
N 
F 
0 
R 
M 
A 
týT 
O 
N 
S 
Y 
S 
T 
E 
M 
Operatioial Analysis 
Change Analysis 
Incident and accident analysis' 
Periodic audits 
Table 6- The Safeware Safety Analysis Process 
3.17 RECOGNISING THE NEED FOR CHANGE 
The failings of the FHA system have their roots in a lack of accurate data 
sources leading to imprecise reliability assessment, the freedom to apply "fiddle 
factors" to meet the specification and to use reliability figures for equipment 
running at whatever output the manufacturer chooses, i. e. not necessarily the 
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"worst case" scenario. Although ARP 4761 recommends independent 
checking of safety analysis away from the design team, this is not mandatory 
and therefore is seldom done. 
"There are numerous examples where products which appear to satisfy the 
original functional requirements as intended, fail to do so. The desire to achieve 
performance requirements for the new system has tended to overshadow other 
considerations. The system must of course be functionally capable 
... 
if it is not 
the readiness will fall below an acceptable level. The designer, although highly 
skilled, is not a support engineer, he needs the assistance of both reliability and 
support engineers. Individual departments within a manufacturer's organisation 
worked on a project to produce a variety of output reports; e. g. Technical 
Publications, Supply provisioning lists, reliability reports, etc. Whilst these 
documents served their purpose it was very difficult for other departments to 
utilise the information within them. In some cases departments ignored them or 
were ignorant of them. " 1 
"Some areas (within a design function) see (the Logistic Support Analysis 
process) as a direct threat to their departmental influence. Many areas 
however, do not recognise that they are involved in that process and feel that it 
is just another additional department. These are all symptoms of the same 
thing, a lack of appreciation and an incomplete understanding of the process. " 
1371 
Potential interaction between different systems on an aircraft is very difficult to 
do in any case, not least because of the need for a systems integrator who can 
give his suppliers the earliest possible view of the results of preliminary zonal 
analysis and other allied processes. Measures of equipment reliability 
performance during test, development and in-service are variable and 
frequently inaccurate or even missing altogether, and even when they are 
present, there tends to be a failure to recognise or understand the limitations of 
the analysis. Many elements that can impact on system performance are 
frequently overlooked, such as software reliability, the effect of flight cycles, the 
operating environment, etc. 
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Finally and most significantly, it is still common for ILS/reliability/safety analysis 
to be regarded as a "necessary evil" 
-a "tick in the box" which can be done 
retrospectively once the design and testing activity is complete. Resource 
pressures and a national shortage of experienced ILS/reliability/safety 
engineers, lead to this attitude becoming more and more prevalent. 
In the words of the SAE in their introductory material for the planned JA 1000/1A 
Reliability Program Standard Implementation Guide: 
"The importance of reliability in design engineering has significantly grown since 
the early Sixties. Competition has been a primary driver in this growth. The 
three realities of competition today are: world class quality and reliability, cost- 
effectiveness, and fast time-to-market. Formerly, companies could effectively 
compete if they could achieve at least two of these features in their products 
and product development processes, often at the expense of the third. 
However, customers today, whether military, aerospace, or commercial, have 
been sensitized to a higher level of expectation and demand products that are 
highly reliable, yet affordable. Product development practices are shifting in 
response to this higher level of expectation. Today, there is seldom time, or 
necessary resources to extensively test, analyze, and fix to achieve high quality 
and reliability. It is also true that the rapid growth in technology prevents the 
accumulation of historical data on the field performance of their products. 
Unfortunately, some reliability methods have depended upon the availability of 
historical data, other experiential information, or learning through extensive and 
time consuming tests. To enable this transition, reliability efforts must be 
directed toward anticipating problems and designing-in features that assure the 
achievement of quality and reliability, concurrent with the development process, 
instead of trying to assess quality and reliability downstream. The gains in time- 
to-market and cost savings from such an approach can be significant. " 
"More recent reliability programs tend not to prescribe reliability tasks or 
methods to be performed by suppliers. Rather, suppliers are considered equal 
partners in the effort to produce a reliable product and work with the companies 
in deciding which reliability methods provide most value in achieving objectives. 
Furthermore, it is not unusual for several design iterations of technologically 
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different hardware and software to be developed before the final version is 
incorporated into the production product. Also, the reliability discipline is 
generally a separate activity from the design discipline in some sectors of the 
industry. " 
This same view then spills over into the in-service phase, where minimal 
monitoring of performance is carried out to check the validity of the analyses 
that lead to certification. Relying on meeting MTBF targets is the norm, but it is 
only half the story. MTBF is a measure of a constant failure rate, and its' 
limitations could be disguised by relying on "reliability growth" in the early years 
in service. Furthermore, Mean Time Between Unscheduled Removal (MTBUR) 
is potentially just as important in safety terms, but major aircraft manufacturers 
do not agree on its' definition. 
"Stuff happens. Usage and deployment changes occur 
- 
item characteristics 
are different 
- 
reliability predictions versus observed demand rates. Missions 
change and budget problems constrain usage. " MI 
Unfortunately, the certification process allows much of this in many regards. 
As an example, it is quite permissible for a manufacturer to state how he has 
derived failure rates by simply stating that he has used standard reliability 
databases, or the test and in-service data; supporting evidence does not have 
to be included in the safety case, and is only ever requested by the authorities 
in the event of an unreasonably low failure rate being claimed. 
"The traditional reliability programme approach 1393: 
0 Customer specifies how reliability will be achieved 
Imposes a sequential product development methodology 
" 
Supplier includes all tasks, relevant or not 
Programme is not product specific 
Imposes a rigid programme, stifling innovation" 
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3.18 RELIABILITY DATA AVAILABILITY 
To help illustrate the difficulties, let us look in more detail at how the Bellcore 
reliability data model compares with the long-established, but no longer 
maintained, Mil-Hdbk-217F. The specific requirements of a particular reliability 
prediction analysis may mean that one model is more applicable than the other. 
There are many differences between the two models, each of which is briefly 
described below. 
3.18.1 International Recognition and Acceptance 
Use of the Bellcore model is still more common in the United States than 
elsewhere. Although it is slowly growing in popularity internationally, it 
continues to come up against the general perception, that Mil-Hdbk-217F 
remains the industry standard tool for reliability prediction analyses. 
"Mil-Hdbk 217 Is discredited. It only looks at individual components, which only 
account for 5% of failures. It ignores assembly joints and so on, which account 
for 95% of failures. " 1401 
3.18.2 Components Considered 
AT&T Bell developed the Bellcore model primarily for commercial equipment, 
and naturally concentrated on their core business telecommunications 
equipment. On the other hand Mil-Hdbk-217F had a far broader scope, being 
geared towards both the military and commercial markets across a wider range 
of equipment types, and without any specific market focus. 
3.18.3 Calculation Methodologies 
The basic methodologies of the Bellcore and Mil-Hdbk-217F models are very 
similar. Nevertheless, when comparing them more closely, it quickly becomes 
apparent that the Bellcore calculations tend to be more optimistic. In general 
Bellcore calculations also require fewer part parameters for components. 
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Hence the calculations performed by Mil-Hdbk-217F are frequently more 
pessimistic, and generally require more component parameters to achieve an 
acceptable degree of calculation accuracy. 
This does not mean that Bellcore failure rates will always be more accurate, but 
it does indicate that depending on the components being analysed, it is likely 
that there will be significant differences in the predicted failure rates produced 
by the two methods. 
3.18.4 Consideration of Test Data 
Unlike Mil-Hdbk-217F, the Bellcore model includes the capability of considering 
component bum-in, laboratory test, and field service data in its calculations. 
This provides a greater degree of confidence in its predictions, since they tend 
to be based on historical data, rather than the basic stress methodology used 
by MIL-HDBK-217F. The bum-in data is also used to quantify expected failure 
rates in the first year to provide an indication of so-called "infant mortality", i. e. a 
higher failure rate than can be expected during the "steady state" expected 
throughout the bulk of the in-service life. However, this shortfall on the part of 
Mil-Hdbk-217F has been partly addressed by some commercial software 
packages, which now have the ability to use these additional calculation 
methods in either model. 
3.18.5 Multiplier 
The Bellcore model calculates failure rates to a value expressed as failures per 
billion hours, instead of Mil-Hdbk-217's more usual failures per million hours, so 
this has the potential to be a source of unintentional error in reliability 
calculations. 
3.18.6 Part Types 
Each model supports part types that the other does not. For example, Bellcore 
contains data on batteries, coolers, computer systems, gyroscopes and heaters, 
none of which are contained within Mil-Hdbk-217. On the other hand, Mil- 
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Hdbk-217 has data on lasers, printed circuit boards, tubes, etc., which are not in 
Bellcore. This can result in a tricky situation whereby an analyst may need to 
refer to both models, with all the inherent difficulties in coping with differing 
failure rate calculation methodologies, as already mentioned. 
3.18.7 Environments 
Initially Bellcore only supported three different ground based environments, as it 
was originally designed for use only by the telecommunications industry. This 
shortfall has recently started to be addressed by later iterations of the model, 
which have additional operating environments including Airborne, Commercial 
and Space. Mil-Hdbk-217 has always offered a variety of different operating 
environments in air, ground, sea and space, but none of these commercial 
models offers a range of environmental options that satisfactorily encompass 
the main air transport operating scenarios. 
3.18.8 Quality Levels 
Bellcore currently supports four standard quality levels, which are identical for 
all component types, and are based on generalities concerning the origin and 
screening of the components. The Mil-Hdbk-217 approach is to use component- 
dependent quality levels, i. e. levels that differ from one part type to another, 
rather than having a simple general classification of quality levels. 
3.19 THE USE OF EMPIRICAL DATA 
Much is written of empirical data and how essential it is in understanding 
equipment performance, but gathering it and using it effectively is not as easy 
as it might at first seem. In recent years there have been a great many 
attempts to establish "industry benchmark" data collection tools, most notably 
the British Airways BASIS system, but to date none has satisfactorily addressed 
all the requirements in terms of primary failure cause analysis and feedback to 
the people who need the information. 
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3.20 WHAT DATA DO WE MEAN? 
As has already been mentioned briefly, it is becoming more common for 
industry to claim the use of "empirical data" when establishing reliability figures 
and failure rates for their equipment. This would appear to be the most 
sensible approach, since it uses data most closely allied to the equipment under 
analysis rather than relying on a standard reference work which by its very 
nature makes generalisations. However, there are many pitfalls awaiting the 
unwary when using such data, and it is absolutely essential for the analyst to 
precisely understand the data he is coming across. 
Let us first consider what is meant by empirical data. The literal meaning is 
relying on or derived from observation or experiment, or guided by practical 
experience and not theory. Therein lies the first problem. Too many systems 
of empirical data retrieval simply gather information from in-service events at 
operator level, and then not always from every operator. The potentially large 
amount of valuable data that can come from in-house equipment testing and 
from the repair and overhaul loop, is all too often either overlooked or is simply 
not available in a useable form. What do SSPP requirements have to say about 
empirical data? In Mil-Std-882C, under section 102.2.6 System Safety Data, it 
is stated that the SSPP shall: 
i. "Describe the approach for collecting and processing 
pertinent historical hazard, mishap, and safety lessons 
learned, data 
ii. Identify deliverable data by title and number, and means of 
delivery (e. g. hard copy, electronically, etc. ) 
iii. Identify non-deliverable system safety data and describe 
the procedures for accessibility and retention of data of 
historical value. -' 
Thus a standard does exist for the capturing of in-service data, but there are 
two major problems with it. Firstly, the programme may be one in which Mii- 
Std-882C is not specified, and secondly, the requirements as listed above are 
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far too vague and open to creative interpretation to suit the manufacturer's 
needs rather than those of the safety of the system. 
3.21 PROCESS SUMMARY 
The safety assessment process is now very well defined, particular within such 
references documents as ARP 4761. The basic analytical tools including FHA, 
FMEA, FMECA, FTA, etc., are well defined and universally understood. Other 
interfacing procedures are also generally acceptable, and there is a number of 
on-going industry initiatives aimed at focusing more attention in this area. 
However, the problem remains the lack of legislation to back them up and 
require their use. This is now also noticeable in the efforts to establish event- 
reporting systems to back-up the design analysis. 
The problem of over-reliance by design teams and analysts on out-dated or 
otherwise inappropriate component reliability data lies at the core of many 
system safety prediction problems. The use of empirical data offers a far more 
satisfactory approach to reliability assessment, but as yet the availability of the 
necessary core in-service data to support such a system is still in its infancy. 
It is to be hoped that the emergence of agencies such as EASA will help to 
enforce a wider adoption of the right procedures through legislation. However, 
in many areas legislation on its own will not work, since the right tools and the 
back-up support infrastructure are not necessarily all in place. 
3.22 HOW IT IS GOING WRONG 
Let us summarise what we have outlined so far. A failure to understand the part 
correct analysis has to play can lead to over-engineered / over-complex 
systems, ineffective built-in test capability, unexpected operational effects in 
service and safety margins being reduced unseen (i. e. the dormant failure case 
mentioned earlier, or a "smart" system re-configuration without an appropriate 
indication to the flight crew). At best this potentially leads on to expensive and 
time-consuming equipment re-design or modification, equipment life constraints, 
extra unscheduled maintenance costs, schedule delays and so on, with an 
inevitable loss of confidence and raising of costs. 
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3.23 THE MANUFACTURERS' PROBLEMS 
As an example of what can happen, let us take a look at the Airbus A330 and 
A340 fleets. They are fitted with a common auxiliary electrical power generation 
system, which suffered a major fall-off in reliability for the very reasons stated 
above. As a result, the engineering investigation to find the problem, identify 
the fix and test it, took well over a year. The modified equipment then had to be 
put into production and embodied across the in-service aircraft fleet, a process 
which it was predicted, would take a further two years to complete. During all 
this time, the operators were therefore suffering high unit removal rates, 
increased maintenance costs and the need for additional spares provisioning, 
all of which were eroding their already marginal profitability. 
Other issues include material or supplier selection, such as financial pressure 
for the retention of unsatisfactory components, e. g. Kapton wiring. The trade- 
off of weight / cost / performance / reliability impacts on safety margins 
- 
but to 
what degree is not 'always clearly understood. Such trade-offs during the 
design stage generally come under three headings: 
" 
Safety / availability 
-a balancing act which attempts to ensure the 
optimum mix of system complexity, redundancy, maintainability and so 
on, while still achieving acceptable levels of reliability so as to satisfy 
both the FHA and ultimately the operator 
" 
Safety / cost 
- 
here it is a simple economic balance between achieving 
an acceptable level of failure risk while doing so at minimal cost in terms 
of both design, test and production effort and system purchase price 
" 
Safety / complexity 
- 
closely allied to safety / availability, but also 
encompassing additional considerations such as maintainability, 
testability, repairability, weight, and again bringing in cost, development 
time ("time to marker), etc. 
Data errors include a tack of feedback from development and qualification test; 
in other words, the analysis is rarely re-run. When in-service data is collected, 
the percentage of the fleet reporting is not always considered, leading to data 
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distortion. Even at the initial prediction stage, the withdrawal of support for 
standard reliability data sources such as Mil-HDBK-217F and NPRD95 means 
that their value, which was always questionable, diminishes even further with 
time, even though they continue to be heavily utilised. The main problem with 
MIL-HDBK-217F in particular, was the fact that it looked at relatively small 
(sometimes very small) populations of individual components, which only 
accounted for around 5% of the total equipment failures. It ignored the 95% 
from such areas as assembly joints and so on, and a comparison of MIL-HDBK- 
217F predictions against actual MTBFs has led to it being generally discredited 
by reliability specialists. The concept of in-house reliability databases based on 
empirical data remains in its infancy. A failure to notice problems, to listen to 
the equipment maintainers, to seek feedback from operators or to learn the 
lessons of history is rife. 
Thus the main areas within the safety analysis cycle that can / do lead to error 
are as follows: 
REQUEST FOR INFORMATION (RFI) STAGE 
" 
Design is extremely immature 
" 
"Guestimates" of reliability levels, based on and frequently over-ruled by, 
commercial department pressures to win the business 
REQUEST FOR QUOTATION (RFQ) 
" 
Preliminary reliability and safety performance estimates still based on 
immature design 
" 
Use of outdated data sources such as MIL-HDBK 217F, or on 
expectations from companys experience with other products 
" 
Some consideration of in-service performance of similar equipments, but 
if the message is not what the commercial people want to hear they may 
well manipulate the figures after the reliability department has produced 
them 
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REQUEST FOR PROPOSAL (RFP) 
" 
Reliability and safety performance guarantees required 
" 
Calculations based on what the customer was told at the RFQ stage and 
preliminary top-level FMEA rather than a scientific analytical approach. 
DEVELOPMENT & TEST 
. 
Development of FHA, FMEA, FMECA, FTA, zonal analysis, CCA, PSSA 
" 
Feedback to design is patchy and messages may be ignored if they are 
unpalatable or are in the lower number range of the risk analysis 
" FMEA and reliability figures are either. 
0 Developed by designers without independent checks 
" 
Developed by ILS I safety analysts / reliability departments 
without reference back to design 
" 
Developed by ILS / safety analysts / reliability departments and 
referred back to design for review, which is frequently 
extended or overlooked because they are too busy 
" 
Feedback to analysis from test may be patchy or even non-existent. 
CERTIFICATION 
" 
Safety Case produced for the certification authorities is rarely subjected 
to independent checks 
" 
May have been reviewed internally because company procedures 
require two or more signatures on it, but this process is likely to have 
involved little more than a token glance at the summary 
" 
Review by the aircraft manufacturer and the authorities will largely be 
based on trust that the analyst has got it right, and may only question 
reliability figures that appear to be particularly optimistic. Even then, a 
justification statement is probably all that will be required. 
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ENTRY INTO SERVICE 
" 
The Safety Case is now gathering dust on the shelf, with no attempt to 
revisit it in the light of actual in-service performance to confirm that FHA 
compliance claims are being met. 
3.24 THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION (FAA) VIEW 
It is time for some fundamental changes, and this view is supported by a report 
issued by the FAA Associate Administrator for Regulation and Certification. 
Commissioned a year earlier, the Commercial Airplane Certification Process 
Study 141) is subtitled "an evaluation of selected aircraft certification, operations 
and maintenance processes. " 
The team that produced the report was led by the FAA, co-chaired by the 
aviation industry and included other experts from NASA, the Department of 
Defense as well as non-US manufacturers and airworthiness consultants. 
Their remit was to perform a comprehensive review of the processes and 
procedures associated with aircraft certification, operations and maintenance, 
taking as -a starting point, the original 
- 
type certification activities, and then 
continuing through operational safety and airworthiness procedures.. Of 
particular interest were the content and effectiveness of information paths 
between certification, operations and maintenance activities, one of the over- 
riding concerns already examined here. 
At the conclusion of their work, the team listed a total of fifteen findings and two 
observations. They are repeated here in their entirety, with those primary areas 
of concern already discussed in earlier chapters of this study, highlighted in bold 
text 
The first four findings were placed under the Airplane Safety Assurance 
Process heading: 
1. Human factors issues in' design, operations and maintenance. Human 
performance is still the dominant factor in accidents. The processes 
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used to determine and validate human responses to failure and 
methods to include human responses need to be improved. Design 
techniques, safety assessments, and regulations do not 
adequately address the subject of human error In design or In 
operations and maintenance. 
2. Correlation of safety assumptions with operations and maintenance 
practices. There Is no reliable process to ensure that assumptions 
made In the safety assessments are valid with respect to 
operations and maintenance activities, and that operators are aware 
of these assumptions when developing their operations and 
maintenance procedures. In addition, certification standards may not 
reflect the actual operating environment. 
3. Robust safety assessments and design for critical functions. A more 
robust approach to design and a process which challenges the 
assumptions made In the safety analysis of flight critical functions 
Is necessary in situations where a few failures (2 or 3) could result 
In a catastrophic event. 
4. Flight critical systems and structure. Processes for identification of 
safety critical features of the aircraft do not ensure that future 
alterations, maintenance, repairs, or changes to operational 
procedures can be made with cognizance of those safety features. 
The next three findings were placed under the Aviation Safety Data 
Management heading: 
5. Co-ordination of data management systems. Multiple FAA-sponsored 
data collection and analysis programmes exist without adequate inter- 
departmental co-ordination or executive oversight. 
6. Data definition and reporting requirements. Basic data definition and 
reporting requirements are poorly defined relative to the needs of 
analysis and other uses. 
7. identification of accident precursors. There is no widely accepted 
process for analysing service data or events to identify potential 
accident precursors. 
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The next four findings were placed under the 
maintenance/operations/certification interfaces heading: 
8. Capturing the lessons learned from design, manufacturing, 
maintenance, and operating experience. Adequate processes do not 
exist within the FAA or In, most segments of the commercial 
aviation industry to ensure that the lessons learned from specific 
experiences in aircraft design, manufacturing, maintenance, and 
flight operations are captured permanently and made readily 
available to the aviation Industry. The failure to capture and 
disseminate lessons learned has allowed aircraft accidents to 
occur for causes similar to those of past accidents. 
9. Constraints on the sharing of information. There are constraints 
present in the aviation industry that have an inhibiting effect on the 
complete sharing of safety information. 
10. Maintenance and operational safety recommendations and feedback 
between operators and Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs). 
There are currently no industry processes or guidance materials 
available which ensure that; safety related maintenance or operational 
recommendations developed by the OEM are evaluated by the operator 
for incorporation into their maintenance or operational programmes, and 
safety related maintenance or operational procedures developed or 
modified by the operator are co-ordinated with the OEM to ensure that 
they do not compromise the type design safety standards of the aircraft 
and its systems. 
11. Communication and co-ordination between Airplane Certification 
Service and Flight Standards Service. The absence of adequate 
formal business processes between FAA Airplane Certification Service 
and Flight Standards Service limits effective communications and co- 
ordination between the two that often results in inadequate 
communications with the commercial aviation industry. 
The next two findings plus one observation were placed under the major repairs 
and modifications heading: 
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12. Classification of repairs and alterations. The airline industry and aircraft 
repair organisations do not have a standardised process for classifying 
repairs or alterations to commercial aircraft as "Major" as prescribed by 
applicable Federal Aviations Regulations (FARs). 
13. Quality of alterations and repair processes. Inconsistencies exist 
between the safety assessments conducted for the Initial Type 
Certificate of an aircraft and some of those conducted for 
subsequent alterations to the aircraft or systems. Improved FAA 
and industry oversight of repair and alteration activity is needed to 
ensure that safety has not been compromised by subsequent repairs 
and alterations. 
Observation 1. Airworthiness Directive/Service Bulletin information flow to 
field reference materials. OEM and operators maintenance manuals, 
Illustrated Parts Catalogues (IPCs), wiring diagrams, and other documents 
needed to maintain aircraft in an airworthy condition after incorporation of 
Service Bulletins (SBs) and Airworthiness Directives (ADs), are not always 
revised to reflect each aircraft's approved configuration at the time the 
modifications were implemented. 
The final two findings plus one observation were placed under the safety 
oversight process heading: 
14. People and process for oversight of Designated Engineering 
Representatives (DERB). Consultant DERB have approved designs that 
were deficient or non-compliant with FAA regulations. 
15. Detection of single point human error. Processes to detect and 
correct errors made by individuals in the design, certification, 
installation, repair, alteration, and operation of transport aircraft 
are inconsistent allowing unacceptable errors in critical 
airworthiness areas. 
Observation 2. Oversight processes and resources: industry. Some air 
carriers do more extensive oversight than others of their in-house and 
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outsourced flight operations and maintenance activities, with major safety 
and economic benefits. 
A very comprehensive and alarming list of findings, which clearly 
demonstrates the depth of concern now starting to emerge in at least one of 
the World's primary certification authorities with regard to overall deficiencies 
with the current aircraft system safety process. Disappointingly however, 
the report stops short of making any concrete proposals for change to 
address these issues which, given the serious nature of the identified 
shortcomings is hard to understand. 
What the report does discuss, albeit extremely briefly, is the need to achieve a 
change of culture across the industry. It recognises that regulation alone 
cannot achieve the desired results, and that is of course quite true, but 
expecting such a large and varied industry to adopt "inter-organisational" 
cultural changes to facilitate a more open exchange of information" is going to 
take more than gentle persuasion. The report recognises that the 
manufacturers, operators and FAA should work together towards achieving co- 
ordination of initiatives, but what about maintenance organisations, all the 
manufacturer's system and component suppliers, ground handlers, etc.? 
3.25 THE ETOPS & LROPS DEBATE 
Let us take a look at one major area of dissention amongst the industry today, 
extended operations, or ETOPS. The present ETOPS regulations began in the 
1980s with new rules governing the design and operation of twin-engined 
aircraft on long-range routes, and considering the possibility of an engine 
failure. It stated that there must be a suitable diversion airport within a certain 
flying time at the one-engine out speed. Today, most Airbus and Boeing wide- 
bodied Airbus twins are type-certificated to 180 minutes single-engine flying 
time from a suitable airport, while many narrow-bodies also have certification to 
120 minutes. 
There are strict rules regarding the modification status and life consumed of on- 
board equipment for ETOPS missions, and this is reflected in differing Minimum 
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Equipments Lists (MEL) and in tighter regulations on maintenance activity. 
Current moves are now pushing ETOPS to 207 minutes, or even 240 minutes, 
and here the two major manufacturers have a difference of opinion. Airbus 
believes that the policy of extending ETOPS maximum diversion times to 207 
minutes for specified airlines for North Pacific operations is inappropriate until 
such time as international agreement is reached on applicable standards. 
They are concerned 1421 because: 
"A typical application of the 207-minute authority will be in winter, when ETOPS 
tracks will take twin-engined aircraft to the north of the Pacific region, in the 
vicinity of the most remote airfields, where any diversion would probably occur 
in bad weather conditions and where ground facilities are minimal. In granting 
the 207-minute authority, the U. S. Federal Aviation Administration has 
presented no explanation of how safety would be maintained. " 
"Airbus believes that ETOPS should be formalised in regulations rather than 
administered through ad hoc policy letters and advisory circulars. ETOPS 
regulations should be driven by safety and a public review is necessary of the 
risk management models used. ETOPS rules should be harmonised with 
international rules, rather than imposed by only the FAA for a select group of 
airlines. Airbus supports the creation of an industry and government working 
group to review 207-minute operations. " 
Furthermore, Long-Range Operations (LROPS) is a newly proposed regulatory 
concept which addresses all aircraft, irrespective of the number of engines. 
"Airbus would like LROPS to embrace flight length, diversion times, and airport 
weather and equipment. The rules criteria should cover systems design, 
maintenance and operations practice. Airbus would like to see diversion 
airfields re-categorised as extreme, demanding and benign, depending upon 
their integrity. " 
Note here the emphasis Airbus places on the need for "rules criteria" on system 
design. 
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More recently, Boeing and the FAA have been pushing to permit twins to 
operate under the same rules as three and four-engined aircraft which currently 
have no limitations on diversion times in the one-engine-out case, due to the 
obviously higher level of system redundancy. The case they make is that 
engine reliability is now at such a high level that such restrictions are no longer 
justified. 
3.26 DOES THE INDUSTRY HAVE TOO MUCH FAITH IN RELIABILITY? 
The ETOPS / LROPS debate is highly indicative of the way in which much of 
the industry appears to be developing an over-confidence in the reliability 
performance of their aircraft systems. What should have been a wake-up call 
occurred in April 2003, when a United Airlines Boeing 777 on a trans-Pacific 
flight suffered an engine failure, resulting in an ETOPS diversion reportedly in 
excess of the 207 minutes currently certificated. 
There can be little doubt that, worthy though it is, the current emphasis on 
improving air safety performance solely by addressing human factors issues on 
the flight-deck, means ignoring a very significant level of risk inherent in the way 
we currently design, analyse and maintain our aircraft systems. 
3.27 ACCIDENTS AND INCIDENTS 
Two main areas of investigation were used to look for evidence of flawed or 
incomplete safety analysis. Firstly, a study was conducted of all known 
commercial aircraft major accidents and incidents over the period 2001 to 2005. 
From this data, an analysis of root causes was carried out, placing particular 
emphasis on those which had design, reliability, system safety and / or human 
factors contributors. 
Secondly, a number of more detailed case studies were carried out where there 
was sufficient data available to do so. The results of both these investigations 
are presented and discussed in section 3.29. 
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3.28 VARIANCES IN RELIABILITY 
The stringent equipment performance and reliability requirements already 
mentioned as being specified to the aerospace industry by aircraft 
manufacturers, manifest themselves in a number of key areas. For example, 
dispatch reliability guarantees for civil systems which five years ago were 
specified at the 97% level, are now being routinely demanded for new 
applications at better than 99%. Similarly, the demands of such initiatives as 
ETOPS certification, places significant demands on system configuration and 
design, which results in extremely complex analyses of reliability and safety 
requirements. 
The problem is that both aircraft and aircraft system reliability experience in 
service may fail to meet the analytical expectations of the design stage, 
intended to support these requirements. For example, an Auxiliary Power Unit 
(APU) generator was introduced into service in a large passenger aircraft in the 
1990s, with a Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF) of 15,000 operating hours 
being guaranteed by the manufacturer. 
Analysis showed that after an apparent very high level of reliability in the early 
service life, some two years after introduction, levels of both MTBF (and Mean 
Time Between Unscheduled Removal (MTBUR)), fell away dramatically to 
levels below that which had been guaranteed. Investigation of units returned for 
repair revealed a number of failure modes, some of which were occurring far 
more frequently than originally predicted, while others had not been expected to 
cause unit failure at all. Extensive 
- 
and expensive 
- 
modification, testing and 
fleet embodiment programmes over an extended period of time were required in 
order to bring reliability levels back up to the required level. 
Cases such as this can result in the safety levels required for certification being 
compromised, quite possibly without anyone realising it until something goes 
wrong. Examples of this could be either a consistent failure to meet dispatch 
requirements, or more importantly from a safety standpoint, a significant system 
loss in flight due perhaps to the unrecognised occurrence of a dormant failure, 
followed by a second failure which creates a problem for the flight crew. 
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Certainly lower reliability will inevitably lead to higher direct operating costs for 
the operator. As an example of this, a modem aircraft Integrated Drive 
Generator (IDG) has a predicted reliability expressed as an MTBF of 15,000 
flight hours. Statistically, this equates to 66.6 removals per million flying hours, 
which is obviously 67 in practice. Assuming the aircraft flies an average of 
4,000 hours a year, this means that each such aircraft (fitted with four 
generators) in an operator's fleet could expect one unscheduled generator 
removal per year. A 10% error in the initial reliability prediction for the 
generator, resulting in a true MTBF of 13,500 hours, would mean that an 
operator with a fleet of 45 of these aircraft would suffer an increase in annual 
fleet generator removals from 45 to 53. The average repair cost for an IDG is 
typically around $60,000; thus the prediction error could be costing the operator 
an extra $480,000 annually 
- 
and this is for just one item of equipment on one 
aircraft type in their fleet. 
Such an error in analysis, albeit by a relatively modest 10%, could also result in 
the safety requirements for the loss, in this case, of electrical power no longer 
being achievable. 
3.29 CASE STUDIES 
A number of case studies were analysed in depth to further illustrate this issue 
of reliability and safety, as follows. 
3.29.1 Lauda Air Boeing 767 
- 
Inadvertent In-flight thrust-reverser 
actuation 
On 26 May 1991 a Boeing 767 aircraft operated by Lauda Air, took-off from 
Bangkok airport en route to Vienna. Fifteen minutes later the aircraft crashed 
in mountainous terrain with the loss of all on board. 
The primary cause of the accident «was the uncommanded deployment of the 
thrust reverser on the left-hand engine, leading to uncontrollable aircraft 
maneuvers followed by a high-speed descent and structural break-up. 
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Although the root cause of the thrust reverser deployment was never 
established, the system was subjected to a detailed analysis of possible failure 
modes. The accident report prepared by the Aircraft Accident Investigation 
Committee of the Ministry of Transport and Communications in Thailand states 
that "this revealed electrical short failure modes in the Directional Control Valve 
(DCV) that could cause an uncommanded reverser deployment following an 
opening of the hydraulic isolation valve. Boeing could not provide test data or 
analysis to determine the extent of thrust reverser movement in response to a 
momentary hot-short with a voltage greater than 8.2 Vdc, or the ability of the 
thrust reverser to return to the stowed position after tripping of the circuit 
breaker associated with the source of the hot-short. " 
"Other potential hydraulic system failures... were tested. The tests disclosed 
that uncommanded deployment of the thrust reverser was possible with 
blockage of the solenoid valve return passage... or total blockage in the return 
line. The result of this testing indicates that this detail may have been 
overlooked in the original failure mode and effects analysis. " 
As a result, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) recommended 
that the FAA "conduct a safety review of the... Boeing 767 aircraft thrust 
reverser systems to evaluate electrical and mechanical anomalies and failure 
modes... The certification review should also determine the adequacy of the 
thrust reverser system safeguards... to prevent uncommanded thrust reverser 
extensions. " 
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This clearly raises questions over the ability of Boeing's in-house reliability 
analysis system to identify some of these anomalies during the design stage. 
3.29.2 Boeing 737 
- 
Incidences of uncommanded rudder Input 
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On 8 September 1994 a Boeing 737-300 aircraft operated by USAir crashed 
while maneuvering to land at Pittsburgh Airport. The aircraft entered an 
uncontrollable descent and hit the ground about six miles east of the airport. 
The NTSB accident report 1441 and resulting Safety Recommendation 1451 state; 
"investigations revealed that during the accident sequence, the rudder deflected 
rapidly to the left and reached its left aerodynamic blowdown limit shortly 
thereafter. 
Examination of the rudder system revealed that it is possible, in the main rudder 
Power Control Unit (PCU) of the aircraft (as a result of some combination of 
tight clearances with the servo valve, thermal effects, particulate matter in the 
hydraulic fluid, or other unknown factors), the servo valve... could have caused 
the rudder to move opposite to the direction commanded by rudder pedal input. " 
"Because this accident and other 737 accidents and incidents raised questions 
regarding the 737's flight control systems, the FAA initiated a Critical Design 
Review (CDR) of the 737 flight control systems with emphasis on the roll control 
and directional flight control systems! 
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A number of Airworthiness Directives (AD) were issued by the FAA covering a 
redesign of the PCU servo valve and improved operational procedures and pilot 
training. The report goes on to say, "however, even with these changes, the 
737 series aircrafts remain susceptible to rudder system malfunctions that could 
be catastrophic. 
The Board is also concerned that the limited period of vulnerability to rudder 
malfunction is based on the assumption that a pilot will perform perfectly and 
that all 
-aircraft systems will perform normally. For example, according to 
Boeing's fault tree analysis for the 737-New Generation, the combination of a 
jammed servo valve with a loss of engine power during take-off would be 
catastrophic only during a 7-second window from V, through lift-off. 
However, Boeing's analyses apparently assumed that a pilot would always 
react immediately and correctly and that the hydraulic pressure limiter would not 
fail. Such assumptions may not be fully warranted. " 
"The 737 has a history of rudder system-related anomalies, including numerous 
instances of jamming. " The Safety Board expressed concern that the new 
features of the redesigned PCU did not address all the previously seen 
malfunctions, some of which were related to improper maintenance, installation 
or modification. This concern appeared to have been borne out with two 
further, thankfully recoverable, instances of "anomalous" 737 rudder deflection 
in 1999. 
"During the initial certification of the 737-100 series, FAA certification officials 
expressed concern about the aircraffs single-panel, single-actuator rudder 
system and recognized the possibility of undetected latent failures in the servo 
valve, thereby negating the system's redundancy. " Nevertheless, the system 
received certification without any requirement for modification. 
The report quotes information from Boeing, which indicated that "between 1990 
and 1994 (before the USAir accident), there were 187 reported yaw/roll events 
involving the 737. In comparison, information from Boeing's Douglas Products 
Division indicates that, over about 75 million flight hours, there had only been 
96 
AIRCRAFT SYSTEM SAFETY ASSESSMENT 
-A NEW APPROACH 
three reported yaw/roll events involving the DC-9/MD-80 series aircraft. 
Information from Airbus indicates that, over about four million flight hours as of 
November 1995, there had been only one reported yaw event involving the 
A320, and that event was caused by a rudder mistrim. " 
Finally, there was a clear suggestion of design error in the design of the PCU 
servo valve: 
"The servo valve was designed to prevent abnormal flow if the secondary slide 
bottomed out at its internal stop; however, during the investigation of this 
accident, it was discovered that parts built within tolerances could be assembled 
with a resulting tolerance buildup that would allow the abnormal flow to occur if 
the secondary slide moved to its internal stop. Thus, in addition to the potential 
for overtravel because of an incorrect chamfer, it became evident that the 
secondary slide could also be forced into the overtravel range if it became 
jammed to the primary slide. Normal movement of the primary slide could 
produce a rudder reversal if a primary to secondary slide jam existed. " 
Following the USAir accident, Boeing's suppliers re-designed the PCU servo 
valve twice, completing the activity in 1998. Since incorporation of the new 
design into the 737 fleet, there have been two recorded instances of rudder- 
related events with the new valve. One was attributed to maintenance error, but 
the cause of the second was not established. The obvious question to be 
asked was to what extent was the new design subjected to safety analysis? 
3.29.3 Boeing 717 
- 
main flight deck display failures 
During the first year of revenue service by the Boeing 717 aircraft, there were 
two instances of total loss of the main flight deck displays, one occurring 
immediately after take-off. These failures forced the crews to resort to standby 
instrumentation, and resulted in a temporary night-time flying restriction on the 
fleet until the problem was solved. Investigation 1461 traced the fault to the Power 
Conversion Distribution Unit (PCDU), located in the electrical equipment bay 
under the flight deck and aft of the nose undercarriage bay. 
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The PCDU was failing due to moisture dripping into it. Making changes to the 
electrical connectors, fitting a drip-tray over the PCDU, and sealing the flight 
deck floor cured the problem. From a safety analysis standpoint, it would 
appear on the face of it that a design flaw may have been missed which allowed 
ingress of moisture into the PCDU, or the zonal analysis may have been 
insufficiently robust to recognise the danger. 
3.29.4 Boeing (McDonnell-Douglas) MD-11 landing accidents 
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Failure to properly analyse failure progression could result in totally unexpected 
failure combinations catching an operator by surprise. A possible example of 
how this could happen might be the two recent instances of heavy landings by 
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McDonnell-Douglas MD-1 I aircraft. In both cases, due to external influences, 
the landings exceeded the design limitations of the undercarriage assembly. 
However, whereas it might normally be expected that the undercarriage would 
break away from the airframe under such conditions, in both these accidents 
the wing structure failed almost simultaneously and broke away from the 
fuselage, resulting in the aircraft overturning and coming to rest inverted. 
In the case of one of these accidents, (to a FedEx aircraft at Newark), the NTSB 
report 147) cited "structural integrity requirements" as a related safety issue. The 
report cites the landing gear certification requirements, which specify that no fire 
hazard from spilt fuel will result from a main landing gear failure due to 
overload. Boeing stated that "the MD-11 was designed to allow sacrificial 
shedding (by use of fuse pins) of the main landing gear assemblies under aft 
(drag) overload conditions to prevent catastrophic loads being transmitted to the 
wing box. " They were also criticised for not giving adequate consideration to 
the high vertical load condition during the design process. 
The risk of being caught out by unexpected or unanticipated failure events has 
was best summarised by author Charles Perrow as follows 1481: 
"A system in which two or more discrete failures can interact in unexpected 
ways is described as 'interactively complex. ' in many cases, these unexpected 
interactions can affect supposedly redundant sub-systems. A sufficiently 
complex system can be expected to have many such unanticipated failure 
mode interactions, making it vulnerable to normal accidents. 
The sub-components of a tightly coupled system have prompt and major 
impacts on each other. If what happens in one part has little impact on another 
part, or if everything happens slowly (in particular, slowly on the scale of human 
thinking times), the system is not described as 'tightly coupled. ' Tight coupling 
also raises the odds that operator intervention will make things worse, since the 
true nature of the problem may well not be understood correctly. 
A normal accident typically involves interactions that are 'not only unexpected, 
but are incomprehensible for some critical period of time. ' The people involved 
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just don't figure out quickly enough what is really going wrong. A normal 
accident occurs in a complex system, one that has so many parts that it is likely 
that something is wrong with more than one of them at any given time. A well- 
designed complex system will include redundancy, so that each fault by itself 
does not prevent proper operation. However, unexpected interactions, 
especially with tight coupling, may lead to system failure. " 
3.29.5 Alaska Airlines MD-83 horizontal stabiliser failure 
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On 31 January 2600 aan tasKamrne"cwnrrerr-ouuyidti MD-83 suffered a 
catastrophic accident off the coast of California, when the pilots lost control of 
pitch attitude in the cruise and during an attempted diversion, the aircraft dived 
steeply into the Pacific with the loss of all 88 people on board. 
The NTSB accident investigation report (493 cited loss of control due to poor 
maintenance, when a failure to grease the mechanism controlling horizontal 
stabiliser pitch, caused it to become wom and fail, thus allowing the stabiliser to 
move outside its normal limits. However, one of the most important points to 
emerge from the investigation was the fact that the stabiliser control assembly 
was not designed to be failsafe in this case. 
Despite the fact that this was the first recorded such catastrophic failure on the 
DC-9 / MD-80 /717 series of aircraft, all of which use the same basic design, as 
a single system without any mechanical back-up for the main structural 
components, it could be argued that this was an accident waiting to happen. 
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This fact prompted the NTSB investigators to question whether or not a proven, 
reliable system can be considered to be "safe enough", purely as a result of its, 
up until that time, impeccable safety record. There was recognition that a 
redesign, affecting something like 1,800 aircraft, to introduce some failsafe 
back-up feature to comply with modem practice, would be very expensive 
indeed for both Boeing (the present owners of the DC-9 / MD-80 / 717 product 
line) and the airline operators. 
What early indicators might there have been from non-catastrophic stabiliser 
events, which a global data capture and sharing system might have 
highlighted? In fact it appears that there were several. Investigators found that 
the accident aircraft s jackscrew end-play was right at the limit required for 
replacement, two years before the crash, yet this fact and the reasons for not 
either carrying out the replacement at that time, or instigating some on-going 
measurement, were neither required nor recorded. Furthermore, out of all the 
relevant overhaul facilities visited as part of the investigation, only one used a 
detailed set of workcards to document each step taken during jackscrew 
overhaul. This in itself is a serious omission in procedures, and one which 
leaves a gaping hole in the ability to identify and analysis potential problems in 
service before a major event can occur. 
In today's industry, the design of a system in which a single failure can lead to a 
catastrophic event is not permitted, and NTSB Director of Aviation Safety John 
Clark described the fact that so many aircraft are still in potential danger thus: 
"It's the unknown which is worrisome. If this one single component fails, it leads 
to catastrophic failure. ' He went on to acknowledge that the problem is 
compounded by the fact that maintenance errors happen and that there 
continues to be the risk of undetected manufacturing error which can lead to 
premature fatigue and component failure. 
The inference from the NTSB accident report is that they have elected to leave 
the decision about whether or not to re-design the stabiliser system, up to 
Boeing. Finally in June 2003, Alaska Airlines admitted responsibility for the 
accident and Boeing said they would not contest liability over the aircraft's 
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design. The two companies declared their positions in filings to a San 
Francisco court where relatives of 17 of the victims are pursuing wrongful death 
claims. 
Safety officials rejected Alaska Airlines' claims that flaws in the aircraft's design 
and maintenance procedures contributed to the disaster. Attorney Brian Panish 
said: 
'This is believed to be the first time that a major aircraft manufacturer has 
declared that it would not contest liability in a mass air disaster case. It is a 
victory for the Plaintiffs because the Boeing Company will now be forced to 
compensate the families of the victims for their tragic loss. " 
Finally, and of particular relevance to this thesis, the NTSB also recommended 
that maintenance facilities overhauling DC-9 / MD-80 / 717 screv4acks should 
not only be required to record end-play measurements, but also to inform their 
airline customers. 
3.29.6 Maritime Patrol Aircraft Electrical System 
A fleet of four-engine military maritime patrol aircraft has recently gone through 
a major structural and systems upgrade to extend both its operational 
capabilities and its service life. 
As part of that upgrade, the opportunity has been taken to install a new 
Electrical Power Generating System (EPGS) to cope with an increased power 
demand from new missions systems. The EPGS is a four-channel system, with 
an Alternating Current (a. c. ) generator mounted on the accessory gearbox of 
each engine. Although there is some system redundancy in the design, that is 
to say it is possible for the total electrical power demand on the aircraft to be 
satisfied with less than full EPGS availability, it is necessary to have a minimum 
of two generating channels on-line before load-shedding is required by shutting- 
down non-essential equipment. 
The mission profile of the aircraft includes extended duration flights of up to 
eight to ten hours duration, which can be extended even further by means of 
air-to-air refueling. In order to conserve fuel and thus extend flight duration, it is 
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Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) to shut-down the two outboard engines 
for lengthy periods during long-range patrols. As a result, the EPGS is 
expected to function as a two-channel rather than a four-channel system for a 
high proportion of its installed life, thus eroding the designed redundancy safety 
margins. Although this is a questionable operating scenario when viewed solely 
from the safety standpoint, it has to be remembered that this is a military aircraft 
and is operated under circumstances where safety levels while still vitally 
important, can be and are overridden in the interests of mission capability. 
Despite this consideration however, an additional concern has arisen as a result 
of the EPGS upgrade. When the two outboard engines are shut-down, the a. c. 
generators on the two remaining engines have to satisfy the total electrical 
power demand for the aircraft, and since it is not required to carry out any load- 
shedding, as all mission systems must remain on-line, these two generators are 
now running at or close to maximum output, and thus maximum speed, oil 
temperature and so on, for extended periods. 
This in itself would not be a problem, provided that the reliability prediction of 
the generator design assumed a steady-state running condition of maximum 
output, speed and temperature, as is the case with some manufacturers' 
analyses. However, in the case of these particular generators, this was not the 
case at all. This time the reliability prediction assumed a steady-state running 
condition in the mid-range, i. e. average power output, speed and temperature, 
which is obviously a far more benign regime for equipment reliability and hence 
safety performance. In fact, the generator manufacturer's reliability guarantee 
assumed this benign environment, and when challenged on the two-engines out 
case, stated that the generator reliability figure under those circumstances 
would be degraded by a factor of approximately ten. 
Thus we are left with a condition where not only are safety margins being 
deliberately eroded by the operator's SOP, but the situation is being 
considerably worsened by a consequential drastic worsening of reliability 
performance in those system channels which are still functioning. More details 
of the analysis which highlighted this problem were shown in section 3.11 on 
103 
3ESSMENT 
-A NEW APPROACH 
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), but the point is that this was done far too late in the 
equipment selection and design process to have any effect on the outcome. 
Reliability predictions cannot be undertaken on a "one condition suits all" basis. 
There will always be large variations in reliability due to environment, usage 
rates, location, and so on. This is a recognised problem, and can be addressed 
by such tools as sensitivity analysis and the establishment of reliability 
calculation confidence levels. However, this is a complex and skilled art which 
is often ignored for the sake of expediency, and in any event, the ability to 
perform such additional analysis over the full range of possible operating 
scenarios can be at best minimal. 
3.29.7 Airbus A340 Main Undercarriage Failures 
Of course, not all design or analysis errors have such extreme consequences, 
and other examples might include the main undercarriage problems in the early 
service days of the Airbus A340, culminating in an incident at Heathrow on 6 
November 1997 involving a Virgin Atlantic aircraft. The airline was unaware of 
a similar failure with another carrier, and the accident occurred when the 
aircraft, which had a landing gear problem on approach to Heathrow Airport, 
subsequently carried out an emergency landing with the left main landing gear 
only partially extended. Full deployment of the landing gear was prevented by 
the unrestrained end of the brake torque rod having become trapped in the keel 
beam structure within the gear bay, jamming the landing gear in a partially 
deployed position. The torque pin which had connected the brake torque rod to 
that wheel brake assembly had disengaged during landing gear retraction after 
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take off from Los Angeles, allowing the unrestrained rod to pivot freely about the 
retained end. 
The wheel brake assembly design had satisfactorily passed the certification 
structural torque tests. However, the tests contained no requirement to use a 
representative axle to reproduce the deflections that occur during aircraft 
braking in service, and did not require post torque test strip assessment of 
brake assemblies for resultant evidence of overstressing deformation, which did 
not produce component failure. Once again, had there been an effective in- 
service data capture system in place, such as the one proposed in this thesis, it 
is quite probable that the earlier failure could have alerted other operators to the 
danger, and forced remedial action prior to the Virgin Atlantic incident. 
3.29.8 Commercial Aircraft Fuel Tank Safety 
Between 1990 and 2001, there were three commercial aircraft hull loss 
accidents, which had explosions of fuel tank vapour as their primary cause. 
These were: 
Philippine Airlines Boeing 737-3Y0 11 May 1990 at Manila Airport. The 
aircraft was parked in very high ambient air temperatures of around 95 
degrees Fahrenheit (35 degrees Celsius), with external air conditioning 
packs positioned beneath the centre wing fuel tank, which had been 
running for approximately 30 to 45 minutes. The fuel tank had not been 
filled since March 9, but probably still contained fuel vapour. Shortly after 
pushback a large explosion occurred in the centre fuel tank, pushing the 
cabin floor violently upwards. The wing tanks ruptured, causing the 
aircraft to burst into flames. The fuel vapour had probably been ignited by 
damaged wiring. 
TWA8 Flight 800 Boeing 747-131 17 July 1996 over the Atlantic Ocean. 
The probable cause of this accident, which resulted in the total 
disintegration of the aircraft in the cruise, was an explosion of the centre 
wing fuel tank resulting from ignition of the flammable fuel/air mixture in 
the tank. The ignition source was never determined, but the most likely 
candidate was a short circuit outside the tank that allowed excessive 
voltage to enter it through electrical wiring associated with the fuel 
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quantity indication system. It was stated that contributing factors to the 
accident were both the design and certification belief that fuel tank 
explosions could be entirely prevented by precluding all ignition sources, 
and also the design and certification of the Boeing 747 with heat sources 
located beneath the tank with no means to reduce any heat transfer into 
it or to render the fuel vapour in the tank nonflammable. 
" 
Thai Airways Boeing 737-4D7 at Bangkok Airport 3 March 2001. Parked 
at the gate in an ambient air temperature of 35 degrees Celsius, and 
again with air conditioning packs located directly beneath the center wing 
tank which had been running continuously for 40 minutes. Fuel vapour in 
the centre wing tank probably ignited, causing an explosion and fire, 
which ultimately gutted the aircraft. 
In response to these accidents, the certifying authorities placed the following 
flammability reduction measure requirements on the aircraft manufacturers; 
automated cut-off of fuel pumps running dry, improved lightning strike protection 
and fresh consideration of the routeing and location of high-power wiring 
harnesses. As a result, it became apparent that most affected aircraft types 
would require design changes to be carried out, and that these would require 
mandatory configuration control measures to ensure fleet-wide compliance. 
Following the re-design effort, it was required to introduce improved 
maintenance programmes by December 2005. Unfortunately, while the FAA 
also required retrospective introduction of these changes, EASA did not, which 
can result in loss of configuration control across like fleets, and the potential for 
confused fire safety standards. 
3.29.9 Global Aviation Information Network (GAIN) Examples 
Two further examples of the potential for learning through the use of more 
robust procedures have been reported by the GAIN initiative 1501. 
"Airline B experienced the loss of an engine cowl on one of its aircraft during 
takeoff. Investigation revealed the cause to be the failure of line maintenance 
personnel to properly secure the cowl latches following routine engine 
maintenance, due in part to the lack of color contrast between the latch 
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recesses and the adjacent cowl livery. Airline B subsequently modified the 
colour of the latch recesses to facilitate visual recognition of incorrect latch 
alignment, and amended its line maintenance procedure to include a cross- 
check of cowl latch security. It also posted an incident report on a safety 
information sharing system in which it participated and notified other operators 
of the same equipment participating in the safety information sharing system. 
Several of these operators subsequently modified their line maintenance 
procedures and some also modified the latch recess color scheme. " 
"In the course of a routine inspection, Airline C discovered a cracked engine 
mounting bolt that could have led to an overstress of the engine mounting and 
an in-flight loss of the engine. A check of incident reports on a safety 
information sharing system in which the airline participated revealed that two 
other operators had experienced the same problem and had concluded that the 
procedure for engine removal and replacement had the potential to overstress 
the mounting bolt if the engine was misaligned during replacement. These 
airlines had devised and adopted a different procedure for engine removal and 
replacement that avoided the potential problem. Airline C then adopted the new 
procedure and notified other operators of the same equipment participating in 
the safety information sharing system of the potential problem! 
3.29.10 Study Of Global Aircraft Accident Reports 
Using the Aviation Safety Network on-line aircraft accident database as a 
starting point, every listed commercial and corporate aircraft accident and major 
incident for the period 2001 to 2005 was analysed for contributory causes (see 
Appendix B). Conclusions were drawn based on either the results of the post- 
accident investigation, where that was known, or using engineering judgement 
based on the available, more limited, evidence presented in the database. 
A total of 112 events was subjected to this analysis, taking as a starting point, 
those that had clear evidence of system or equipment fault as a significant 
contributory factor, in order to exclude purely human error events. The results 
of this analysis indicate quite clearly, that over that five year period there have 
been a number of accidents and incidents which, it can be argued, might have 
been prevented, or had a lesser impact, if either the original system safety 
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analysis had been more robust and /or there had been an effective service 
event data capture system in place. 
3.29.10.1 identified Significant Event Groups 
As a result of the analysis, the following event groups were identified from those 
accident and incident records containing sufficient data to be able to draw 
conclusions with a reasonable degree of confidence: 
a) Maintenance error (22 events) 
b) Component failure (20 events) 
c) Unpredicted failure mode (8 events) 
d) Design fault (4 events) 
Looking at each of these categories in more detail, and starting with 
maintenance error, it was noticeable that two of these (C-130A 17 June 2002 
and PB4Y-2 1ß July 2002), identified inadequate procedures that failed to take 
account of either the advanced age of the aircraft concerned, or the unusual 
environment in which there were operating. These are both major arguments 
contained within this thesis. Other events cited yet more inadequate 
procedures, ineffective repairs and/or poor oversight, with five accidents 
occurring either immediately after the completion of maintenance, or very 
shortly thereafter. 
The two main lessons emerging from this group are; the lack of awareness of 
the need to review and modify procedures over time as aircraft age and 
operations change based on in-service feedback and monitoring, and the 
apparent ease with which maintenance standards and supervisory oversight 
may fail to adequately defend against progression towards an accident. In both 
cases, it is argued that better use of in-service event reporting (confidential if 
required), could have helped prevent some of these events from occurring. 
Moving on to component failure, this category is obviously less easy in terms of 
identifying potential remedies, since it might be argued that all could have been 
simply the result of a random failure. However, that is not to say that there 
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would not have been any earlier indications of impending failure, such as 
performance degradation still within operating limits, or even incorrect 
maintenance action, which again, an event reporting system might have picked 
up. 
The category of unpredicted failure mode is, on the face of it, more 
straightforward, since six of the eight identified relate to almost identical events 
on the same type of aircraft 
- 
engine failure on the Cessna Caravan. This 
single-engined aircraft is fitted with the normally extremely reliable Pratt and 
Whitney Canada PT-6 turboprop, which has a very long history of service in a 
number of different applications. However, all but one of the events listed 
occurred to aircraft operating in fairly challenging operating environments, with 
the majority occurring shortly after take-off. Given that eight of the 44 engine 
failures analysed occurred to this one type, it is reasonable to suppose that 
there may be some aircraftlengine interface problem with the Caravan that has 
not as yet been identified, and may well be linked to operating scenarios not 
fully considered during the design analysis process. It is worth noting in this 
regard, that one African operator of the Caravan (Air Kenya) withdrew its fleet 
from service in 2004, due to concerns about engine reliability; as yet there 
appears to have been no publicised response from the manufacturer. 
Another case of unidentified failure mode relates to the Fokker F. 27 accident on 
5 June 2002. This Rolls-Royce Dart engine turbine disc failure had only ever 
occurred once before, and was still under investigation at the time of this 
incident. In this case, it is clear that there was effective feedback from the first 
event, and good reaction to try and address the problem. 
Finally the four design fault events. One is the Alaska MD-80 horizontal 
stabiliser accident already discussed in this chapter. The second was a fuel 
starvation incident, which occurred to a Virgin Atlantic Airbus A340-600 on 8 
February 2005. The problem was traced to a design logic fault in the fuel 
control computer, causing a failure to transfer fuel automatically between tanks. 
This event simply reinforces the need to understand that design analysis does 
not stop at system certification. 
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The third design error event occurred on 6 March 2002, when a Domier Do. 328 
turboprop had a partial door opening during the take-off roll, which was safely 
aborted. The subsequent investigation found that although the airstair and door 
design was technically compliant with certification requirements, it lacked the 
necessary integrity to prevent such a hazardous occurrence (a cabin attendant 
had inadvertently grabbed the inner door handle to restrain herself during the 
initial acceleration). The recommendation was for a thorough review of the 
entire door operating mechanism. It would appear that in this case, the original 
zonal analysis may not have been as thorough as it might have been, but the 
main lesson here is yet again, the need for incident reporting systems. It would 
be unreasonable to suppose that this was the first time an attendant had used 
the door handle as a means of restraint, and surely the potential hazard of so 
doing must have occurred to those who may have done this before. A 
confidential reporting system may well have highlighted their concerns and thus 
prevented earlier action and prevention of this near-accident. 
The final design fault accident occurred to a Lockheed-Martin F/A-22 Raptor on 
20 December 2004. The aircraft was lost due to the failure of all three rate 
sensor assemblies, which provide feedback on yaw, roll and pitch status to the 
Flight Control System (FCS). The pilot had inadvertently triggered the failures 
during his-, pre-flight preparations when he shutdown the engines for a 
maintenance check, believing the FCS was continuously powered by the APU. 
In fact, the FCS momentarily lost power in this event, and this was linked to a 
known quirk in the system, which was programmed such that it could interpret a 
momentary power loss as. an instruction to enter test mode, which freezes or 
latches the unit Furthermore, the FCS could not warn the pilot that this had 
occurred. Up to this point in the Raptor flight test programme, the aircraft 
manufacturer had returned some 20 control units to British Aerospace for 
investigation of suspected latching events, resulting in a design change and 
fleetwide embodiment of a new standard unit. 
As Alexander Wells puts it in his book Commercial Aviation Safety (511: 
"Non-accident safety data, while not substitutes for accident and fatality data, 
are valuable supplements. If properly collected and maintained, non-accident 
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data can help identify and estimate the magnitude of safety problems and 
permit the monitoring of safety programmes. " 
Perhaps the most interesting statistic to emerge from this study is the 
percentage of aircraft accidents for which "pilot error" was the primary causal 
factor. As stated in Chapter 1, conventional wisdom would have us believe that 
approximately 75% of total loss accidents can be attributed to the human cause. 
Looking at the 112 events analysed above, it was found that the percentage for 
human factors contribution is still close to 55%; a significant point. 
3.30 CASE STUDY CONCLUSIONS 
In each of the case studies described above, it was clear from investigation that 
there had been fundamental errors in either basic design for safety, safety 
analysis of design, post-design testing, or combinations of these. The main 
points from each study are: 
" 
767 un-commanded thrust-reverser actuation 
- 
Incomplete failure mode 
evaluation of the thrust-reverser system. 
" 
737 un-commanded rudder movements 
- 
Design error In PCU servo 
valve not found during analysis. 
717 flight deck display failures 
- 
Design flaw permitting moisture ingress 
plus poor zonal analysis. 
" 
MD-11 landing accidents 
- 
Absence of design considerations for 
undercarriage sacrificial failure in the drag condition. 
" 
MD-83 horizontal stabiliser failure 
- 
Single point failure leading to a 
catastrophic event, not permitted under current certification rules, had 
been carried across without re-design from the DC-9 aircraft, which was 
designed in the 1960s before the rule was introduced. 
" 
Maritime patrol aircraft electrical power system reliability 
-A failure by 
the generator manufacturer to recognise the potential for drastically 
reduced equipment reliability when operating under certain standard 
operating flight conditions. 
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" 
A340 main undercarriage failures 
- 
Failure to adequately test the 
undercarriage design using conditions fully representative- of those 
expected on the aircraft in service. 
" 
Fuel tank safety 
- 
Failure of different certification authorities to agree on 
a common approach to implementation of essential safety modifications. 
" 
GAIN examples 
- 
The other side of the coin, demonstrating the potential 
for corrective action to address design anomalies, when data sharing is 
effective between operators. 
" 
Study of global aircraft accident reports 
- 
Statistical confirmation of the 
need for improved in-service event data capture and analysis, and more 
robust design safety analysis. 
The question that emerges from these cases is, has the industry adequately 
learned the lessons for the future? If this is not the case, what can be done to 
make the designer and analysts life easier to produce less opportunity for such 
error in their next aircraft programme? 
3.31 DEPTH OF ANALYSIS 
It is apparent that in some sections of the aerospace industry, there is a lack of 
appreciation of both the value of the system analysis process, the point in the 
equipment life-cycle at which it should be started and the depth to which it 
should be taken in order that failure mechanisms can be properly understood. 
Too often it is the case that failures are analysed by the manufacturer as single 
events and effects, with little consideration for the subsequent chain of events 
that may occur. The more detailed investigation tends to be reactive to events, 
such as the excellent work done by the Air Accident Investigation Branch (AAIB) 
on the A340 incident described above. 
This raises the issue of how well zonal, cross-system or whole aircraft analysis 
is performed. Recent initiatives to establish extensive combined designer / 
customer teams during new aircraft development (as with the Boeing 777 for 
example), plus the continued enhancement of computer-aided design and 
computer simulation of aircraft systems and interfaces are all good aids to 
design refinement. Nevertheless, while it can be argued that for instance, the 
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circumstances surrounding the MD-11 accidents were so extreme that no 
amount of analysis could have accurately predicted the actual failure 
progression, there is no escaping the fact that analysis of the interaction of 
different systems is not as smart as it needs to be. 
To be fair to the manufacturing industry, the airworthiness authorities must 
shoulder some responsibility for this, as during the course of this research it has 
been stated on several occasions that there is a distinct lack of regulatory 
guidance from them. The authorities have tended to rely almost exclusively on 
the sense of regulation FAR / JAR 25.1309 (see section 2.5), without going into 
much detail of the processes they expect the industry to use, thus leaving the 
door open to misinterpretation, lack of understanding, or too much room for 
flexibility and short-circuiting of analytical processes as a replacement for 
industry experience, in order to save time and money. 
3.32 LEGISLATION 
This lack of regulatory guidance is the root of the problem. The existing 
legislation framed by the airworthiness authorities to ensure that aircraft 
systems are fit for purpose and safe, is inadequate. Whilst the specific 
requirements for system performance, failure effect severity, failure probability 
and so on are well defined, the required methodology is insufficiently defined 
and policed to ensure adequate adherence. Even the new European Aviation 
Safety Agency (EASA) appears to have failed so far to grasp this issue (521; this 
is potentially a major lost opportunity. 
The authorities response to questions in this regard, is to point to the need for 
adequate training of system analysts; this misses the point. Most of the safety 
analysts working in the industry today are highly skilled, professional engineers 
who know their job, and are very familiar with the various guidance documents 
and standards. 
However, issues such as commercial pressures, lack of resources, etc. 
continue to harass the safety analyst and all too often result in the line of least 
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resistance being taken. From personal experience within the aircraft system 
industry, the author can say that this can result in any one or all of the following: 
" 
Analysis started too late to adequately impact on design 
Analysis results "tailored" to fit the expectations or design requirements 
" 
Incomplete analysis 
- 
the minimum to satisfy the requirement 
" 
Suspect data which may not be supportable 
- 
e. g. failure rates 
" 
No independence in the analysis 
- 
the designer does it himself 
"A potentially unsafe system enters service 
The FAA states in Advisory Circular 23.1309-1 C Equipment, Systems and 
Installations in Part 23 Aircraft, that: 
"This advisory circular provides guidance and information for an acceptable 
means, but not the only means, for showing compliance with the requirements 
of 23.1309. This material is neither mandatory nor regulatory in nature and 
does not constitute a regulation. " Perhaps it should? In the next chapter the 
various conflicting views that lead to the posing of this question are discussed. 
3.33 SUMMARY 
It is clear that despite the good safety levels being enjoyed by the industry, 
there is little room for complacency, particularly with regard to the projected 
future growth of air travel. The case studies examined demonstrate that the 
emergence of human factors as the centre of attention must not be allowed to 
completely divert attention away from the problems of technical failure. 
However, even such acknowledged experts as Charles Perrow are still not 
taking their work far enough. He excludes from his analysis what he calls "final 
accidents, " catastrophic events such as an aircraft breaking up in flight, since, 
he says, "they are not interesting from an analytical point of view because there 
is nothing that the operator can do to influence the course of events. " This 
sweeping statement ignores the vital contribution of in-service data capture to 
the overall effort to ensure safe designs. The legislators must take a clear 
stance on this issue and ensure that the industry uses the best available 
processes to produce robust system safety analysis. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
- 
IN-SERVICE DATA GATHERING SYSTEMS 
4.0 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines the use of commercially available data gathering 
systems to collect and analyse commercial aircraft in-service event data, and 
comments on the usefulness of the data captured and the effectiveness of the 
analysis. Regulatory guidance material is considered, and is coupled with the 
standard processes for formulating aircraft maintenance programmes and the 
associated reliability monitoring requirement. Wider issues discussed include 
Flight Data Monitoring (FDM), Mandatory Occurrence Reporting (MOR), 
maintenance error reporting, human factors issues, and the effectiveness of 
various industry responses. 
The chapter concludes with a detailed look at the key areas of system safety 
that need to addressed, concentrating on clear demonstration of the need for far 
more accurate and meaningful event data capture and feedback than is 
currently available. 
4.1 DATA GATHERING SYSTEMS 
"British Airways credit the use of a Flight Data Analysis programme, as part of a 
safety management system, as reducing their hull losses from 30, in the years 
1952 to 1978, to 2, in the period 1978 to 1999. " 1" 
"Aviation accidents and incidents continue to occur, information sharing is 
usually anecdotal and not business-as-usual... currently there is no single 
source of lessons learned/corrective action information for the aviation 
community. " 1541 
When in-service event data gathering is done, the most common methodology 
by which an aircraft or systems manufacturer will capture the data is by use of a 
Failure Reporting Analysis and Corrective Action System (FRACAS), which 
gathers event data, deposits it into a database or spreadsheet and then offers 
the facility to analyse that data for performance, reliability and failure trends. 
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The system will also add in additional data such as that provided by the repair 
and overhaul people, while the most developed systems also have a formalised 
output that requires trend review and corrective action to be taken if necessary. 
In more recent times the similar sounding Defect Reporting Analysis and 
Corrective Action System (DRACAS) has gained favour in some parts of the 
industry, since it attempts to illustrate a more developed approach to equipment 
performance analysis than is the case with a system that just looks at failures. 
Given that an understanding of what is and what is not a true component failure 
is, perhaps surprisingly, not as widespread as it should be, this opportunity for 
improved analysis is still not well established. 
4.2 HOW RELEVANT IS THE DATA? 
"Modem technology has a lot to offer the operating organisations. Better, more 
comprehensive monitoring of aircraft components, systems and performance 
coupled with enhanced means of transferring and analysing the recorded data 
can provide big payback. The reality is that aircraft are being kept in service for 
longer and their mission requirements are continuously being revised. As a 
fleet ages so its maintenance costs continue to grow. Concurrently, the 
pressure to increase maintenance productivity, reduce maintenance manhours 
and improve aircraft readiness continues to strain the current structure. Better 
understanding of aircraft actual usage, more accurate and timely information on 
needed aircraft maintenance and improved tracking of component usage is 
critical to realising gains in aircraft readiness. Comprehensive aircraft 
monitoring is the key to this achievement. " 1551 
Let us now take a closer look at the data that may go into a FRACAS (or 
DRACAS) system. In the early days of equipment's service life it is likely to be 
covered by the manufacturer's warranty. For that reason alone, whenever a 
unit suffers an unscheduled removal from an aircraft, it is virtually certain that 
the operator will return it to the manufacturer for assessment and repair. 
Therefore there will be considerable confidence that the manufacturer is getting 
information about every such event across the whole fleet of aircraft fitted with 
his equipment, and thus he believes that his resultant reliability calculations will 
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be as accurate as possible. However, in those early days of fleet build-up when 
flying hours totals are comparatively low, small changes in the number of 
equipment arisings can have disproportionate and distorting effects on reliability 
calculations. 
The picture changes considerably however, once the warranty period passes. 
The operator may elect to repair the equipment himself or contract the work out 
to a third party, with the result that the flow of data back to the manufacturer 
becomes at best less than complete, and at worst ceases altogether. This will 
be especially true of equipment that goes to a third party, since in many cases 
they will be in direct competition with the manufacturer for repair business and 
will therefore be highly unlikely to share their shop findings. 
Will the manufacturer now recognise the fact that his FRACAS system is no 
longer seeing 100% of fleet events, or will he simply believe that his equipment 
is becoming more reliable as time goes on? Unless he recognises the signs, 
he will continue to analyse reliability using 100% of the total fleet flying hours 
and far less than 100% of the events. This distortion of the analysis may then 
get fed back into the design team who get an unjustifiably rosy picture of how 
the equipment is performing, and then use those incorrect failure rates in the 
safety analysis of follow-on or upgraded equipment. 
An example of this is a recent case involving safety analysis of contactors in an 
aircraft electrical power distribution system. The manufacturer claimed an 
extremely low failure rate for his contactors, and when challenged to justify it, 
stated categorically that the rate had been established by in-service data, and 
was based on all the units returned to them for repair. What the company's 
analyst had failed to recognise was that a very significant proportion of 
contactors failing in service were simply being discarded on failure and replaced 
with new ones, since it was a far more cost-effective policy than going to the 
expense of putting them into the repair loop. 
Of course it could also be true that the manufacturer's data gathering system is 
not sufficiently robust to recognise unjustifiably pessimistic analysis, which may 
then penalise a design because it apparently fails to meet its safety targets. 
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Such errors can occur when the natural instinct to "worst case" incomplete data 
is permitted to cloud the data. 
4.3 WHAT TO DO WITH THE DATA 
Despite these attempts at gaining a better understanding of how a 
manufacturer's equipment is performing in the field, all too often the result is a 
data gathering system without a close-out action loop; in other words what the 
company really has is a FRA system without the CAS. If the data is not 
properly analysed and the need for some kind of action goes unrecognised, 
then potentially damaging and costly impacts on the customers may not be 
addressed. From the safety analysis perspective, a full and correct 
understanding of equipment performance, failure mechanisms and trends will 
not be gathered to be fed back into the design analysis. 
The other major problem endemic in many FRACAS systems is the inability to 
differentiate between an inherent component failure, and an induced (or 
secondary) failure. Without this understanding through sufficient detail in both 
repair shop strip reports and the FRACAS system itself, the outcome may be a 
corrective action that addresses the wrong failure mode. Needless to say, this 
not only has the potential for generating expensive and ultimately fruitless 
equipment modification, but also will seriously undermine the value of the 
reliability data being fed into the analysis of new or improved designs. 
Fortunately the SAE, at least, has recognised this poor approach to the 
monitoring of in-service equipment performance. A new standard ARP 5150 
was released in 2003, and is intended to be the international standard for 
ongoing safety assessment of aircraft in the field. 
The fundamental issue is that when analysing a new design, it is vitally 
important to be certain just how relevant the raw FRACAS input data coming 
from the field really is. Without that certainty, unjustified beliefs in reliability 
high-performers may become so entrenched in the organisational psyche that it 
can come as a major and expensive shock to learn, some years down the line, 
that all is not well with the operators. 
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4.4 REGULATORY GUIDANCE 
What guidance does the industry receive from regulators or other bodies that 
might encourage the retrieval, analysis and effective action-taking of empirical 
data from the in-service fleet? The short answer is "plenty"; but a closer look at 
what is expected soon reveals significant holes in the guidance. 
Implicit in the JAR-OPS regulations concerning aircraft maintenance (contained 
in Sub-Part M), is the requirement for an operator or his contracted 
maintenance provider, to have a system to monitor the effectiveness of their 
maintenance programme. Specifically, JAR-OPS states in section 1.890(a)(4) 
Maintenance Responsibility: 
"An operator should have a system to analyse the effectiveness of the 
maintenance programme, with regard to spares, established defects, 
malfunctions and damage, and to amend the maintenance programme (this 
amendment will involve the approval of the Authority unless the operator has 
been approved to amend the maintenance programme without direct 
involvement of the Authority). " 
Section 1.910(a) Operator's Aeroplane Maintenance Programme is even more 
explicit: 
"Where an operator wishes to use an aeroplane with the initial operator's 
aeroplane maintenance programme based upon the Maintenance Review 
Board Report (MRBR) process, any associated programme for the continuous 
surveillance of the reliability, or health monitoring of the aeroplane should be 
considered as part of the aeroplane maintenance programme. Some approved 
operator's aeroplane maintenance programmes, not developed from the MRB 
Process, utilise reliability programmes. Such reliability programmes should be 
considered as a part of the approved maintenance programme. Reliability 
programmes should be developed for aeroplane maintenance programmes 
based upon MSG logic or those that include condition monitored components or 
that do not contain overhaul time periods for all significant system components. " 
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A suggested method of compliance with these requirements was first defined in 
the JAA's Temporary Guidance Leaflet (TGL) 25, which layed out their vision of 
an ideal process. Subsequently, the TGL25 principles were absorbed by EASA 
into guidance material on means of compliance with the regulatory 
requirements for commercial aircraft maintenance programmes, albeit 
essentially unchanged. The good news was that this material stated that a 
reliability programme should be in place for any aircraft whose maintenance 
programme is defined using Maintenance Steering Group 3 (MSG-3) rules. It 
is necessary to explain in some detail exactly what that means, in order to 
illustrate just how complex this whole problem of accurate in-service data 
gathering has become. 
4.5 ORIGINS OF MAINTENANCE STEERING GROUPS 
The MSG system has its origins in a United States initiative in the 1960s. Up to 
that time, there was no standardised, structured procedure for developing 
scheduled maintenance plans for commercial aircraft, and as a consequence, 
the tendency was for operators to over-maintain aircraft and systems. The 
reason for this of course, was that no-one had a clear view of the safety effects 
of all system failures, because they were not being analysed, so by the "belt 
and braces" approach, the view was taken that too much maintenance was 
better than not enough. 
This approach was obviously not only very hit and miss with regard to ensuring 
safety, but was also generating excessive amounts of maintenance man-hours 
per flying hour, and thus becoming a major financial burden on the airlines. 
The MSG initiative, lead by representatives of various airlines, decided to start 
addressing the issue by looking at aircraft engines, and building a process to 
identify those parts which could cause a major safety problem if they failed, and 
concentrate on these when constructing the scheduled maintenance 
programme. In theory therefore, a significant number of other parts could be 
taken out of the maintenance schedule and in essence, allowed to fail 
- 
the so- 
called condition-based maintenance, generically known as "fit and forget. 
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4.6 EVOLUTION OF MSG-3 
The first major outcome of the initiative was the publication of Handbook MSG 
Maintenance Evaluation and Program Development, which included decision 
logic and airline/manufacturer procedures for developing scheduled 
maintenance plans for the then-new Boeing 747, chosen as the vehicle for what 
came to be known as MSG-1. This laid the basis for the system that is still 
used today, and which is described below. 
The process was further refined to make it non-aircraft type specific, and the 
resulting MSG-2 Airline/Manufacturer Maintenance Program Planning 
Document was derived in the 1970s to analyse both the Douglas DC-10 and 
Lockheed L-1011 aircraft. Next, the British and French aircraft industries 
picked up the process, and the European MSG version was successfully used 
on the Concorde and Airbus A300 programmes, with the lessons learned from 
that being fed back into the original US model. An Air Transport Association 
(ATA) task force reviewed MSG-2 to finally produce today's MSG-3, which 
included some clarification of the distinction between economics and safety, 
and more adequate treatment of hidden functional failures. With relatively 
minor amendments, this is where we are today. 
4.6.1 The MSG-3 Process 
The MSG-3 process is closely allied to another long-standing model, Reliability 
Centered Maintenance (RCM), which was formulated many years ago by two 
United Airlines employees. In an effort to further promote this work, John 
Moubray gave RCM a wider audience through his book Reliability Centered 
Maintenance published in 1992. RCM is a very thorough audit of equipment 
and process functionality with the end result usually being a programme of non- 
destructive testing and usually some procedure changes to avoid catastrophic 
failure. Moubray said he saw no harm to equipment or processes by using RCM 
and believed that it was a long and arduous way of developing an effective non- 
destructive testing plan. 
It was quickly taken up by the US Armed Forces and embedded in the present 
worldwide process, MIL-STD-2173. 
121 
AIRCRAFT SYSTEM SAFETY ASSESSMENT 
-A NEW APPROACH 
MSG-3 itself is originated by the aircraft and system manufacturers, with the 
results being reviewed by Industry Steering Committees (ISC) Maintenance 
Review Boards (MRBs) representing regulators, operators, and so on. 
However, the process does not stop once the MRB is happy, since following 
entry into service, the operator may wish to modify the scheduled maintenance 
programme in some way to suit his own particular operating scenario, and the 
rules allow him so to do, provided that he still follows the same MSG-3 
methodology. 
The first step is the identification in every system on the aircraft, of those parts 
which, if they failed, could cause a significant safety problem. This is done by 
answering the following four questions: 
a. Could failure be undetectable or not likely to be detected by the 
operating crew during normal duties? 
b. Could failure affect safety (on ground or in flight), including 
safety/emergency systems or equipment? 
c. Could failure have significant operational impact? 
d. Could failure have significant economic impact? 
If the answer to any one of these questions is "yes", then the part is termed a 
Maintenance Significant Item (MSI) or, if it is a structural component a 
Structurally Significant Item (SSI), and must now be taken through the rest of 
the analytical process. However, if all four questions have been answered "no", 
the process stops and no further analysis of the item for maintenance 
requirements is required. Needless to say, it is vital that this initial selection is 
accurate, and at the design stage, the information provided to answer the four 
selection questions comes from the designer's FMEA and / or FMECA. 
Following selection SSIs are next taken through a process that asks a further 
series of questions about the nature of their failure effects, which depending on 
the responses are categorised as one of the following: 
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a) Evident / Safety 
- 
the effect of the failure is evident to the flight crew 
and could have major or catastrophic consequences 
b) Evident / Operational 
- 
the effect of the failure is evident to the flight 
crew and could curtail operational or have a significant operational 
impact. Note: Operation is defined as the time during which 
passengers and crew are onboard for the purpose of flight. 
c) Evident / Economic 
- 
the effect of the failure is evident to the flight 
crew but the effects have only an economic impact, e. g. loss or 
degradation of non-critical and non-operational systems in flight, and 
corrective maintenance activity back on the ground 
d) Hidden / Safety 
- 
the effect of the failure is NOT evident to the flight 
crew and could have major or catastrophic consequences 
e) Hidden / Operational 
- 
the effect of the failure is NOT evident to the 
flight crew and could curtail operational or have a significant 
operational impact 
f) Hidden / Economic 
- 
the effect of the failure is NOT evident to the 
flight crew but the effects have only an economic impact, e. g. loss or 
degradation of non-critical and non-operational systems in flight, and 
corrective maintenance activity back on the ground 
As can readily be seen, categories a) and particularly d) are especially 
undesirable. 
Following categorisation, each MSI is now taken through a final series of 
questions intended to identify what (if any) scheduled maintenance activity can 
be applied that will be appropriate and effective in reducing the probability of 
occurrence of the failure and its consequent effects on the aircraft. Once 
again, there are a number of options: 
1) Is a lubrication / servicing task appropriate and effective? 
2) Is an operational /visual check task appropriate and effective? 
3) Is an inspection, / functional check task appropriate and effective? 
4) Is a restoration task appropriate and effective? 
5) Is a discard task appropriate and effective? 
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As soon as "yes" is answered, the process stops and all that is now required is 
to fully define the nature of the maintenance task, together with a justification 
statement and a proposed periodicity, (it is acceptable to say "yes" to more than 
one task). Here too, it can be seen just how vital it is to assess the accuracy of 
the analysis by learning from in-service feedback, thus giving confidence in the 
maintenance of safety margins (assuming of course that the original FMEA - 
FMECA 
- 
SSI / MSI task selection trail was correct). 
What happens if no maintenance tasks can be identified as appropriate and 
effective? Here MSG-3 is very unambiguous. In the cases of failures with 
safety effects, either evident or hidden, it states that re-design is mandatory. In 
all other cases, i. e. those with operational or economic outcomes, it says that 
re-design may be desirable. 
However, what if there was a fine line in the decision process between whether 
or not a failure had a safety effect or an operational effect? What part might the 
original use of non-empirical failure rate data have had to play in that decision? 
Could all this subsequently be influenced by a commercial decision based on 
the premise of trading off safety against the economic viability or desirability of 
what could be an expensive re-design? 
Once we enter the in-service phase of the fleet, and aircraft are being 
maintained by JAR-21 (design authority) and JAR-145 (maintenance) approved 
organisations, who are allowed within certain limits to design and incorporate 
their own modifications, just how robust are their systems within the framework 
of JAR-OPS Sub-Part M and the acceptable means of compliance in ensuring a 
full understanding of what they are doing in MSG-3 terms? 
4.7 MAINTAINABILITY 
Of course, no matter how good the MSG-3 work has been, the starting point for 
effective maintenance to ensure safety levels, has to be a maintainable design. 
Right back at the beginning of the safety analysis process, maintainability (and 
repairability) should have been inherent parts of the analysis. 
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A maintainability prediction provides a solid framework for performing 
maintainability analyses. Replaceable component data is used to generate 
maintenance parameters and calculations, including Mean Time to Repair 
(MTTR), Mean Maintenance Man-hours per Repair (MMH/Repair) and so on. 
Gaining ever increasing importance is the ability of on-board monitoring, testing 
and diagnostic systems to isolate and identify an ever increasing percentage of 
faults to a single replaceable item. Typical requirements for new systems talk of 
values in the order of 90% plus. 
Indeed, new developments in test technology are predicted to see engines and 
other aircraft components eventually becoming "smart assets" that tell 
maintenance planners exactly what their condition is, what maintenance they 
are going to need and when they will need it Managers will, in turn, plan the 
most economical schedules for repairing or replacing these smart pieces of 
equipment, supposedly without the expensive unscheduled removals that 
happen today. That, at least, is the vision, and many people share it. However, 
there still are substantial hurdles and questions. Quite apart from the danger of 
false warnings leading to a high rate of No Fault Found (NFF) removals, what 
about the skill of the maintenance engineer? There was much talk in the 1980s 
and 1990s of the need for aircraft operators to remain as "intelligent customers", 
that is to say, retaining a certain level of systems knowledge and expertise to 
ensure that in-house maintenance activity, even at line level, remained cost- 
effective. Even in the cockpit, it has recently been stated that pilots entering 
the profession today may go through their careers without ever experiencing an 
engine failure, due to the high levels of reliability now being achieved. If they 
did suffer a failure, how confident might the pilot feel in coping with the 
situation? 
The relentless drive towards diagnostic and prognostic sophistication may, in 
many ways, militate against this philosophy, and turn our line engineers 
especially into little more than licensed "box changers". Indeed it is not just the 
engineers who may fall into this trap of diminished systems awareness, so vital 
in order to maintain our flight safety levels and provide the feedback that should 
be the life-blood of the design and analysis effort. 
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Take the example of the Air Transat A330 incident in 2001. The aircraft was on 
a scheduled flight from Canada to Portugal when it suffered a major fuel leak in 
the supply to the right hand engine, which as a result, flamed out. Some 
minutes later, the left hand engine also flamed out, primarily because the flight 
deck crew system knowledge was insufficient to enable them to accurately 
identify the fuel system leak problem and take the appropriate corrective action 
to isolate the leak which was available to them. In the event, the aircraft was 
able to glide to a successful un-powered landing in the Azores, but 
nevertheless, the lesson is clear. Not only should flight crews be given 
additional training in aircraft systems knowledge, but also how safe can a 
system truly be claimed to be if such an event can be allowed to happen? 
Once again we are bringing in several aspects of safety analysis: 
Design analysis that must consider system safe states 
" 
Efficiency of Built-In Test Equipment (BITE) 
" 
Possibility of incorrect actions required by the crew 
Poor maintainability design not only impacts directly on maintenance cost per 
flight hour, but also may lead to incorrect or incomplete corrective action or 
maintenance being performed either on the flight deck or in the field. 
4.8 HOW GOOD IS EASA GUIDANCE MATERIAL 
As we have already said, an aircraft operator may elect to repair aircraft and 
equipment himself or contract the work out to third parties, a decision based not 
only on financial expediency, but also on a whole host of other issues including 
his own capabilities in terms of facilities, people skills, experience and so on, 
repair turn-round times, fleet size, annual hours flown, etc.. The more 
diversified the maintenance system is, the more likely that the flow of data back 
to the manufacturer becomes less than satisfactory. 
EASA guidance material clearly states that an operator is perfectly at liberty to 
contract out not only his maintenance, but also the accompanying reliability 
programme, although he still has a "duty of care" in both cases requiring audit of 
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his contractors capabilities on a regular basis. So far so relatively good, but 
the data trail is now getting very lengthy and unwieldy indeed, and thus like any 
chain, it is only going to be as strong as its weakest link. It must be 
remembered that what we are trying to achieve in all this is a clear 
understanding by everyone concerned of just how well equipment and systems 
are performing in service, in order to: 
1) Ensure aircraft safety levels are not being compromised 
2) Identify event trends and do something about them 
3) Measure the effectiveness of maintenance programmes and corrective 
actions 
4) Prevent re-invention of the wheel by learning the lessons 
5) Communicate the results 
There are three final chinks in the acceptable means of compliance's armour or, 
as Professor James Reason says in his well-known work on risks and defences, 
there are two further ways in which the holes in the defences can line-up to 
allow, in this case, risk to slip through un-noticed. 
Firstly, because the EASA material is for guidance only and therefore not 
mandatory in all its aspects, the distribution of reliability reports is largely left to 
the judgement of the originating organisation. As a result, it is easy, and 
perhaps tempting, for some to have minimal distribution of their reports outside 
their own four walls. Perhaps this is driven by a desire to avoid airing their dirty 
linen in public, or to avoid any issues with commercial confidentiality as has 
already been mentioned. In either case, if they are not forced to give reports 
the widest possible circulation, then obviously they will not do so unless they 
can see a clear benefit. 
Secondly, operators of small aircraft fleets are quite rightly encouraged to tailor 
their reliability programmes using their own engineering judgement, to ensure 
that the data they do collect and analyse is appropriate. The main reason for 
this is that drawing meaningful conclusions from failure trend analysis when you 
have a fleet of only a handful of aircraft, perhaps of mixed types, and maybe 
with low annual utilisation, is virtually impossible. But, that should not mean that 
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their data is not just as important as that coming from those with large fleets. 
There are lessons to be learned from everyone, not least because of 
differences in operating scenarios, environmental conditions, utilisation, 
maintenance programmes and so on. The small players should be encouraged 
to share their data, while at the same time, the owner of the "central database", 
be it the aircraft manufacturer, system manufacturer, regulator, or whoever must 
disseminate the analytical results and recommendations back out to everyone 
too. 
Thirdly, the acceptable means of compliance lists the following sources of data 
for a reliability programme: 
(a) Pilots Reports 
(b) Technical Logs 
(c) Aircraft Maintenance Access Terminal / On-board Maintenance System 
readouts 
(d) Maintenance Worksheets 
(e) Workshop Reports 
(f) Reports on Functional Checks 
(g) Reports on Special Inspections 
(h) Stores Issues/Reports 
(i) Air Safety Reports 
0) Reports on Technical Delays and Incidents 
(k) Other sources: ETOPS, RVSM, CAT I1/I11 
Laudable though these aims are, there is as yet no system in place with the 
capability of pulling all these highly disparate strands together to form a 
cohesive and truly meaningful repository of knowledge. 
Finally and encouragingly, the guidance material does talk about the desirability 
of pooling data with others. Paragraph 9 of the document says: 
"In some cases, in order that sufficient data may be analysed it may be 
desirable to "pool" data: i. e. collate data from a number of operators of the same 
type of aircraft. For the analysis to be valid, the aircraft concerned, mode of 
128 
AIRCRAFT SYSTEM SAFETY ASSESSMENT 
-A NEW APPROACH 
operation, and maintenance procedures applied must be substantially the 
same: variations in utilisation between two operators may more than anything, 
fundamentally corrupt the analysis. " 
Regrettably, it is the use of such phrases as "may be desirable to pool data" and 
the clear implication that variations in utilisation may corrupt the analysis, that 
provides operators with a "get out of jail free" card to enable them to back away 
from data sharing. 
In paragraph 9.4, it goes on to say: 
"Where an operator wishes to pool data in this way, the approval of the 
Authority should be sought prior to any formal agreement being signed between 
operators. " 
The logic behind this statement is difficult to understand. Surely there should 
be no regulatory barriers to data sharing, which can only be for the common 
good? 
Finally, the guidance material ends this section with the statement: 
"It is acceptable that the operator participates in a reliability programme 
managed by the aircraft manufacturer, when the Authority is satisfied that the 
manufacturer manages a reliability programme which complies with the intent of 
this leaflet' 
Yet again, the wording is hardly designed to give encouragement to any 
operator who is wavering over the extent of his reliability programme and 
distribution of his output data and reports. 
4.9 RECORDING ACCIDENTS, INCIDENTS AND ERRORS 
Apart from reliability programmes, which capture equipment or systemic issues 
in their purest form, what other information is out there that we need to have 
access to in order to achieve our goal of fewer accidents, and why should we do 
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it? Taking the last question first, the premise of what is known as Continuing 
Airworthiness is laid down by ICAO 1561 as follows: 
"All of the processes ensuring that, at any time in its life, an aeroplane complies 
with the technical conditions fixed to the issue of the Certificate of Airworthiness 
and is in a condition for safe operation. " 
ICAO also has a view on accident data capture, and is very specific about 
reporting responsibilities and so on, and rightly so, but the key message here is 
that all this only relates to major accidents, with a similar process for less 
serious incidents. Why can we not have a similarly clearly defined process for 
minor incidents and occurrences, to help prevent the more serious stuff from 
happening in the future? 
Accident Reliability of 
Severity Reporting 
Figure 8- Heinrich Pyramid (R G WCherry & Associates 
The Heinrich Pyramid shows that for every major accident or injury, there will be 
3-5 less significant accidents, and 7-10 incidents, but there will be at least 
several hundred (unreported) occurrences. Adopting this pyramid for the air 
safety information model, an extra layer for aircraft defects can be added. 
The inverted pyramid on the right shows the relative amount of information 
currently made readily available for each type of occurrence. A large number of 
occurrences are simply not reported, either because the aircraft was not 
damaged or delayed, and / or because none of the occupants were injured. In 
the majority of occurrences an unsafe situation does not occur thanks to the 
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safe design features already discussed, system redundancy and so on. 
Nevertheless, unreported occurrences may be the start of a process that builds 
towards a major incident or even a catastrophic accident, especially in those 
cases were two or more unreported occurrences coincide. 
Addressing all these "lesser events" at the bottom of the pyramid should be 
everybody's goal, but as can be seen, this is the area where reporting is 
currently at its least reliable. In order to try and overcome this the GAIN was set 
up in 1996 to promote as the name implies, data sharing through globally 
accepted and accessible systems. The definition of the initiative states that: 
"GAIN promotes and facilitates the voluntary collection and sharing of safety 
information by and among users in the international aviation community to 
improve safety" 
GAIN is sub-divided into a number of working groups, which are studying the 
problem in much detail, but so far they are being limited by the amount of 
interest being shown in their work in the wider industry. Indeed, many airline 
people when asked about their view of GAIN, have never heard of itl It is the 
same old story, so far. 
In February 2003, GAIN issued a study document on their view of the way 
forward in this area, entitled How Information Sharing Contributes to Airline 
Flight Safety. The document makes the point very forcibly that "not only does 
new information from accidents and incidents become available relatively 
infrequently, but an increasing proportion of accidents arise from causes that 
have not been previously recognized as significant hazards. Flight safety 
management is about managing these threats, and the first requirement is to 
know which threats to address. The necessity of learning from incidents with 
less serious consequences in order to make changes that reduce the likelihood 
of more serious incidents or accidents is therefore becoming widely 
recognised! 
"The obvious, and important, benefit of sharing safety related information lies in 
reducing the risk of an accident through more timely recognition of previously 
unforeseen threats and ways to address them. While accidents are fortunately 
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very rare, when they do occur, they impose enormous costs on the airlines 
involved, not to mention the often tragic consequences to the passengers, 
airline personnel and third parties directly involved. " 
it is clear that data sharing can only aid the operators' understanding of what is 
going on. An airline flying a fleet of say, 50 Being 747s, is sure to have a 
reasonable "feel" for how well any of the aircraft systems are performing with 
some level of confidence in the representative nature of the statistics, even 
without looking outside their own operation. However, the corporate operator of 
a single 747 flying a low number of hours annually, and operating far removed 
from other 747 operators, will have great difficulty relating failure events on his 
aircraft in overall reliability terms that mean anything. The danger of course is 
that he may not fully recognise the problem and could believe that his MTBF of 
say 1,000 hours for an item of equipment is acceptable since he only flies 600 
hours a year, whereas the rest of the world-wide fleet may be getting MTBFs 
many times that. 
Effort continues to follow-up on operational demonstrations of a number of 
software packages aimed at promoting data sharing, but to date the interest 
level and take-up by a significant number of the world airlines is yet to start. 
Furthermore, the necessary links from the airlines, to and from other bodies 
such as the aircraft and system manufacturers, maintenance and repair 
organisations, the regulatory authorities, and so on, are not yet in place. 
Nevertheless, GAIN has issued a Concept of Operations document for a 
lessons learned and corrective actions sharing system, and has recently 
followed this up with studies aiming towards an international standard for safety 
event descriptor codes, a vital step forward to facilitate data sharing, and one 
which is addressed in more detail later in this thesis. 
4.10 LEARNING FROM MAINTENANCE ERRORS 
For initiatives such as GAIN to be effective requires not only widespread co- 
operation, but also the drawing together of many different data capture and 
analysis processes. These processes must be easy to use and must be 
operated in a good safety culture; for good read "just". 
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There has been much talk over the years of how to define an organisations 
safety culture, and even today it is still possible to hear people refer to their 
safety management systems as being "no blame", since that was seen as the 
right way to go to move away from the bad old days of "blame" cultures, when 
nobody would ever use an error reporting system (assuming one existed), for 
fear of retribution. 
Blame free is equally wrong, since removal of all threats of action in the case of 
deliberate or malicious acts is equally devaluing to the error capture need. 
One of the best and increasingly common models used today to capture 
maintenance error events and ensure they are learned from, is Boeing's 
Maintenance Error Decision Aid (MEDA). 
Boeing's philosophy in developing the tool is: 
"In most accidents its the process that's to blame, not the individual worker. " 
Maintenance errors are thought to contribute to around 15% of aircraft 
accidents worldwide, and it is therefore vital that we learn from them. It is not 
simply a case of finding an individual's simple erroneous or negligent act and 
counseling them, MEDA goes far deeper than this. What we really need to 
discover is all the underlying contributors to the error, and with particular regard 
to system safety analysis, find out if there was a fundamental design flaw 
among those contributors, and if so fix it. 
The MEDA methodology follows this logic: 
Identification of a maintenance error event 
Identification of the person or persons responsible 
Interviews to ascertain underlying causes 
" 
Identification of corrective action 
- 
this could be manual discrepancies, 
erroneous maintenance procedures, poor or inappropriate resources 
- 
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both human and material 
- 
shift patterns, working hours, environmental 
conditions, and so on 
" 
Implementing corrective action and measuring its effectiveness over time 
" 
Communications all of the above to the widest possible audience 
Needless to say, the final point is the one where, as we have already seen, 
most such systems fall down. Even assuming the operator has ensured that 
the rest of his team learn about the error and the fix, how about all the other 
operators of similar equipments? How about the aircraft manufacturer, the 
system supplier, the regulators; surely they should all be in the communication 
loop too? 
4.11 FLIGHT DATA MONITORING AND OTHER EXISTING DATA 
RETRIEVAL SYSTEMS 
One of the best-known flight data retrieval systems is British Airway's Safety 
Information System (BASIS), which has been around since 1990. 
BASIS consists of a number of different modules as follows: 
ASR 
- 
Air Safety Reporting. The ASR module is used to process flight crew 
generated reports of any safety-related incident and was the original BASIS 
module. There is a built-in risk assessment facility and the system records 
details of resulting outcomes and actions taken to prevent recurrence. Incidents 
are categorised using a reference and keyword system with the 
option of breaking these down further into cause and effect. 
AUD 
- 
Auditing System. The audit module has been designed to store and 
analyse details of JAR Ops (Flight Operations, Engineering, Ground 
Operations) and Health and Safety audits. 
CSR 
- 
Cabin Safety Reporting. For safety incidents in the cabin such as violent, 
abusive and/or unsafe passenger behaviour. Although designed, this part of 
the BASIS system has never been used. 
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GOR 
- 
Ground Found Occurrence Reporting. Reports raised by ground 
engineers which are related to aircraft safety, analysed in a similar way to 
ASRs generated by flight crew. As BASIS says, "Engineering Quality would 
normally be the main user of this system, however, there are great benefits in 
sharing this type of information with the rest of the airline" and indeed the other 
operators of similar equipment. Like other modules, GOR produces analysis 
charts which provide a means of identifying trends. 
GHR 
- 
Ground Handling Reporting. Events resulting in damage and operational 
disruption. 
HFR 
- 
Human Factors Reporting. Aims to facilitate identification of human 
causal factors behind incidents. 
MEI 
- 
Maintenance Error Investigations. Identifies what maintenance errors are 
occurring and more importantly why; i. e. what were the contributory factors. 
This module derives its data from the already-described Boeing MEDA system, 
which British Airways helped to develop. Failed processes which should have 
prevented the incidents are identified. Corrective actions suggested or taken to 
prevent recurrence at both the local and organisational level are stored for 
analysis. 
SIE 
- 
Safety Information Exchange. For system safety, this is one of the key 
modules, since users extract and send their data quarterly to IATA. The data is 
de-identified at source and merged into one global database which is then 
distributed to those users who have contributed data. The merged SIE database 
is sent out every quarter and contains incidents occurring during the preceding 
12 months. Originally supported entirely by the BASIS team, this service Is now 
provided by IATA under the auspices of their Safety Trend Evaluation, Analysis 
and Data Exchange System (STEADES). This may be partly due to the 
decision by British Airways in 2003 to sell off BASIS (and its on-line version 
WinBASIS), as it no longer represented core activity of the airline. This was 
seen as a concerning development, and it is to be hoped that the new owners, 
Mercator (part of the Emirates Airlines group), who in September 2005 re- 
branded the product as Sentinel, will continue the good work. They are 
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certainly ambitious for the product, aiming to enable direct connection between 
the aircraft and Sentinel using Gatelink technology, to make "web-based 
reporting a thing of the past" 1571. Whether this latter aim is the right one is 
highly debatable, since it apparently assumes that only on-aircraft data capture 
systems have anything to tell us. This still leaves the issue of data analysis to 
resolve. In a 2004 conversation with Tom O'Kane, formerly the BASIS manager 
at British Airways, he mentioned two particular concerns with the system. 
Firstly there was a large number of unexplained events waiting to be looked at, 
many of which could potentially hold important messages and secondly, 
operating environment variations should include consideration of the quality of 
maintenance, possibly linked to effective maintenance measures of 
performance as required by JAR Ops. This thesis' SSCM model has the 
potential to address both these issues. 
STEADES is promoted as being the only global safety event database providing 
analysis of events, with the goal of reducing accident potential and, therefore, 
costs. It is based on the principles of an open, non-punitive, reporting system 
that is compatible with other (unidentified) reporting systems. Data loaded into 
the system is de-identified and analysed internally by IATA. The analysis 
identifies trends and areas of potential. 
Currently over 45 airlines are contributing something in the order of 50,000 
records per quarter, with the aim of building up to around 250 airlines over the 
next four years. STEADES allows daily on-line access to the analysis results 
through a Safety Data Management & Analysis (SDMA) website, with the facility 
for ad-hoc analysis requests. In addition, monthly Safety Bulletins, quarterly 
Safety Trend Analysis Reports and annual Safety Reports are made available 
to members. The most recent development is the inclusion of a Flight Data 
Analysis (FDA) module to satisfy the ICAO mandatory requirement for FDA 
programmes in place with airlines from I January 2005. 
Promoted as having been designed for use by "anyone collecting incident data 
(i. e.: ground handlers, air traffic control units, maintenance outfits, regulators, 
etc. ), STEADES currently costs IATA Members $2,500 annually. Future plans 
for the system include growing membership to 250 airlines by 2008, with the 
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ultimate aim for STEADES to interact with other systems and become a one- 
stop shop for safety information. 
Again to quote BASIS; "The likelihood is that if one airline has experienced a 
problem then others will eventually experience the same problem. Hence this is 
a pro-active method of reviewing air safety incidents, before they happen to 
you. Even if you have already experienced the same problem, the SIE 
database is a powerful source of information when trying to convince others that 
your airline's incident is not an isolated case. Also such a database allows small 
fleet operators access to safety information from a much larger fleet database. " 
The first question is, how many airlines have taken up the cause and subscribe 
to the BASIS/Sentinel/STEADES systems? The second question is, once 
again, who else sees the data outside the airlines? 
Finally, there is the European Co-ordination Centre for Aviation Incident 
Reporting Systems (ECCAIRS). This initiative was designed to facilitate 
European Union member states' efforts in collecting and exchanging 
information on incidents and accidents in civil aviation, through a collaborative 
network of civil aviation authorities, accident investigation bureaus and others. 
The intent was to improve and standardise analysis tools and methods for 
implementation in the 2004 to 2006 time period. However, laudable though this 
initiative is, it is primarily focused on reportable accident and incident data, and 
thus the many lower level events which are just as important in understanding 
reliability and safety performance are unlikely to be addressed. 
4.12 HUMAN FACTORS 
- 
THE MISSING PART OF THE EQUATION 
Almost a mantra today, the term "human factors" has become inextricably linked 
with the air safety challenge. Of course it is a vital link in the chain of failure 
events, and must therefore be properly understood and quantified, which is 
primarily where this problem still rests. To again quote Charles Perrow 1581: 
"it is indeed the case that people sometimes do really stupid things, but when 
most of the accidents in a particular type of system (airplane, chemical plant, 
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etc. ) are blamed on the operator, that is a symptom that the operators may be 
confronted with an impossible task, that there is a system design problem. In a 
typical normal accident, the operator's actions may contribute to the problem, or 
even initiate the sequence of events, but the characteristics of tight coupling 
and interactive complexity also make their contributions. " 
4.12.1 A Regulator's View 
In May 2001 Hazel Courteney, head of the CAA Human Factors Group 
presented a paper at a Royal Aeronautical Society (RAeS) safety seminar 1591, 
which gave an interesting insight into the way in which the regulators are now 
considering human factors in aviation safety. To quote from the introduction: 
it is no longer news to say that crew error is the most common causal factor in 
aircraft accidents. In fact, human errors would probably account for all but a 
handful of accidents if the definition were extended to errors In air traffic 
management, aerodrome support, aircraft maintenance, production, design, 
organizational management and so on. Human error is our single biggest 
safety risk. Yet, despite this awareness, and the current high profile of 'human 
factors' in the industry, the issues remain cloudy, much debated and 
unresolved. " 
Although regulations aimed at specifically addressing human factors are still in 
their infancy, some indicators are already apparent. The JAA has adopted an 
interim policy entitled Human Factors Aspects of Flight Deck Design with 
particular relevance to projects that introduce novel items to the flight deck. 
The document continues detailed guidance about what is regarded as novel, 
including new uses or procedures for existing technology. 
Two of the Special Conditions listed in the policy are of especial interest to the 
safety analyst: 
1. "The effects of crew errors in managing systems, including the potential 
for error, the possible severity of the consequences, and the provision for 
recognition and recovery from error. " 
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2. The adequacy of feedback, including clear and unambiguous: 
" presentation of information 
" representation of system condition by display of system status 
indication of failure cases, including aircraft status 
" 
indication when crew input is not accepted or followed by the 
system 
. 
indication of prolonged or severe compensatory action by a 
system when such action could adversely affect aircraft safety 
Consequently, the CAA has gone on to issue a draft regulatory document 
entitled Preliminary 
- 
Notice of Proposed Amendment 25.310 Human Centred 
Design 1601. The central theme of the proposal is that all aspects of an aircraft 
design should embody a certain level of resistance to human error. The key 
paragraph states: 
"It must be shown by analysis, substantiated where necessary by test, that as 
far as reasonably practicable all design precautions have been taken to prevent 
human errors in production, maintenance and operation causing Hazardous or 
Catastrophic effect. Where the potential cannot realistically be eliminated, then 
the remaining safety critical tasks should be sufficiently understood and the 
potential for human error mitigated. " 
4.12.2 Response From Industry 
This far-reaching proposal has the potential to have a major impact on the way 
in which the aerospace industry currently conducts safety analysis. The initial 
response to the CAA called for agreement on an Acceptable Means of 
Compliance, as a result of which the CAA is researching a draft method of 
Human Hazard Analysis (HHA). The principle will be to systematically identify 
items where a safety risk could arise from human error, and then demonstrate 
to the certification authority how the risk has been mitigated. The CAA sees the 
inclusion of human error base events in system fault tree analysis as the 
primary tool to achieve this. 
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To date industry has rarely addressed human factors issues in such analyses. 
The challenge with this approach is going to be establishing supportable 
probability of occurrence rates for human factor events. As has already been 
discussed, we live in a far from ideal world already with regard to obtaining 
good equipment failure probability data; it is infinitely more difficult to assign 
realistic probabilities to human factors events. 
The problem is that although the identification of the actual events is relatively 
straightforward, e. g. mis-assembly, incorrect alignment, incorrect procedure, 
and so on, such events are the result of a combination of factors, including time 
of day, stress levels, time pressure, resources, distractions, skill level, the list is 
almost endless. 
In the total absence so far of any meaningful guidance in this issue, some 
system designers are now adopting a philosophy that the risk from human error 
is always assumed to be less than Ix I0'9 and therefore can be discounted 
from the safety assessment. This is a very dangerous path to tread; on what 
basis was that assumption made? No-one yet has the answer. 
4.13 EUROPEAN UNION AND OTHER LEGISLATION 
As the European Union (EU) moves increasingly into legislative matters across 
the member states, movement is particularly evident in the area of transport. 
4.13.1 European Aviation Safety Agency 
In the autumn of 2002 the European Union officially brought the European 
Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) into being. What is EASA, and what bearing 
does it have on the problem of aircraft system safety? 
In the 1990s, there was a general agreement between the JAA members that 
the authority needed a more formal and legally binding status. Accordingly, a 
working group was set-up, which developed a possible text for a JAA 
Convention outlining the framework of a formalized air safety agency, and it 
received an agreement in principle from the JAA Board in 1995. However, it 
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was not developed any further at that time, as some JAA members felt that co- 
ordination with the European Union was necessary. 
In 1997 the European Union started discussing a proposal from the European 
Commission for the establishment of a European-based organisation 
responsible for civil aviation safety. In June 1998 the Council of the EU 
Transport Ministers accepted the general concept for EASA, and agreed that it 
will be responsible for rulemaking, certification and standardisation for the 
application of rules by the national aviation authorities, such as the UK CAA. 
The Council asked the European Commission to prepare negotiations for an 
international convention to establish EASA together with non-EU members. In 
December 1999 the Council discussed the draft documents for EASA and an 
alternative concept for an EU Aviation Safety Agency presented by the 
European Commission. It was decided to explore both concepts further, but in 
the meantime the European Commission developed and agreed a draft 
regulation for the creation of EASA, and ultimately the alternative proposal was 
shelved. As part of the implementation of EASA in 2002, the JAA has 
developed an Agenda for Change and this is now being implemented step by 
step into the JAA system. 
EASA is now the legislative body for all aviation safety matters within the JAA 
member states, and over the next ten years or so, EASA Implementing Rules 
(IR) will gradually replace JARs. Early work by EASA includes airworthiness 
issues encompassing the question of aircraft and systems safety. 
The overall transition programme for EASA to take over the safety regulation 
functions of the present central JAA will last some 42 months from the 
September 2003 start up date. This will cover the relevant detail agreements 
with all the JAA National Aviation Authorities (NAAs) for transfer of specific 
safety functions to the EASA, any delegated functions to specific NAAs with 
appropriate expertise, and completion of the preparation and promulgation of 
the present JARs into relevant EU regulatory material. The EASA Regulation is 
only binding on the 25 EU member states; it is therefore essential that a method 
is found for the continued participation of the other non-EU states that are part 
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of the present JAA. The stated main objectives are to avoid safety gaps, to 
assure the present safety achievements continue to be built upon, to ensure 
maximum smoothness in the transition process with particular reference to the 
impact on Industry, and to ensure that non-EU states continue to participate in 
Pan-European mechanisms, which provide for co-operation at the highest level 
on European Aviation Safety. 
It has been emphasised that the commitment of the EC to abide by the ICAO 
Standards is clearly and repeatedly stated in the EASA Regulation. The 
Member States are acting collectively, using the EC processes, to fulfill their 
obligations enshrined in international treaties, in particular the Chicago 
Convention. * 
EASA themselves, in their formative documents, have stated that: 
The principle of certification of aircraft, organisations and personnel is 
established. The same principle also applies to third countries, while respecting 
their rights specified in the applicable international Conventions. " 
"The essential airworthiness requirements which products and appliances must 
meet in order to be certified are those contained in Annex 8 to the Chicago 
Convention, which is annexed to the proposal. The Commission is empowered 
to adopt, by a committee procedure, any additional rule for application of these 
requirements. " 
Thus it can be seen that EASA is focusing immediately on the safety of aircraft 
and their systems, and this view has been reinforced by the issuing in June 
2003, of a draft Consultation Document 1611, ultimately leading to a Commission 
Regulation laying down implementing rules for the airworthiness and 
environmental certification of aircraft and related products, parts and 
appliances, as well as for the certification of design and production 
organisations. The most important statements within this document are: 
"The Basic Regulation establishes common essential requirements to provide 
for a high uniform level of civil aviation safety and environmental protection; it 
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requires the Commission to adopt the necessary implementing rules to ensure 
their uniform application; it establishes the "European Aviation Safety Agency" 
to assist the Commission in the development of such implementing rules; " 
"lt is necessary to adopt common technical requirements and administrative 
procedures to ensure the airworthiness and environmental compatibility of 
aeronautical products, parts and appliances, subject to the Basic Regulation; 
such requirements and procedures shall specify the conditions to issue, 
maintain, amend, suspend or revoke the appropriate certificates. " 
in adopting measures for the implementation of common essential 
requirements in the field of airworthiness, the Commission must take care that 
they reflect the state of the art and the best practices, take into account 
worldwide aircraft experience and scientific and technical progress. " 
"The need to ensure uniformity in the application of common airworthiness and 
environmental requirements for aeronautical products, parts and appliances 
calls for a common approach and measures to be followed by the competent 
authorities of the Member States and, where applicable, the Agency in order to 
assess compliance with these requirements; consequently, the Agency must 
develop certification specifications, including airworthiness codes and 
acceptable means of compliance to facilitate the necessary regulatory 
uniformity. " 
In any event, it is not expected that any newly formulated EASA legislation will 
be on the statute books until 2006 at the earliest. As EASA evolves, the JAA 
will fade away from its legislative status to become an advisory body, much like 
the national aviation authorities, but as yet, its future is still unclear. 
4.13.2 Directive On Occurrence Reporting 
In September 2001 a proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of 
the Council on occurrence reporting in civil aviation was published 162). it was 
intended as a follow-on to Council Directive 94/56/EC dated 21 November 
1994, which established the fundamental principles governing the investigation 
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of civil aviation accidents and incidents by "facilitating the expeditious holding of 
investigations. " 
The 2001 proposal (since adopted), recognised that before an accident occurs, 
a number of incidents and other deficiencies have shown the existence of safety 
hazards, and that safety improvement requires a better knowledge of these 
occurrences to facilitate analysis and trend monitoring in order to initiate correct 
actions. It said that each EU member state should set up mandatory reporting 
systems, and that occurrences of interest should be reported by various 
categories of personnel working in civil aviation. 
However, although it clearly recognised that "the efficiency of detection of 
potential hazard would be greatly enhanced by the exchange of information", it 
then went on to back away from legislating the fullest possible dissemination of 
information. Article 7 of the proposal states: 
"Any entity entrusted to regulate civil aviation safety or to investigate civil 
aviation accidents and incidents within the Community shall have access to 
information on occurrences collected and exchanged.. 
. 
to enable it to draw the 
safety lessons from the reported occurrences. " 
uThe Commission may... decide on the release of selected information to... other 
interested parties. Such decisions-shall be based on the need to: 
- 
provide persons and/or organisations with the information they need... or 
- 
allow the analysis of occurrences by bodies specialised in aviation 
safety" 
"The decision to disseminate information shall be limited to what is strictly 
required for the purpose of its user. The recipient of information shall in turn 
commit itself not to disseminate the information further. " 
Annex I of the proposal lists examples of reportable occurrences, and at 
system level it is especially well written, leaving little scope for omission of 
almost any event under the proposed mandatory reporting scheme. However, 
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the damage has been done in article 7, which leaves the limits of the 
dissemination of information and thus the overall usefulness of the entire 
proposal to the aviation industry at large. If, as seems likely, the proposal 
becomes legislation in its current format, it represents a brave attempt, but still a 
missed opportunity. 
In the United States, the FAA issued very similar legislation as Advisory Circular 
(AC) 120-66B dated 11 November 2002, as part of their Aviation Safety Action 
Programme. 
4.13.3 International Civil Aviation Organisation 
In 1999, ICAO proposed changes to strengthen the wording of Annex 6, 
Chapter 3 of their regulations, which now state that: 
- 
"From 1 January 2002, an operator of an aeroplane of a certified take-off 
mass in excess of 27000 kg should establish and maintain a flight data 
analysis programme as part of its accident prevention and flight safety 
programme! 
- 
"From 1 January 2005, an operator of an aeroplane of a maximum certified 
take-off mass in excess of 27,000 kg shall establish and maintain a flight data 
analysis programme as part of its accident prevention and flight safety 
programme. " 
ICAO followed up this encouraging change in the arena of Flight Data 
Monitoring (FDM), in June 2002 with the adoption of Resolution A33-16: ICAO 
Global Aviation Safety Plan (GASP). This recognises that improvements in the 
air accident rate will require new approaches, in particular pro-active and risk 
analysis based approaches, on the part of all participants in the aviation 
industry, including ICAO, States, aircraft manufacturers and operators. 
Operative clauses 8,9,10 and 11 of Resolution A33-16 read as follows: 
"8. Instructs the Council and Secretary General to participate in efforts by States 
to improve existing safety database systems and the exchange of safety-related 
information, and to participate in activities aimed at the development of a 
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comprehensive data analysis and information dissemination network, taking into 
account the need to adequately protect privileged information and its sources; 
9. Encourages the free communication of safety-related information amongst 
users of the aviation system, including the reporting of accident and incident 
data by States to the ICAO Accident/lncident Data Reporting (ADREP) system; 
10. Urges all Contracting States to examine and, if necessary, adjust their laws, 
regulations, and policies to achieve the proper balance among the various 
elements of accident prevention efforts (e. g. regulation, enforcement, training, 
and incentives to encourage voluntary reporting) and to encourage increased 
voluntary reporting of events that could affect aviation safety, and instructs 
ICAO to develop appropriate policies and guidance in this respect; and 
11 
- 
Urges all Contracting States to ensure that their aircraft operators, 
providers of air navigation services and equipment, and maintenance 
organisations have the necessary procedures and policies for voluntary 
reporting of events that could affect aviation safety. " 
A note at the beginning of Annex 13 Chapter 8 reads as follows: 
"The objective of these specifications is to promote accident prevention by 
analysis of accident and incident data and by a prompt exchange of 
information. " 
Chapter 8 addresses one of the main aspects of an accident prevention 
programme, namely, incident reporting systems, database systems, the 
analysis of safety data, and the exchange of safety information. 
To address the need for incident reporting systems, Standard 8.1 in Annex 13 
requires States to establish a mandatory incident reporting system to facilitate 
the collection of information on actual or potential safety deficiencies. In the 
previous edition of Annex 13, this provision was a Recommended Practice only. 
Finally, a new Recommended Practice (8.2) has been introduced concerning 
the establishment of voluntary incident reporting systems to supplement the 
mandatory systems. 
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"The pursuit of aviation safety worldwide requires that safety lessons learned 
through accident investigation, the analysis of information from incident reports, 
or by other means, be disseminated as widely as possible. " 
4.13.4 JAR39 Airworthiness Directives 
Advisory Circular Joint 39.3 of JAR39 Airworthiness Directives, discusses the 
sufficiency of corrective action when addressing defects. The status of this 
document is quoted as being: 
"Not intended to be regarded as binding in specific cases, but, by being used in 
conjunction with engineering judgement, to aid airworthiness engineers in 
reaching decisions in the state of technology at the material time. " 
The document recognises the variation in airworthiness risk levels due to such 
factors as environmental conditions, variations in material standards, design 
deficiencies and unforeseen combinations of failures, etc.. It also recognises 
the need to attempt to monitor conditions tending to increase risk levels. It then 
goes on to set out a set of guidelines for defect rectification campaigns. 
However, in addition to its non-binding status, the document simply identifies 
the overall process for identifying defects, recognising variance and taking 
corrective action. In other words, it essentially describes the already well- 
established FRACAS-type system, without giving details of a methodology such 
as that which is proposed within this thesis. 
4.14 SUMMARY OF THE PRESENT SITUATION 
The safety assessment process is now very well defined, particular within such 
references documents as ARP 4761. Other interfacing procedures are also 
generally acceptable, but the problem remains the lack of legislation to back 
them up. This is now also noticeable in the efforts to establish event reporting 
systems to back-up the design analysis. 
Hopefully, the emergence of agencies such as EASA will help to force a wider 
adoption of the right procedures through legislation. However, in many areas 
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legislation on its own will not work, since the right tools and the back-up support 
infrastructure are not necessarily all in place. 
4.1 6 AREAS TO BE ADDRESSED FOR ACTION 
The International Federation of Airworthiness (IFA) recently published a White 
Paper entitled Continuing Airworthiness 
- 
The Basic Story 1631. This attempts to 
lay out in a clear and concise fashion the continuing airworthiness requirements 
and control functions and the complex ways in which they all interact. 
Responsibilities are defined under five main agencies, with their principal areas 
of concern regarding system safety, highlighted below: 
" 
ICAO 
- 
issues international Standards and Recommended Practices 
(SARPs), and technical guidance publications 
" 
State Regulatory Authority (Agency) 
- 
issues aircraft/engine type 
certificates; requirements for occurrence reporting, analysis and 
feedback schemes. Approves maintenance/reliability programmes and 
ageing aircraft and systems programmes. Establishes state occurrence 
reporting, analysis and feedback schemes. Audits and monitors 
certification, AOC and Maintenance and Repair Organisation (MRO) 
standards 
" 
Certified Air Operator / Carrier (Air Operator Certificate [AOC] holder) 
- 
establishes maintenance/reliability programmes and occurrence 
reporting, investigation and follow-up scheme 
" 
Approved Certification Organisation (OEM) 
- 
prepares and controls 
safety assessments and analyses, type certificates and type certificate 
data sheets. Establishes occurrence reporting, investigation and follow- 
up scheme (i. e. FRACAS). Issues safety and guidance information for 
products 
" 
Approved Maintenance Repair Organisation (MRO) 
- 
controls 
maintenance/reliability programmes. Establishes occurrence reporting, 
investigation and follow-up scheme. Implements ageing aircraft 
structural and systems programmes 
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This all clearly shows the level of responsibility for various aspects of the aircraft 
system safety performance programme. However, it also exposes the holes in 
both the spread of responsibility and in the current safety legislation. 
There can be no "magic bullet" to correct all the issues surrounding aircraft 
system safety analysis. It is also fair to say that there are many very worthy 
initiatives under way to try and improve the situation already. Yet still thereis a 
need for a fundamental shift in both the basic analytical methodologies and the 
"learning from the past" systems the air transport industry currently has in place. 
As a result of the situational review carried out in the preceding chapters, a 
number of areas for action have been highlighted in this chapter. These should 
be taken simply as 
- 
in some of the cases 
-a first step along a very long road 
towards the overall aim of maintaining a necessary focus on aircraft system 
safety issues throughout the system life-cycle. The key issues have been taken 
further and developed into a detailed proposal for a new process, which is 
discussed in chapter 5. 
By far the most important issues to emerge are: 
1. A legislative shortfall which allows the continuation of unsatisfactory 
safety analysis processes 
2. The failure to recognise the need to benchmark reliability databases to 
replace obsolete references and provide a global safeguard for design 
safety margins. 
3. An absence of clearly defined links between the many initiatives 
emerging in the arena of in-service event data capture and the 
equipment and system manufacturers 
4. A critical shortage of engineers with the necessary skills and expertise to 
properly address system safety analysis in all its forms 
5. An appalling lack of understanding and appreciation of the need and 
long-term cost-effectiveness of correct and educated design analysis 
within many sectors of the manufacturing industry 
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The proposals are broken down into five main areas, covering: 
" 
The fundamental safety analysis process 
" 
Source data from reliability databases 
" 
Learning the lessons from service experience 
Training our safety practitioners 
" 
Educating the aviation industry at large 
4.16.1 A Mandatory Safety Analysis Process 
It has been shown that while a fundamentally sound process (ARP4761) 
already exists for much of the system safety analysis work, the main problem is 
that the regulatory authorities do not mandate its use. The regulators require 
demonstration of safety performance by analysis and test for example, but stop 
short of requiring each step in ARP4761 to be followed. 
The most concerning issue here is that this approach allows the manufacturers 
to perform only as much of the ARP4761 work as they have to in order to 
demonstrate compliance, and thus see any additional effort, such as 
independence in the safety assessment process, as an un-necessary "cost 
plus". Many companies have thus disbanded their traditional reliability and ILS 
departments who used to perform this work, and either have their design teams 
(who are not trained safety analysts) do it, or contract it out to specialist ILS / 
safety analysis companies. While the latter option at least ensures that the 
people performing the work are familiar with the tools, it does remove the 
immediacy of not being in the same building as the design, manufacturing and 
test teams, thus losing the ability to gain a clearer understanding of day-to-day 
issues and the background to design assumptions and decisions. 
So how can these problems be overcome? One solution might be to digitise the 
FAR / JAR 25.1309 and individual system FHA requirements in a format that 
can be readily and instantly cross-checked by designers, or better still, the 
independent analysis team. This would be quicker and potentially more cost- 
effective in building a safety case that can ensure design compliance both 
automatically and iteratively. 
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Perhaps there should be a joint FAR / JAR / EASA safety analysis process 
requirement as a replacement for ARP4761, issued and mandated by both the 
FAA and EASA? This might take the form of a straight-forward adoption by 
EASA and the other agencies of an updated ARP4761. For example, it is 
known that Airbus is working on a new system based on a starting point of 
identifying all the aircraft system's safe states and then looking at how it might 
fail, rather than the traditional failure and consequences approach. 
4.15.2 Revised Equipment & Component Reliability Databases 
It is absolutely essential that the continued use of MIL-HDBK-217F and NPRD 
95 (at least) be brought to a halt at the earliest possible date, preferably through 
legislation. Realistically though, this cannot happen until there is something to 
replace them. The ideal of course, is empirical data, but until such time as the 
system described in chapter 5 has been fully implemented, another course of 
action needs to be found. 
The regulators should change the requirements of that section of the safety 
case that calls for failure rate justification, such that claims for the use of MIL- 
HDBK-217F and NPRD 95 failure rates alone will not be accepted. Where 
these sources are claimed, the manufacturer must give justification for not using 
another more robust database, or empirical data. Only this kind of approach will 
drive people away from continuing to rely on hopelessly out-dated and 
inadequate data when performing a preliminary reliability assessment which 
may well stay with the aircraft for the next thirty years. 
4.15.3 Industry-Wide Event Analysis And Lessons Learned Systems 
Remember the words of the FAA's Commercial Airplane Certification Process 
Study discussed in the previous chapter, 
"Adequate processes do not exist within the FAA or in most segments of the 
commercial aviation industry to ensure that the lessons learned from specific 
experiences in aircraft design, manufacturing, maintenance, and flight 
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operations are captured permanently and made readily available to the aviation 
industry. The failure to capture and disseminate lessons learned has allowed 
aircraft accidents to occur for causes similar to those of past accidents. " 
And: 
"There are constraints present in the aviation industry that have an inhibiting 
effect on the complete sharing of safety information. " 
Firstly, let us return to the GAIN initiative, and take a detailed look at their action 
plan 1641 as it affects the area of system safety. The plan, which was divided up 
into a number of main areas, is unfortunately currently stalled due to withdrawal 
of FAA funding from GAIN. However, those areas of most immediate concern 
here (and there are many) include: 
"1. Foster the use of existing analytical methods and tools and the development 
of new methods and tools. Sub-tasks include: 
- 
Gather requirements for analytical methods and tools from the aviation 
user community 
- 
Conduct detailed analysis of the Survey of Analytical Processes and 
Requirements for Airline Flight Safety Management to refine 
requirements for analytical methods and tools. 
- 
Define a hierarchy of analytical tools needed for an airline flight safety 
office. 
- 
Continue to add analytical methods and tools to the GAIN website 
addressing flight safety, air traffic system safety, airline maintenance 
safety, and ramp safety. 
- 
Assess the usefulness and usability of existing tools in partnership with 
the aviation user community 
- 
Work with several airlines at their facilities to gather practical experience 
in the use of analytical methods and tools with airline data and document 
lessons learned. 
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- 
Partner with several airlines and/or airline organisations to demonstrate 
the use of data mining or text mining tools for the analysis of safety event 
reports. 
- 
Facilitate the development of enhanced or new analytical methods and 
tools 
- 
Explore issues involved in linking and merging data in airline internal 
safety data bases (e. g. FOQA and ASAP), and identify requirements for 
new or enhanced tools to support this capability. 
- 
Facilitate the use of analytical tools and services in the aviation 
community 
- 
Identify and document the appropriate skill set and/or staff mix needed 
by flight safety offices and/or airline organisations to perform safety 
analysis. 
2. Promote and facilitate the development and implementation of systems to 
support the global sharing of aviation safety information. Sub-tasks include: 
- 
Facilitate the development of systems to share airline safety event 
information among trusted groups in near-real time 
- 
Facilitate the on-going work on two systems for exchanging Standard 
Sharing Reports (SSRs) containing proprietary information on safety 
events among airline safety managers in near-real time. 
- 
Develop an integrated plan to demonstrate the airline safety event 
sharing system prototypes and assist the airline safety officers in the 
monitoring and documentation of the results of the demonstrations. 
- 
Solicit additional airlines to join the prototype sharing systems (alliance 
members, air carrier and commuter groups, and regional associations), 
- 
Develop standard or operating protocol for sharing airline safety 
information. 
- 
Facilitate the development of training materials for airline safety officers 
to improve the usefulness and usability of these sharing systems. 
- 
Promote aviation industry sharing systems 
- 
Identify "automated" aviation safety information sharing activities 
throughout the world and document approaches used in organising and 
operating each activity. 
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- 
Promote data standardisation among these "automated" aviation safety 
information sharing activities. 
- 
Facilitate the development of a system to share safety lessons learned 
and corrective actions within the aviation community 
- 
Gather requirements for a system to share safety lessons learned and 
corrective actions from target user community, with initial focus on airline 
flight operations. 
- 
Develop and demonstrate a prototype system for sharing safety lessons 
learned and corrective actions among airline flight operations. 
- 
Promote and facilitate the voluntary, non-punitive collection and sharing 
of safety information among the worldwide aviation community 
- 
Identify and increase awareness of current and planned government 
safety information collection and sharing programmes. 
- 
Promote the establishment of voluntary safety information sharing 
networks among all users of the aviation system and facilitate the free 
exchange of information on actual and potential safety deficiencies. 
- 
Identify examples of collaborative processes that airlines and 
governments have initiated to determine lessons learned from safety 
information. 
- 
Help reduce legal and organisational barriers that discourage the 
collection and sharing of safety information 
- 
Encourage government and industry organisations to establish safety 
management systems that emphasise the importance of non-punitive 
collection, analysis and sharing of safety information within their 
organisations. " 
Let us look closer at one of these GAIN initiatives, which is for a Standard 
Sharing Report for use in airline Safety Management Systems. This maps the 
proposed data fields for effective incident capture and analysis and is designed 
to permit an airline safety officer to determine at a glance if an event report is of 
interest to a particular issue. 
The fields listed are: 
. 
Event Date YYYY/MM DATE 
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" 
Aircraft Manufacturer 
" 
Aircraft Model Type 
- 
e. g. 737, A320 
" 
Aircraft Master Series Model 
- 
e. g. 737-700 
" 
Event Category 
-a limited list of 10 categories is proposed 
" 
Event Type 
-a standard comprehensive list covers over 200 events 
" 
System Involved 
- 
ATA code 
" 
Phase of Flight 
- 
based on CAA standard 
" 
Airport Location 
- 
ICAO or IATA codes 
Weather Condition (if pertinent) 
" 
Environment 
Event Description 
" 
Probable Cause 
" 
Corrective Action 
- 
Actions taken to reduce future risk 
Recommendations 
The more detailed parts of the proposal include: 
"Section 145.221 Reports of Failures, Malfunctions, or Defects 
Repair stations are required to submit reports of defects or unairworthy 
conditions to the FAA. The FAA proposes to standardise the type of data 
reported under the service difficulty reporting system by specifically listing the 
information required when a repair station submits a report. 
Section 145.63(b) states that in cases where filing a report of defects or 
unairworthy conditions might prejudice the repair station, the repair station shall 
refer the matter to the Administrator for a determination as to whether a report is 
necessary. " 
One commenter on the proposals stated that it constituted an invasion of 
privacy. Other commenters opposed including the name and address of the 
operator in the report, because the report already includes the aircraft 
registration number, which can be used for obtaining the other information. 
Another stated that the rule should be expanded to include all part 145 
certificated repair stations. 
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"The estimated safety benefits, being difficult to quantify, are calculated based 
on what the reduction in accidents needs to be in order to equate the discount 
costs to the discounted safety benefits. If the safety benefits are half of those 
discussed in the initial regulatory evaluation (6.9 hull loss accidents will be 
avoided, including general aviation), then the quantifiable safety benefits of the 
final proposal will be approximately, $28.5 million in current dollars discounted 
at 7 percent, over 13 years. On an annual basis (assuming that quantifiable 
benefits are only one-half of those estimated in the initial regulatory evaluation) 
an average of 3.4 total accidents will be avoided. 
The estimated net cost of compliance after subtracting cost savings with the 
final amendment will be $22.2 million (net of cost savings) in current dollars, 
discounted at 7 percent, over 13 years. The most costly requirement, section 
145.161, Training Requirements, will result in repair stations incurring 
discounted costs of $30.5 million. The most cost-saving requirement, the 
Manufacturer's Service Manual, will result in repair stations saving between 
$22.8 and $45.5 million discounted. 
The final rule is not expected to have a significant impact on international trade 
nor is it expected to have a significant impact on a substantial number of small 
firms. " 
4.15.4 The French View 
Some years ago, the French Civil Aviation Authority, Direction Generale de 
('Aviation Civile, (DGAC), produced a report entitled Development of a 
Methodology for Operational Incident Reporting and Analysis Systems 16q which 
examined existing methodologies for incident reporting and data analysis. The 
report took as its starting point, the perception that there were a lot of databases 
around the aviation world, being fed with a lot of data, but that data was not 
being put to effective use, as data alone cannot identify problems. What was 
needed was a better appreciation of the substantial amount of potentially useful 
information that incident data can provide and how to process It. 
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Therefore, the DGAC issued a call for a research study aimed at the 
development of a methodology for Operational Incident Reporting & Analysis 
Systems (OIRAS), which resulted in the above report. A number of existing 
incident databases were reviewed for their effectiveness, and none was found 
to be entirely satisfactory. The main areas of shortfall were identified as: 
. 
In order to ease data retrieval, there needed to be categorisation of the raw 
information. This is most problematic with subjective descriptions of an event 
and its causal factors 
" 
It was impossible to anticipate all possible contingencies, therefore it was 
also impossible to create an exhaustive list of keywords. Furthermore, since 
keywords are either present or not present, and can only be combined in a 
linear fashion, this becomes an unsatisfactory representation of the real 
situation 
. 
Information is retrieved in the form in which it is entered, so categorisations 
derived by the analyst defines the output parameters. For example, if there 
is no "bearing failure" in the database category list, then "bearing failure" can 
never be found to be a cause of incidents during a database search. 
Therefore, the safety model which guided the categorisation can only confirm 
or deny what is already known, nothing new 
.A large amount of data is never retrieved once it is entered. Was it relevant 
in the first place? Of course it was, but the retrieval protocols are not robust 
or flexible enough to either find that data or recognise its value. 
. 
When a keyword search does identify a case, the analyst usually has to go 
back to the original report to understand all the details In context 
" 
Once a database grows beyond the memory of the analyst, it becomes a 
data store, and with consideration of the previous point, potentially important 
data and lessons are in essence "forgotten". 
. 
The keyword structure acts to bias output reports to fit the established 
keywords. The danger here is obvious 
- 
data which does not fit the keyword 
structure or other search criteria, may be ignored. 
In their report summary, the DGAC team stated that: 
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"We argue that most existing Operational Incident Reporting & Analysis 
Systems (OIRAS), derive from accident investigation protocols and have been 
somewhat effective in their role as a reactive safety strategy redressing 
identified deficiencies as perceived by current safety models, but we doubt the 
success of these systems as proactive tools for new and deeper organisational 
learning. As such we seriously doubt that current safety thresholds will be 
improved with the current application of OIRAS. Our approach recognises that 
OIRAS can provide unique information to an organisation about its risk 
awareness and risk management processes. We believe that an OIRAS 
database will be more effective when it works top-down rather than bottom-up, 
so it can explicate the safety assumptions at work within an organisation, 
explicitly challenge them against the feed-back of facts gathered from 
occurrence reports, trace the rationale behind corrective action decisions, 
assess the efficiency of those corrective actions, and possibly challenge the 
safety assumptions again for the next iteration of the process. Ultimately, the 
success of any OIRAS should indeed be evaluated by the success of the 
interventions it proposes. " 
4.15.5 Other Databases 
There are several Internet databases available, either hosted by accident 
investigation authorities or by independent websites. The NTSB database is by 
far the best publicly available one since all NTSB investigated accidents and 
incidents that have occurred since 1983 can be searched (there are over 
46,000 records). 
The FAA Incident Data System is also available on-line and contains almost 
80,000 events that occurred between 1978 and the present time. The search 
interface is however very basic, and the presentation of the search results is 
poor. The information on each occurrence is quite detailed, but lacks a 
description of causal factors. 
A major problem with these and other databases, is that they can only be 
searched separately, there is no cohesion or attempt to make them interface 
with each other. An initiative attempting to address this problem is the 
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European Co-ordination Centre for Aviation Incident Reporting Systems 
(ECCAIRS) project, which aims to integrate information from aviation 
occurrence reporting systems running in the authorities of the various EU 
member states. This project started back in 1993 and has not yet been fully 
implemented. 
Similarly concerned with how little is currently being learned from operational 
feedback, Airbus has, since 1999, been developing a new system intended to 
learn more from less data. Using data from Air Safety Reports, incident reports 
and so on, the Airbus "ERASM" model is still undergoing trials and it may be 
some time yet, if at all, before it results in a commercially available product. 
Of course the fundamental difficulties with this whole issue of industry-wide data 
sharing, remain: 
1. Who owns the database? 
2. Who pays for it? 
3. Who has access to it, both for input and for data analysis? 
4. How can the industry as a whole be persuaded to use it? 
These points are addressed in Chapter 5. 
4.15.6 Flight Data Monitoring 
With effect from 1 January 2005, the use of Flight Data Monitoring (FDM) 
procedures was mandated by the JAA for all European operators of aircraft over 
27 tonnes. A parallel programme was introduced in the United States where it 
is known as Flight Operations Quality Assurance (FOQA). New technologies, 
such as data fusion techniques to automatically link different data types, and 
data mining techniques, are making the collection, analysis and presentation of 
such data more useful. 
However, data analysis and therefore monitoring, comes at a cost in terms of 
finance, infrastructure and manpower resources. The fact that not all airlines 
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have data monitoring programmes, lends credence to the notion that there is a 
commonly held concern that the cost benefit of such a programme would be 
minimal or unquantifiable. 
"Evidence is available to prove that airlines which have been using FDM data 
for 7-14 years now have a lower accident rate than US airlines, and those 
airlines which have used FDM for more than 14 years, have an accident rate 
under half that experienced by US carriers. " 1661 
"In competition for scarce resources within an airline, FDM programmes need to 
go through the same cost justification process as any other programme. While 
there are clear and compelling benefits for an FDM programme to identify and 
reduce operational risks, they are often difficult to quantify. Airlines with FDM 
have indicated that as they become more familiar with the programme, they 
have discovered uses of the data that have resulted in extended engine life, 
more efficient routings, and in saving money in other areas. These 
improvements, coupled with safety enhancements, have been determined to 
more than justify the cost of implementing an FDM programme. The one 
cautionary note is, however, that without the correct management of data 
quantity and quality, not only will airlines input and receive 'garbage' from their 
FDM programmes, but they will also possibly jeopardise their relationship with 
their employees. " 1671 
4.1 b. 7 Training Safety Practitioners 
In the United Kingdom, some independent ILS / reliability companies run short 
course training for safety practitioners, and Cranfield University has for many 
years offered a very popular one week course on the safety assessment of 
aircraft systems. These initiatives are to be applauded, but they only scratch 
the surface. 
As can be seen, system safety analysis is a complex subject, and that in itself is 
part of the problem preventing its fuller adoption by industry. It is viewed with 
suspicion as a "black art", primarily through a lack of understanding not just of 
the need to perform the activity properly, but also of the benefits it can bring. 
What is required is a much broader and deeper range of education options to 
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compliment what we already have, including courses offering Certificate, 
Diploma and Degree level qualifications for safety professionals. In addition, 
the Air Transat A330 incident mentioned in section 4.7, and other cases of poor 
systems understanding, suggest that some kind of system safety overview 
training for pilots and maintenance engineers would be highly beneficial. 
As part of the more detailed safety analysis training, more emphasis needs to 
be given to moving away from the still common practice of basing reliability 
figures on the mean. What consideration should be given to variance driven by 
operational, environmental and ageing factors, not to mention the human 
interface? How does all this potential for variance in the numbers affect safety 
requirements compliance, particularly when the system is only marginally 
compliant when mean figures are used? 
There are many potential sources of quantitative variation in analyses. One 
form is classical variability, which is applicable to first-principle-based problems. 
Another form is subjective uncertainty, which means that available data or 
models are not definitive enough to prescribe variability, thereby requiring 
alternative processes to consider what might be possible. 
What is required is an appreciation of the need to combine basic reliability data 
and physical elements with engineering judgment, while still producing results 
that are both understood and traceable. 
"There is a tendency to misunderstand the role of the PSSA, assuming that it 
provides positive proof that the proposed design is safe, rather than the 
intention of the process, which is to say that the design can be safe if the 
component parts of it are implemented correctly" 1681. Yes, PSSA is vital, but it 
is just the first step on a long road. 
Within manufacturing companies, different engineering discipline teams tend to 
be isolated from each other, only interfacing once their work packages are 
complete. This is nonsense of course, and often means that problems are often 
found either too late in the process to make a difference at all, or too late to 
make a difference in a cost-effective manner. It is up to the system safety 
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engineer to provide the day-to-day link with other engineering (and commercial) 
groups and thus prove that the whole independent element is a legitimate one. 
Without the right numbers of safety engineers, who have received the proper 
level of training, convincing industry to fully adopt this approach is always going 
to be an uphill struggle. 
4.16 EDUCATING THE INDUSTRY 
Of course everything that has been proposed up to this point may sound 
relatively easy, but without "buy in" from the aviation industry, there will not be 
any motivation for change. Although everyone in the industry says safety 
comes first, the reality is that safety remains a trade-off, especially in the current 
climate of extreme financial constraint throughout the world airline industry. 
Thus it is vital that attempts to introduce a greater awareness of the system 
safety issues 
- 
in other words instilling a culture of really meaning safety first 
- 
must be able to show the benefits to the industry of doing so, or indeed of failing 
to do so. The case studies discussed earlier, while being extreme in that many 
of them resulted in catastrophic accidents, nevertheless do show that the 
aircraft manufacturers in particular, have been forced to spend a considerable 
amount of time, money and resources, all of which are increasingly scarce in 
today's cost-conscious world, fixing problems that would not have been there if 
the design had been correct in the first place. Not only that, but if the problems 
manifest themselves early on in the equipments in-service life, the 
manufacturer also gets hit by the additional cost of warranty claims from the 
operator who is suffering from the equipment performance fall-down. 
Similarly with the airlines and maintenance organisations, increased frequency 
of both scheduled and unscheduled maintenance due to both initial design flaws 
and a poor understanding of in-service event issues, will lead at the very least 
to increased Direct Maintenance Cost (DMC) and thus Direct Operating Cost 
(DOC). 
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4.17 SUMMARY 
It has been shown that attention needs to be paid to correcting flaws in the 
fundamental safety analysis process, the use of source data from reliability 
databases, the way in which we learn the lessons from service experience, how 
we currently train our safety practitioners and educating the industry In the need 
for better system safety. 
Each of these areas demands its own set of initiatives, but this document goes 
on to take one major aspect of the procedural problem and develop it in a totally 
new direction. In order to better understand this, the current safety analysis 
system is shown in the following sequence of diagrams, which build on each 
other to illustrate the total system and the flaws currently embedded within it. 
4.17.1 The Present Analytical System 
Figure 9- Post Design Support Basic Model 
Figure 9 shows the intent of the basic model, which allows in-service 
experience of technical performance to be fed back to the originating design 
team in the OEM, and then acted upon. Event information, either flight data or 
more usually maintenance data, is fed to the OEM's Post Design Support (PDS) 
team, which analyses the events, looking for either significant one-off cases 
where action needs to be taken straight away, or longer-term trends which may 
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also eventually require correction. Changes identified in this process as being 
necessary, are passed back to the design team, who will initiate the change, 
thus resulting in some form of modification to the design that will be passed on 
to the operator as a product improvement. 
Figure 10 
- 
Post Design Support Lessons Learned 
Figure 10 shows the same process but with a significant addition, the lessons- 
learned loop. This is that part of the overall process which ensures that once 
modification action has been taken by design to correct an in-service anomaly, 
that information is also archived in such a way that future designs can retrieve 
the information to ensure earlier mistakes are not repeated. 
in Figure 11 a further link is shown, that which allows the design team to learn 
how well their equipment is performing directly from the operators. This is one 
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AIRCRAFT SYSTEM SAFETY ASSESSMENT 
-A NEW APPROACH 
of the critical areas of feedback, which currently is only carried out on an ad hoc 
basis at any level below that of the prime contractor. 
Figure 12 
- 
Event Database Links 
Figure 12 introduces two databases to the system. The first one, resident within 
the PDS domain, receives input from the operator, either from flight operations 
or maintenance and provides the raw data on which reliability and safety 
calculations are based. A dotted link is shown to the database from the design 
team, who should be able to interrogate it for information to influence their 
current efforts. The second database, hosted within the design area, is the 
lessons-learned database already mentioned, which also draws information 
from the PDS system and which can in fact, be the same database if configured 
correctly. 
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Figure 13 
- 
Closing The Loops 
The final part of the process, shown in Figure 13 closes the last required loops 
to ensure the full and optimum flow of data. Now there are feedback loops 
directly from maintenance to design and as mentioned in the previous 
paragraph, from the PDS database to the lessons-learned database. 
This diagram also shows the business profit requirement within the operators' 
domain, since a major key to any new system has to be cost-effectiveness. 
Cost issues have been seen to be a factor in a number of aircraft accidents, 
usually through either maintenance of flight operational procedure shortcuts, but 
financial issues are outside the scope of this thesis and are not addressed. 
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Figure 14 
- 
The Flaws In The System 
In Figure 14 flaws in the total system are highlighted in red. There are 
essentially five such flaws where the present system breaks down and reduces 
its effectiveness, either because the need is not properly understood, because 
the regulation does not require it, or because the right tools are simply not 
available or in place. The new model central to this thesis and shown in the 
next chapter, addresses each of these flaws: 
1. Feedback from maintenance to PDS, particularly so at Tier 1 and Tier 2 
supplier level, where the reporting lines are patchy or are filtered by the 
aircraft manufacturer. 
2. Retrieval of event data from maintenance into a PDS analytical 
database, which even if it exists, may be poorly configured so that not all 
the data essential to ensure safety compliance is collected. 
3. Dataflow from PDS to lessons-learned, often totally absent. Statistics 
have shown that approximately 80% of human factors errors have their 
basis in flawed design. "PDS is a block to effective in-service event 
feedback to design. " 1691 
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4. Interrogation of PDS databases by design teams. This is infrequently 
done, resulting in a transitory and unstable knowledge base at the core 
of design activity. 
5. Feedback from operator to design team. Especially at sub-aircraft 
manufacturer level, neither operator nor design team are able to see the 
value of this loop, the former because their primary link is with the aircraft 
manufacturer, and the latter because they tend to be remote from the 
end-user, seeing that contact as purely a PDS function. 
The other factor that comes into play in many parts of this system, is time delay. 
This is especially true in the PDS arena, which tends to be fire-fighting against 
undesirable events and trends as they arise. Reaction times to solve problems 
are often needlessly extended by the need to review previous case histories 
almost "by hand" and re-run reliability and safety calculations over and over 
again, simply because no central system exists to do this work for them. 
In essence then, while the PDS part of the system is probably working 
reasonably well at aircraft manufacturer level, albeit with unnecessary time 
delays, below that it is not. The outer loops on the system illustrated above, 
which are concerned with the speedy and accurate flow of essential data 
outside PDS, are not working, and the proposal in this thesis will enable that to 
change. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
-THE SYSTEM SAFETY COMPLIANCE MODEL 
(SSCM) 
5.0 OUTLINE 
This chapter introduces the System Safety Compliance Model (SSCM), which is 
the principal innovation of this thesis. It describes how the system will function, 
including who can access it, how they will do so, the data it contains, how it is 
analysed, and the automated alert functions for safety non-compliances. It also 
considers system ownership, data confidentiality and interface with existing 
systems. The financial benefits of SSCM are also reviewed through specific 
case studies to demonstrate potential savings. 
5.1 INDUSTRY VIEWS ON THE NEED FOR BETTER DATA 
"Detailed information and data about whats going on out there is the lifeblood of 
any safety management programme" [701 
"If we had the ability to predict and forecast difficulties ahead, many of us would 
take the necessary steps to avoid the problem in the first place. Information 
and monitoring is not just about collating data. It also involves building a trusted 
relationship with customers to accurately understand their operating 
requirements" L"i 
Speaking in September 2004 at the first annual US FAA International Aviation 
Safety Forum FAA Administrator Virginia Blakey said the five-year timetable for 
global safety data sharing is "too slow. 
"We can do it now, and it needs to happen on an international scale, " says 
Blakey. "We needed it five years ago. The timetable of the next five years is too 
slow. We need to take another big step, data needs to be shared and 
integrated so we can see fleet and geographic trends. We can de-identify the 
data, aggregate it and make it available to everyone via a secure network. 
Without the overall data we will not see the big trends. " 
Harro Ranter of the Air Safety Network has taken a very pro-active stance on 
the issue of air safety data from in-service events V21. 
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"Preventing accidents from happening and preventing recurrence of accidents 
that have happened, is a responsibility for everyone in the aviation industry. In 
order to achieve this goal (air) accident investigation boards issue reports and 
recommendations in the wake of accidentsfincidents, regulating authorities 
collect data on accidents, incidents, aircraft Air Safety Information is limited. All 
these air safety data/information sources are a key element in the process of 
preventing accidents since it serves as a raw material for safety studies, trend 
analysis, monitoring, regulations etc. " 
"Maybe not directly linked with accident prevention, a manufacturer or 
prospective buyer may want to investigate the defect and damage history of an 
aircraft. Similarly, air safety data can be used to claim that a manufacturer knew 
about certain problems beforehand, because of earlier occurrences. Vast 
amounts of aviation safety related information are currently available on paper 
as well as online, free as well as paid and reliable as well as unreliable. It is 
becoming more and more difficult for aviation professionals to keep track of 
everything and filter out the reliable and relevant information for his/her 
organisation. " 
In the previous chapter, the work of the French DGAC in assessing incident 
feedback databases was discussed, and the inescapable conclusion was that 
none of the existing systems was entirely satisfactory. 
5.2 PRINCIPLES OF SSCM 
At the 5`h Eurocontrol Human Factors Workshop in Prague in May 2001, a 
paper was presented by Jean Paries of the Dedale company, entitled Feedback 
from Experience in Aviation 
- 
Current Challenges and Industry Initiatives. 
Among the many issues raised by Paries' paper, one stands out as a 
fundamental principle tying in operational feedback with the original system 
safety analysis of design. 
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In the Correction Cycle section of the paper, he states that there should be a 
"warning function if results are not obtained. " This crucial point is the main one 
currently being missed by the air transport industry as a whole. 
In order to address both this and all the other problems outlined in this thesis, 
the SSCM has been developed. With the exception of the already identified 
needs for improvements in personnel training and industry awareness, all the 
other shortfalls in the current safety analysis process are addressed by SSCM. 
The basic principles of SSCM are: 
"A web-based fully-automated system safety analysis software package 
maintained by an independent agency, which includes component 
reliability databases feeding into FMEA, FMECA, RBD, FTA and FHA 
tools to provide the basis for the safety case required for certification 
" 
Operating environment considerations in reliability data analysis through 
an automated coding system 
"A linked incident data capture system for use by operators, maintenance 
organisations, and manufacturers. This includes confidential reporting of 
incidents, as well as the traditional reporting methods previously 
discussed 
" 
Links to network-based automated spares and maintenance activity 
systems based on the ATA 2000 E-Business Specification for Materiels 
Management system for standardised electronic spares demands and 
progression. Those airlines that have bought into ATA Spec 2000, use 
the specification to conduct their e-business for a range of material 
management activities. ATA Spec 2000 describes common data formats 
for industry to exchange information electronically, allowing airlines and 
their suppliers to fully automate processes in the areas of: Provisioning, 
Spares, Procurement, Procurement Planning, Purchase Order 
Administration and Invoicing, Repair Administration, Reliability Data 
exchange, Surplus Data, Delivery Configuration and Warranty. Amongst 
the features utilised by SSCM will be the bar code system for spares and 
maintenance tasks, which will provide the downloadable link to update 
parts catalogues and component reliability databases In virtually real- 
time 
171 
AIRCRAFT SYSTEM SAFETY ASSESSMENT 
-A NEW APPROACH 
An alert message system which is automatically triggered whenever an 
aircraft system reliability performance degrades to such an extent that it 
threatens to jeopardise compliance with the safety levels defined under 
the FHA procedure. Different alert levels are used depending on the 
immediacy of the threat, and follow the system used throughout the 
industry for cockpit warning cue colours and nomenclature. 
5.3 SYSTEM FUNDAMENTALS 
The overall structure of SSCM is based on the FRACAS system that the author 
designed, successfully implemented and evolved at TRW Lucas Aerospace in 
the late 1990s, but taken several stages further with a great deal of new 
functionality and data input. However, the basic concepts of data capture, data 
conversion and a lot of the basic analysis tools have been tried, tested and 
proven in everyday use. This should considerably facilitate the work required 
for proof of concept testing of the fully developed SSCM. 
In order for the new system to be effective, a fundamental change of attitude 
towards reliability and safety data is required across the air transport industry. 
Today there are many good efforts underway, with many of them having been 
highlighted by the DGAC report discussed in chapter 4. Despite this, the critical 
failings already examined still hamper efforts to make this vital work as effective 
as possible, and will continue to do so if no change is made. 
Therefore, the SSCM system must be: 
Demonstrably cost effective. This is especially critical at the design 
stage, with the key argument being the long-term benefits of getting the 
design "right first time" and thus avoiding the potential for lengthy and 
expensive reliability enhancement modifications post entry into service. 
This also enables reduction in time to market for new products, thus 
bringing the manufacturer's revenue stream on-line earlier than might 
otherwise be the case. It is also key in minimising the operator's direct 
operating costs through the ability to take correctly informed 
maintenance and spares provisioning decisions based on accurate input 
data from events in the field 
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"A step change in process capability, offering "something new", such as 
the automated alerting system for adverse safety trends and system 
safety non-compliance and the comprehensive coding system for 
accurate data searches and analysis 
" 
Instantly accessible (with appropriate safeguards) at shop floor level to 
everyone in the business, i. e. component manufacturers and suppliers; 
equipment manufacturers, suppliers and repair organisations; aircraft 
manufacturers; aircraft operators including leasing companies; third 
party aircraft repair organisations; regulatory agencies; industry 
associations 
" 
Easy to use and as automated as possible to minimise staff training 
requirements 
" 
Capable of performing instant re-assessment of safety performance 
down to system level and including consideration of a variety of 
operating environments and conditions 
" 
The industry standard repository of component reliability data, replacing 
the present motley collection of outdated and / or inappropriate data 
sources (this will take time) 
" 
"Centrally" owned by a world-wide recognised industry body or bodies, in 
order to give it credibility and acceptability right across the aviation 
industry 
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Figure 15 
- 
SSCM Architecture 
174 
AIRCRAFT SYSTEM SAFETY ASSESSMENT 
-A NEW APPROACH 
The steps shown in red in Figure 15, are those that are embedded within the 
centralised SSCM database. Let us now look at each of the steps in the 
process in turn: 
5.3.2 In-Service Event 
This can be anything from a minor maintenance error or damage event to, in the 
worst case, a hazardous or even catastrophic accident. As has been shown 
with the Heinrich Pyramid however, it is essential to capture events at the 
lowest possible level. So long as the staff at every level appreciates, through 
training if necessary, the need for and value of reporting, and their company has 
a just culture with regard to incident reporting, the data should flow. 
5.3.3 Event Report 
Event reports can and should come from a multitude of sources, and just a few 
examples are shown in Figure 15. Cockpit crew reports are an obvious source, 
but the cabin crew should not be forgotten either. Flight data from the aircraft's 
on-board monitoring systems will provide a great deal of data, as will 
engineering activity during both scheduled and unscheduled maintenance 
activity, including the use of both on and off aircraft diagnostic systems. 
Other potential sources of event data include ground handling agents, air traffic 
controllers, aircraft services companies such as caterers, cleaners, baggage 
handlers and so on. Thus it can be seen that the traditional view of event data 
as coming solely from pilots and engineers is flawed, and risks ignoring a 
potentially vast amount of useful input so that we can really begin to understand 
just how well the aircraft really is performing. 
For this to work, the mechanism by which these multiple agencies can access 
the SSCM system to record their findings must be quick and simple, with a 
minimum of time needed to enter the event onto the system. Today most 
airline and support employees are never far from an on-line computer, and this 
is the way into SSCM. Paper-based systems are far less effective, not least 
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because they require relatively complex procedures for collection and 
distribution. 
Another solution might be for SSCM to draw the raw event data from existing 
systems. This has the advantage of possibly being rather more palatable to 
operators in the initial stages of implementation, than being asked to introduce a 
new data capture system at all levels. However, in the longer term it would still 
be preferable for SSCM to replace as many existing systems as possible, and 
thus become the initial point of entry for incident information. 
Once an event has occurred, the information required by SSCM must be 
balanced between being sufficiently detailed to be analytically robust, and not 
so time-consuming that the person inputting it will become bored and eventually 
not bother reporting at all. The minimum data for non-technical personnel at 
this initiating point should include: 
" 
An automatically generated unique numerical event identifier to provide 
traceability right through to closure, and common for all agencies having 
an input into that event 
Date of the event 
Person entering the event 
" 
Aircraft type and tail number, registration, or fleet number 
. 
Brief free-text description of the event 
Aircraft identification to individual airframe level is essential to ensure recurrent 
faults, which may be airframe, rather than equipment related can be readily 
identified. 
Event description should be a free-text field rather than using a drop-down 
menu of event types (as some databases do), since the latter option leads to 
inappropriate entries and also limits options to the choices made by the menu 
designer. 
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Figure 16 
- 
Event Report Screen 
Figure 16 shows the format of the basic database screen used to generate the 
event, using the fields already described. In the top right hand comer there is 
an Event Status field, which defaults to "Open" as soon as an event is input. 
Data from an actual in-service event has been entered to provide an indication 
of how the data appears, and in the later stages, how it is combined with 
investigation information to provide the required input for corrective action and 
reliability monitoring purposes. 
Flight crew and engineers' reports will of necessity be more detailed, and 
depending on the nature of the event, will require data input into some or all of 
the following additional fields: 
9 Technical log number or other unique identifier 
Operating environment (this information ultimately feeds into the 
environmental coding system described in section 5.4) 
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" 
Symptoms and fault diagnosis (if any) 
" 
Equipment identification including part number, serial number, 
modification status, and life consumed (hours, cycles, landings, starts, 
etc. ) 
" 
Action taken, e. g. the reason for equipment removal, system reset, and 
soon 
As part of their pre-use SSCM training, inputting staff will be encouraged to 
make full use of the free-text fields, since the common practice of listing 
symptoms such as "failed" or even worse "not known" are virtually useless. As 
with all of this activity, it is fundamentally important not just to train staff to use 
the system, but also to educate them, so that they fully understand and can see 
the benefits of, learning how system performance is contributing to the safety of 
the aircraft operation. 
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Figure 17 
- 
Enhanced Event Report Screen 
Additional details may also be automatically entered by virtue of the location of 
the workstation used to make the entry. This will include location and reporting 
operator / company. 
In each screen example illustrated, it can be assumed that all the additional 
fields will be present, but "grayed out" to deny access as appropriate. They 
have been omitted here simply for reasons of clarity. 
5.3.4 Investigation Findings 
As a result of the event report being raised, an "open entry" status will be 
flagged on the SSCM system. This status will remain until such time as the 
Event Closure field has been completed (see below). 
The nature of the findings will obviously vary depending on the type of event. 
For example, a report of a suspected operating parameter exceedance during 
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flight, may on investigation, be found not to have been the case, and the 
findings will simply say so. On the other hand, if an item of equipment has 
failed and been removed for repair, a much longer list of input data will be 
required to ensure that the nature of the failure is properly understood. As a 
minimum, this repair shop data must include: 
. 
Workcard number or other unique identifier 
" 
Primary findings 
-a free-text entry detailing what, in the opinion of the 
investigating engineer, was the primary cause or causes of the 
equipment failure. This free-text will later be coded using the failure 
mode codes described in section 5.5.2.1. This essential information is 
used in two primary areas; firstly to update the SSCM component 
reliability database and from there feed into the monthly re-check of the 
system FHA compliance. It is also quite possible that new or previously 
unpredicted failure modes may be discovered In this way, which may in 
themselves have a significant impact on FHA compliance. On the other 
hand, a No Fault Found entry can be used to feedback into such areas 
as fault diagnosis procedures and on-aircraft BITE 
" 
Secondary findings 
-a free-text entry detailing any other problems the 
engineer may have found that he / she considered occurred as a result of 
the primary failure cause, e. g., secondary damage. This is used for 
enhancing the understanding of failure effects as recorded in the original 
equipment FMEA and FMECA 
Action taken 
- 
what work did the engineer perform to correct the 
problems found. This is a brief summary of repair, overhaul, upgrade or 
modification and test 
5.3.5 Data Conversion 
At this point, the central SSCM database has sufficient information to start data 
coding under the various headings described in this chapter. One other vital 
piece of information is still required before reliability and safety levels can be 
analysed, and that is the aircraft fleet flying hours data. All the major aircraft 
manufacturers (Airbus, Boeing, Bombardier, Embraer, etc), already issue fleet 
flying hours, landings and dispatch reliability data on a regular basis, so it will be 
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a simple matter for them to upload the same data into SSCM. However, the 
manufacturers have to rely on the operators providing them with their own fleet 
data, and this can be patchy. Thus there is an unavoidable data lag in this 
area, so a full flying hours data upload can only be expected, at best, each 
month. 
6.3.6 Event Trends 
The database is now equipped with all the data it requires to perform the 
standard trend analyses of equipment reliability, based on the usual parameters 
of MTBF, MTBUR and NFF. Trend charts can be instantly updated, but due to 
the flying hours data lag already mentioned, will normally only be reviewed on a 
monthly basis. 
Trend charts should be produced using a moving 12-month dataset. This 
ensures topicality, and avoids the risk of masking trends by looking at too much 
data, as is the case with those systems that chart all events from entry into 
service to date. 
5.3.7 Reliability Update 
As the event trend analysis is updated, so too is component reliability. This is 
why component part number information is so important during the event data 
entry phase, in order to provide the link to the reliability database, which also 
takes account of varying environments to produce a range of failure probability 
estimates, as was the case which such obsolete systems as NPRD. 
5.3.8 FHA Compliance Check 
Once the component reliability database has been updated, system 
manufacturers FMEA / FMECA and FTA, which are all embedded within SSCM 
as part of the safety case deliverables to the certification authorities, can also 
be recalculated to ensure FHA compliance. 
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5.3.9 Data Review 
There is now a full set of updated information that can be reviewed as 
necessary depending on a number of requirements and triggers including: 
" 
FHA non-compliance alert 
" 
Removal rate alert levels 
" 
Modification or other corrective action effectivity checks 
Maintenance effectivity checks 
" 
Other regular Measures Of Performance (MOP) 
Appropriate bodies through multi-skilled forums of interested parties will carry 
out data reviews. For example, a system manufacturer might convene a 
monthly Reliability Trend Review Team (RTRT), that looks at all the current 
performance levels for their equipment, picking out adverse trends for 
discussion and either allocating responsibility for new corrective actions, or 
looking at the progress of previously established actions. Recommended 
attendees at an RTRT include the data analysis team (usually part of ILS), 
customer/ product support, design, production, test, repair and overhaul, quality 
and, commercial departments. The results of data reviews must be 
summarised on SSCM. 
5.3.10 Action Required 
What has the data review body decided to do? It may be that no action is 
actually required, in which case there will be a justification statement, otherwise 
one of the following statements may be input: 
Modification or re-design 
- 
to enhance reliability and safety levels, 
vulnerability to incorrect operation or maintenance, etc. 
Change to operating procedure 
- 
procedures are being followed correctly 
but are inappropriate 
Change to maintenance procedure 
- 
procedures are being followed 
correctly but are inappropriate 
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. 
Training 
- 
to correct incorrect operating or maintenance practice, 
repeated error, etc. 
" 
More data required 
- 
referred back to the originator or repair organisation 
Further trend measurement required 
- 
non-urgent and trends are erratic 
or require a longer period to become clear 
Whichever of these cases is selected, a brief summary of the actual action 
proposed must also be included, together with the proposed timescales for 
implementation and references to the detailed written reports and 
recommendations. 
5.3.11 Action Taken 
At some stage following identification of the required action, this field will record 
what was actually achieved, such as: 
" 
Modification or re-design implemented 
- 
including identification of 
modification category, embodiment policy and completion date across 
the aircraft fleet, introduction point into new production and so on 
Change to operating procedure implemented with effect from a certain 
date 
Change to maintenance procedure implemented with effect from a 
certain date 
Training programme (new or modified) introduced and all effected staff 
trained 
More data received from originator or repair organization and further 
action taken (as appropriate) 
" 
Further trend measurement carried out and further action taken (as 
appropriate) 
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Figure 18 
- 
Complete SSCM Data Entry Screen 
5.3.12 Action Measures / New Trends 
Now that some appropriate action has been taken, the next step is to ensure 
that it has had the desired effect. A number of questions requiring a simple Yes 
/ No / NA toggle selection on the database are posed to provide the necessary 
confidence. The NA (Not Applicable) option is necessary for use in those cases 
where some action has been taken without any safety alert first being triggered. 
. 
Have all the identified actions been completed? 
. 
Have adverse downward reliability trends been reversed consistently 
across the fleet? 
. 
Has the trend reversal occurred and / or reliability stabilised for the last 3 
months? 
Have safety compliance levels been re-established at all operators? 
Have safety compliance levels stabilised for the last 3 months? 
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A "No" answer to any one of the questions automatically locks-out the ability to 
select event closure, and requires further action to be taken. 
5.3.13 Lessons Learned 
All manufacturers should have some form of "lessons learned database", and 
many do. The intent is to ensure that bad decisions or mistakes made during 
design are not put back into the next generation of equipment. The lessons 
learned section of SSCM is a field that receives automatic data input as earlier 
fields are completed. What the enquirer will find here for downloading into his 
own lessons learned system are: 
Event description 
Primary findings 
" 
Action taken 
5.3.14 Feedback 
It is now essential that as a minimum, the same information provided under the 
lessons learned heading above, is also feedback to all the parties involved in 
the event, from the originator onwards. Individual company communication 
mechanisms need to be in place and effective to ensure this happens since 
without effective feedback loops, event-reporting rates would slow down and 
could eventually either stop altogether, or only consist of the more dramatic 
occurrences. 
This information flow will not stop at the front door of the organisation involved 
however, and will continue on to all other interested agencies, such as other 
operators of the same equipment, the aircraft manufacturer, the OEM and the 
regulators. 
One way in which the ease of feedback data flow can be enhanced will be 
through the part number system already embedded in SSCM for the reliability 
database. A straightforward linking of part numbers to standard supplier 
designators will allow automatic messaging to the supplier that there is a 
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problem with those parts associated with adverse trends through the FHA 
compliance alert system. 
6.3.15 Event Closure 
This field requires a simple confirmatory message that all actions have been 
completed and that the five Action Measures / New Trends questions have all 
been answered "yes". The "open entry" event status is then unlocked and the 
event can be closed, completing the SSCM cycle. 
5.4 ENVIRONMENTAL CODING 
As has already been discussed, a major failing in current safety analysis 
processes, is the lack of appreciation of the impact of varying operating 
environments on equipment reliability. In general terms, the aircraft 
manufacturer will specify a "typical" flight profile and operating scenario for the 
system designers to feed into their analytical model, and while there is 
obviously room for sensitivity analysis to vary some of the parameters, that is 
about as far as it goes. 
A recent example of how this lack of clear understanding can cause problems is 
the teething problems experienced by airlines introducing the Bombardier 
CRJ700 and CRJ900 regional jets into service. Reliability has been markedly 
down from expectations, and Jeff Mihalic, General Manager Customer Service 
at Bombardier, has said 1731: 
"The problems are operator-specific. The aircraft is not mature yet and how it is 
deployed is key. Addressing operator-specific issues in the short term can have 
big benefits for fleet-wide reliability. " 
The problem of course is the tremendous complexity of analysing system 
performance under all possible permutations of flight profile, operating 
environment, geographical location, and so on. For example, the Airbus A320 
series of airliners currently fly with around 80 different operators in almost every 
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comer of the World, with average flight times varying between 30 minutes and 
possibly six hours (in the case of the A319CJ variant). 
SSCM facilitates an easier analysis of these variables by the use of a four-figure 
code that is assigned to each failure event. The coding system considers four 
environmental parameters and allocates an alpha/numeric identifier under each 
heading, as shown below. 
Geographical Location Code 
Tem erste 1 
Tro ical 2 
Sub-tropical 3 
Arid 4 
Cold 5 
Marine 6 
O eratin Cycle 
1 cycle er da A 
1-2 cycles per day B 
3-6 c cl es er day c 
>6c cles per da D 
Dail Utilisation 
<3 hours 6 
3-7 hours 7 
8-12 hours 8 
> 12 hours 9 
Annual Utilisation 
< 100 flying / operating hours T 
100-500 flying /operating hours U 
500-1 1,000 flying / operating hours v 
1000-2 000 flying / operating hours w 
2,000-4,000 fl in /o eratin hours x 
>4 000 flying /o eratin hours y 
> 12 hours z 
Table 7- Environmental Coding System 
Use of this system will enable instant recognition of a wide range of operating 
environment factors which when combined with other event data, will assist in 
focusing in on the causal factors leading to a downturn in system reliability 
performance. 
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5.5 EVENT AND INCIDENT DATA CAPTURE AND ANALYSIS 
Fundamental to the success of SSCM is its widespread use throughout all 
sections of the industry, and many other systems have tried and failed at this 
stage. The are five main reasons for this: 
1. The company being asked to supply the data does not have a fully- 
developed safety culture. Without this there will always be reluctance on 
the part of the employees to use a data capture system effectively. 
2. The proposed system is either difficult to access, difficult to use, or the 
data asked for is either too complex or over-simplified. 
3. Data is considered proprietary and thus not to be shared. This is 
particularly true of repair organisations competing with each other for 
business. 
4. There are no resources available to look after the system and carry out 
the analysis tasks. 
5. There is no effective regulatory pressure to do so. 
How can these problems be addressed? Some can indeed by answered by 
SSCM, while others require adoption of some of the other points raised earlier, 
in particular, the need to better educate the aviation industry about the need for, 
and benefits of through-life safety analysis. We are not yet smart enough in 
maximising use of the powerful analytical tools at our disposal. 
The organisation operating and maintaining the system must have no direct 
interest in the outcome other than the sharing of safety information. The system 
must be owned and maintained by an independent non-regulatory organisation 
with no vested interest in the content of the data and information stored in the 
database. An example of a qualifying government organisation would be 
NASA. A commercial organisation outside the aviation industry and specializing 
in information processing and/or Web application hosting would also qualify. 
With the decreasing cost of hard drive storage media, constraints on system 
capacity are not likely. Nonetheless, the system must be capable of storing one 
million records plus attachments, and the system must be capable of indexing 
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and searching all the data stored within the system and linked to data owner 
systems. 
The first step in integrating dissimilar data into a sharing system involves 
identifying data fields that are common among the different safety event 
reporting systems. Once the common fields are identified, the fields are 
reviewed for relevance, based on the information needs of the user. Such 
relevant fields may include make/model, airport name, phase of flight or type of 
event. Once the relevant fields are established, a map is generated mapping 
the common fields among the dissimilar data sources to create a virtual subset 
of data. The next step is to organize the data within the mapped framework so 
that the information can be conveniently manipulated. This process involves 
converting the data from dissimilar systems into a common standardised format. 
Another consideration when implementing a system is to examine the various 
approaches to collecting the data. One method uses on-line discussion forums 
or electronic bulletin boards. A more complex approach requires periodic 
extraction of data from multiple, disparate, event management systems and 
merging the data into a central repository. An emerging approach includes the 
use of the Internet to network several airline flight safety event management 
systems by mapping individual data fields within each of them to a virtual 
repository that is available to all members. " 174] 
5.5.1 Company Culture 
Correcting an organisation's inappropriate safety culture obviously cannot be 
done overnight, but demonstrating to management the potential cost savings of 
being able to fully understand how equipment performance might be improved 
is a good start. This can then be followed up by standard industrial initiatives 
such as Total Quality Management (TQM), embracing the ideals of employee 
empowerment to help everyone understand the part they can play in improving 
performance. 
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Company's face ever-increasing financial pressure and this is frequently 
highlighted as a reason for not introducing a new process. The key is to 
demonstrate to the doubters, the potential benefits to them of adopting SSCM. 
One answer is to point out the extra maintenance burden of incorrect reliability 
assessment, as was shown in section 3.28. Lower reliability will always lead to 
higher direct operating costs, and the example discussed resulted in an 
increased annual cost to the operator of $480,000 annually for just one item of 
equipment. 
This figure pales into comparison with the effect on the operator of a 
catastrophic accident. The industry has stated that the average cost of such an 
event is something in excess of $3 million for every passenger killed. No 
company can afford this, and even if they can, the effect of an accident on their 
public image and hence commercial viability, is extremely serious. 
5.5.2 Ease Of Use 
Designing a data capture and analysis system which is user-friendly enough 
that people will actually get into the habit of using it every time they should, is a 
fine balancing act between quick and easy data input and meaningful analysis 
output. For example, some repair shop systems have moved away from 
allowing "free text" entry by the engineer of what he found when he performed 
the work, to giving him a menu of "finding codes" from which to select that which 
closest fits his actual findings. The great danger here is that the tendency 
rapidly develops to always use the same one or two codes that are easiest to 
remember quickly, and which may not be a true reflection of the fault. Even 
worse, is having a vague "general" finding code, where the coder has run out of 
ideas during the building of the menu. This is meaningless and should be 
avoided at all costs. 
As the DGCA said (see section 4.15.4), data categorisation is essential to ease 
data retrieval, but "this is most problematic with subjective descriptions of an 
event and its causal factors", since "it was impossible to anticipate all possible 
contingencies, therefore it was also impossible to create an exhaustive list of 
keywords. ' 
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5.5.2.1 Failure Mode Codes 
What is needed is a combination of free text and data categorisation. The 
SSCM database allows for free text entry by the originator, which is translated 
into a pre-determined two or three-letter fault code by the receiving data 
analyst. Thus generalised searches can be made on the codes, and more 
detailed searches can be made when required by looking for word strings in the 
free text field. 
When drawing up the failure mode code dictionary, a balance must be struck 
between having sufficient breakdown of failure modes to enable quick homing in 
on problem areas during data searches, while not making the dictionary so 
large that it becomes unwieldy with individual codes which become overly 
specific in failure detail. 
In the examples in table 8 below, it can be seen that the majority of the codes 
contain sufficient detail for failure identification and thus trend analysis 
purposes. On the other hand, room is still left for "one-offs" or other difficult to 
categorise events, through the use of more generic codes such as MF for a 
Manufacturing Fault, which could be for example, a problem with a poor-quality 
batch of components, or the breakdown of a production process for some non- 
design related reason. 
Failure Mode Code Description 
ACF Auxiliary connector failure 
ADJ Out of adjustment 
BC Bad communication 
BF Bearing failure 
BOS Bearin outer race spinning 
BRF Banding ring failure 
BSM Brush solder melted 
BWC Brush wear check failure 
CAS Chassis assembly damage 
CBF Clutch bearing failure 
CBS Clutch bearing separation 
CC Casting cracked 
CE Clutch examination failure 
CF Customer fault (induced damage or failure 
CIR Customer incorrect repair 
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Failure Mode Code Description 
CMS Contaminated motor section 
CPT Component part failure 
CTP CT lead power failure 
CUS Chassis unserviceable 
DCF DC/DC converter failure 
DIO Diode failure 
DLD Diode lead damaged 
DLS Diode lead sheared 
DPI Diode pack disintegration 
DV Damage various (not categorised elsewhere) 
EB Earth bonding failure 
EO Extemal overload/Extended operation 
EV Excessive vibration 
FIL Filter fault 
FS Failed stator 
HMF Hit module failure 
IPN Incorrect part number reported (by software) 
IRS Inner race spooling 
LF Lo is fault 
LL Lack of lubrication / low oil level 
MBF Multiple board failure 
MD Minor damage 
MER Main exciter rotor failure 
MES Main exciter stator failure 
MF Manufacturing fault 
MOD Modification 
MRD Main rotor damage 
MRL Main rotor leads damaged 
MRO Main rotor open circuit 
MSB Motor section burnt 
MSW Main stator winding failure 
NCD Non confirmed defect 
Table 8- Example Failure Mode Code List 
The Customer Incorrect Repair (CIR) code is also very significant. This 
demonstrates the SSCM ability to identify and enable searches against human 
factors criteria. A CIR can be due to a variety of reasons, including 
maintenance error (which in itself may have multiple causal contributors), or 
incorrect procedures, any one of which can be expanded in the free-text 
sections. 
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5.5.2.2 Event Codes 
A further coding system is also used for categorising each event being reported. 
In this case, SSCM first identifies the source of the data, followed by the type of 
event, basic action taken and subsequent findings identifiers. This is the core of 
the SSCM system, and will ultimately become a very extensive and detailed list. 
For clarity it is shown separately in Appendix C. 
This a very comprehensive range of eventualities that can be covered to give a 
clear and precise overall picture of; who found the problem and under what 
circumstances, what initial action was taken to recover from the effects of the 
event, and what close-out action was subsequently carried out. The codes list 
follows a logical sequence: 
1) Data source 
- 
identification of the origin of the event report. Options 
include flight crew reports, flight data, on-board monitoring systems, 1`` 
and 2nd line engineering reports, MRO or Depot level repair, and 
technical or regulatory post-event investigations. 
2) Event category 
- 
identification of the basic nature of the event. Options 
include fault indication (a failure may not be apparent), failure (where 
such is clear), parameter exceedance (where a fault indication or failure 
has not apparently occurred), scheduled maintenance, and unscheduled 
maintenance. 
3) Action taken 
- 
identification of what was done to clear that single event. 
Options vary depending on the input data under the first two categories, 
but include none (where no action was required), system reset, on- 
aircraft maintenance, repair, replace, overhaul and other. 
4) Findings 
- 
the results of the post action investigation. Options include 
confirmed fault, induced fault, monitor (where further clarification or 
measurement over time is desirable), no fault found, condition / status 
report, and human factor event. 
In all cases, the basic event codes are used to facilitate both data input and 
database searches, but are backed up by free-text narrative. As SSCM 
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evolves, other categories will undoubtedly develop, and this code list should be 
seen as a first iteration to enable the system to become established. 
An important addition here though, is the identification of human factors events 
under their own sub-code. Over a period of time, this will enable the 
quantification of some human factors events, which is the current great difficulty 
with accurate forecasting of human factors impact on system safety 
performance. 
5.5.2.3 Understanding Failure Types 
One of the key issues is the definition and use of the differentiation between 
confirmed failures and induced failures. Even today this is not well understood, 
and is certainly misused within much of the aviation industry, yet it is 
fundamental to understanding the contributory causal factors in a failure to 
ensure the proper corrective action is taken. 
For example, let us consider again, an aircraft electrical power generating 
system. A generator failure occurs during normal operations, and on inspection 
back in the repair shop, is found to have suffered a main rotor windings 
disconnection. Assuming there are no other mitigating circumstances, which is 
unlikely, this becomes a clear case of an inherent failure of the unit, for which 
the generator manufacturer must take responsibility and identify whether or not 
this could be considered to be a "one-off" vent, or one which is part of a trend 
requiring remedial action. Such a failure in the SSCM database would therefore 
be classified as a confirmed failure and coded F. 
Another generator fails and is found to have suffered a short circuit due to 
contamination by metallic debris in the oil. The generator shares its oil with the 
engine gearbox on which it is mounted, and examination of the debris 
composition shows that it has come from a gearbox component rather than from 
anything within the generator itself. This is clearly a case of the generator 
failure having been caused by some external event, for which the manufacturer 
cannot be held liable. In this case the SSCM database would classify this as an 
induced failure, and allocate the code Ito it. 
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This is a vital differentiation for two reasons. Firstly, in the case of a warranty 
claim, identification of primary responsibility for the failure is obviously essential. 
Secondly, and more importantly from the point of view of reliability and safety 
performance, confirmed failures (F) are counted towards the calculation of 
MTBF, while both confirmed AND induced failures are counted towards the 
calculation of MTBUR. When downloading event data from SSCM into the 
component reliability database, only MTBF-related events must be considered. 
However, both MTBF and MTBUR events are necessary for the re-assessment 
of FHA compliance levels. 
In fact, aircraft manufacturers address this issue in different ways, which can 
and does lead to confusion over what is and what is not an accountable failure. 
Gaining clarity of understanding and a common approach across the industry 
will be vital. 
5.5.3 Proprietary Data 
As has already been mentioned, one of the problems in getting operator buy-in 
to a data retrieval system such as this, has been their concern over "airing their 
dirty linen in public", that is to say, many are worried about their events and the 
action they take, being in the public domain. Even more important is the 
potential for liability, should the subsequent engineering investigation indicate 
that the operator, whether by accident or design, had done something wrong. 
Thus data confidentiality, or "de-sensitising" is very important in order to gain 
acceptance of and confidence in, SSCM. 
However, the simple expedient of removing all originator information from 
incoming data, removes at a stroke, the ability to address one of the great 
problem areas with current safety analysis, the understanding of the effects of 
different operating environments, (see section 5.4). It also prevents an easy 
communication route back to the originator for feedback of the results of trend 
analysis and investigation, an absolutely vital part of the whole system. Some 
existing databases use the IATA two or three-letter operator code system, 
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where for example, easyJet translates as EZY, to facilitate data searches, but 
this does not make the data confidential. 
There are two possible solutions for SSCM to adopt. The simplest is to 
continue to use the IATA codes, but hide that data field in the publicly- 
accessible database, which would still allow the database owners to perform 
meaningful analysis and provide feedback, but which would somewhat degrade 
the value of the data to visitors. 
The alternative is to use a new set of confidential operator (and other 
organisation) codes, visible to website visitors but de-identified, which would 
help the identification of operator-specific issues (especially in conjunction with 
the environmental codes), without the ability to point the finger at anyone. This 
is the system that SSCM proposes to use. 
In parallel, other data that can identify the originator, such as aircraft tail 
numbers for example, will also be contained in hidden database fields. Access 
to the hidden fields will be granted to those agencies that need to know this 
detail, in particular the aircraft and systems manufacturers and the regulatory 
authorities. 
5.6.4 Lack Of Resource 
Here again, the argument about the fight for survival under the daily commercial 
pressures will be used as a reason for not implementing SSCM, and of course 
the potential cost savings as already shown, are the main response to that. It 
cannot be denied that, depending on the size of the organisation and its current 
structure, there may be a requirement for a dedicated resource to set up and 
manage their end of the SSCM system. In other cases, particularly in the larger 
companies, there will already be for example, a reliability team, who can 
transfer much of their current disparate systems into SSCM, which may well 
actually bring a saving in resource requirements. 
Procedures must be put in place, including confidential reporting systems if they 
are not already established. Staff must be educated about the need for SSCM 
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and trained to use it, terminals must be set-up, review bodies identified for the 
monthly meetings, and so on. All this takes time and money and ties up people, 
so the business case must be robust and take the longer-term view with clear 
identification of benefit. 
5.5.6 Lack Of Regulation 
The regulatory authorities continue to move away from audit and in many cases 
basic legislation, and are driving hard towards the principle of self-regulation by 
the industry. Not least among the problems is the poor state of the existing 
legislation intended to ensure that aircraft systems are fit for purpose and safe. 
So far, the messages emerging from EASA seem to indicate that they too, have 
failed to recognise the issue. 
EASA should therefore be encouraged to require implementation of SSCM, 
phased in across the European industry over a period of five years. At the 
same time, ARP4761 must be moved from being a recommended practice, to 
being a regulatory requirement, although it will need considerable amendment 
and upgrading in the medium term to increase its effectiveness. It is believed 
that these initiatives will be able to demonstrate the benefits of SSCM in a fairly 
short period of time, such that the other major world regulatory agencies, 
including the FAA, Transport Canada and so on, will take notice and follow suit. 
As long as the industry is able to pick and choose what it does with regard to 
safety analysis, the situation will not change. Legislation is vital. 
5.6 MAINTENANCE AND SPARES DATA CAPTURE 
The increasing adoption of maintenance documentation and materiel supply 
standards ATA 1000 and ATA Spec 2000, provides the opportunity for SSCM to 
capitalise on already established systems for easier parts tracking. The 
introduction of standard text formats, and Common Source DataBases (CSDB) 
has vastly improved the communications systems between OEMs, MROs, 
aircraft manufacturers and operators. 
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ATA Spec 2000 has defined common data formats for electronic data 
exchange, and this capability is heavily utilised for automated spares 
provisioning. A link between ATA Spec 2000 and SSCM will allow instant 
updating of component useage rates, and this can be input to the parts 
catalogues and component reliability databases in virtually real-time. This 
means that not only will unscheduled component replacements be captured via 
the normal SSCM event report system, but so too will scheduled replacements 
of lifed items for overhaul. 
This capability closes the loop for full understanding of component performance, 
and allows the continuous assessment of the validity of both reliability estimates 
and replacement period recommendations for lifed items. 
As with the entire SSCM system, getting the maximum benefit from the ATA 
Spec 2000 link will take time. The ATA model is not yet in widespread use, but 
is growing rapidly, and now is the time to maximize its benefits by paralleling 
with SSCM. Together over a period of time, they will build into a co-ordinated 
and effective system that will finally enable the obsolete Mil-Hdbk-217F, NPRD 
95 and other databases to be pensioned off completely. 
5.7 SAFETY PERFORMANCE ALERTS 
For ensuring aircraft systems are both designed to and are performing in a safe 
manner to acceptable levels, this is the core section of SSCM. This is the first 
time that a capability has existed for virtually instant, automated and continuous 
assessment and re-assessment of safety compliance, coupled with a warning 
system to every interested party when things start to wrong, and before they 
can potentially lead to an accident. 
At the initial design stage, system safety analysis, primarily in the form of 
FMECA and FTA, is embedded within SSCM, and uses the parts reliability 
database as the source of its core data. Due to the automated alert system 
built into SSCM, it is therefore evident that even at this early stage, any non- 
compliance with FHA requirements will automatically be highlighted and require 
the design team to revisit their system. Additionally, should the design analyst 
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select a part that does not appear in the database, this too will trigger an alert, 
which can only be cleared by means of an acceptable justification statement by 
the design team, such as: 
" 
New part with no in-service history 
- 
reliability estimate based on 
comparison with similar equipments, or on prototype test results 
" 
Insufficient data for confidence in the database 
- 
estimate to be validated 
by testing 
Following entry into service, any degradation in safety levels, within the trend 
parameters detailed below, are automatically triggered to both the aircraft 
manufacturer and the system OEM simultaneously. However, allowing SSCM 
to do this on an event-by-event basis, even if it were possible to receive daily 
flying hours updates for an entire aircraft fleet (which it is not), would be unwise, 
since daily variations and unexpected operational changes, could result in 
short-term wild swings in reliability which might trigger spurious alerts. 
For the alert system to be effective, the automatic compliance check will 
therefore be performed on a monthly basis, following upload of the aircraft fleet 
flying hours data from the aircraft manufacturers (see section 5.3.8). 
FHA 
compliance 
level 
Trend 
analysis 
results 
Alert colour 
I type 
Action taken Close-out 
requirement 
Catastrophic Declining Cyan 
- 
Manufacturer Reliability 
<1x10-9 reliability over advisory required to reverts to 
three comment previous 
consecutive within 30 days levels for 
months, but three 
still at or in consecutive 
excess of months 
certificated 
compliance 
levels 
Declining Amber 
- 
All operators Reliability 
reliability over caution advised. reverts to 
three Manufacturer previous 
consecutive required to levels within 
months, still advise three months 
compliant, but proposed and remains below corrective there for three 
certificated action within further 
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FHA Trend Alert colour Action taken Close-out 
compliance analysis / type requirement 
level results 
compliance 10 days consecutive 
levels months 
Non- Red 
- 
Regulators Compliance 
compliant warning and all achieved 
operators within two 
advised. months and 
Manufacturer regains 
required to previous 
advise levels within a 
proposed further three 
corrective consecutive 
action within 5 months 
days 
Hazardous Declining Cyan 
- 
Manufacturer Reliability 
<1 x10"7 reliability over advisory required to reverts to 
three comment previous 
consecutive within 30 days levels for 
months, but three 
still at or in consecutive 
excess of months 
certificated 
compliance 
levels 
Hazardous Declining Amber 
- 
All operators Reliability 
<1x10"' reliability over caution advised. reverts to 
(continued) three Manufacturer previous 
consecutive required to levels within 
months, still advise three months 
compliant, but proposed and remains 
below corrective there for three 
certificated action within further 
compliance 10 days consecutive 
levels months 
Non- Red 
- 
Regulators Compliance 
compliant warning and all achieved 
operators within two 
advised. months and 
Manufacturer regains 
required to previous 
advise levels within a 
proposed further three 
corrective consecutive 
action within 5 months 
days 
Major <1x10' Declining Cyan 
- 
Manufacturer Reliability 
reliability over advisory advised and reverts to 
three asked to previous 
consecutive comment levels for 
months but , I three 
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FHA Trend Alert colour Action taken Close-out 
compliance analysis I type requirement 
level results 
still at or in consecutive 
excess of months 
certificated 
compliance 
levels 
Declining Amber 
- 
All operators Reliability 
reliability over caution advised. reverts to 
three Manufacturer previous 
consecutive required to levels within 
months, still advise three months 
compliant, but proposed and remains 
below corrective there for three 
certificated action within further 
compliance 30 days consecutive 
levels months 
Non- Red 
- 
Regulators Compliance 
compliant warning and all achieved 
operators within two 
advised. months and 
Manufacturer regains 
required to previous 
advise levels within a 
proposed further three 
corrective consecutive 
action within months 
10 days 
Minor <1x10' Declining Cyan 
- 
Manufacturer Reliability 
reliability over advisory advised and reverts to 
three asked to previous 
consecutive comment levels for 
months, but three 
still at or in consecutive 
excess of months 
certificated 
compliance 
levels 
Minor <1x10' Declining Amber 
- 
All operators Reliability 
(continued) reliability over caution advised. reverts to 
three Manufacturer previous 
consecutive required to levels within 
months, still advise three months 
compliant, but proposed and remains 
below corrective there for three 
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FHA 
compliance 
level 
Trend 
analysis 
results 
Alert colour 
I type 
Action taken Close-out 
requirement 
certificated action within further 
compliance 30 days consecutive 
levels months 
Non- Red 
- 
Regulators Compliance 
compliant warning and all achieved 
operators within two 
advised. months and 
Manufacturer regains 
required to previous 
advise levels within a 
proposed further three 
corrective consecutive 
action within months 
20 days 
Table 9- Safety Performance Alert Matrix 
In order to assist early understanding and familiarity with this aspect of SSCM, it 
has been decided to use an alert colour and descriptor method based on that 
found in on-board aircraft systems such as Engine Indication and Crew Alerting 
System (EICAS). This system uses colour codes as attention getters, which 
require different levels of reaction as the hazard level increases. Thus a cyan 
colour indicates an advisory level, which may or may not require some action to 
be taken, amber indicates caution, and red indicates a warning. The degree of 
action required is decided by reference to the standard FHA compliance levels 
of catastrophic, hazardous, major and minor. 
The SSCM software will automatically trigger these alerts, which will stay "live" 
on the system until the designated necessary close-out action has been 
completed. Visibility of this activity will be clear to all concerned parties, 
including the regulators. 
Thus system safety analysis performed at the design stage, is continually 
assessed for accuracy throughout its in-service life. Any significant downward 
trends in reliability and hence safety levels are immediately brought to the 
attention of the regulators, the aircraft and systems manufacturers, and the 
operators, all of whom will continue to have on-line visibility of progress towards 
a resumption of FHA compliance. 
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5.8 SSCM OWNERSHIP AND ACCESS 
Obviously, for SSCM to be both acceptable and accessible, it must be "owned" 
and maintained by a recognised and respected international aviation body. 
This initially suggests two choices, IATA or ICAO. 
As previously discussed, FATA is already in the early stages of running its 
STEADES programme, and SSCM is a logical extension of this activity, bringing 
considerably enhanced benefits and greatly expanding the usefulness of the 
existing STEADES system. This is the preferred option for SSCM. 
The alternative is ICAO under the umbrella of the SARPs system. However, as 
standards and recommended practices, SARPs do not necessarily have the 
weight required to drive SSCM into the industry to the extent needed for it to 
become effective in improving safety levels. 
A further option would be for the aircraft manufacturers to take responsibility 
and ownership of the system, and if necessary, pay the operators for their data. 
This option is certainly the view of the former manager of the BASIS system. 
in summary: 
1. Who owns the database? IATA as an extension of STEADES, ICAO 
under the SARPs umbrella, or the major aircraft manufacturers. 
2. Who has access to it, both for input and for data analysis? Input 
- 
every 
operator, aircraft manufacturer, OEM, repair organisation, military? 
Analysis 
- 
detailed analysis and feedback of full database by IATA. 
Manufacturers allowed access to those items for which they have 
responsibility by tying part number with supplier codes. Other items can 
be searched for current reliability performance by part number only. 
3. How can the industry as a whole be persuaded to use it? By 
demonstration of cost benefit of getting reliability and safety right at the 
design stage and by identifying the need for corrective action before 
203 
AIRCRAFT SYSTEM SAFETY ASSESSMENT 
-A NEW APPROACH 
trends start to hurt. Look at the current cost of fixing all the small events 
and continually re-inventing the wheel. 
5.9 IMPLEMENTATION 
Having established SSCM functionality requirements and drawn up a draft 
system architecture, the next step will be to plan a road-map to full 
implementation. As has already been suggested, it is proposed that IATA 
adopts SSCM as an additional function to STEADES, but many other links are 
also required, not least to other existing "satellite" systems such as ATA Spec 
2000 and the existing proprietary data capture software packages such as 
Sentinel. 
The principles steps in the implementation road-map will be: 
1. Present SSCM principles to major interested parties, including IATA, 
ICAO, Flight Safety Foundation (FSF), GAIN, IFA, aircraft 
manufacturers, CAA, JAA, EASA, FAA and a selected groups of 
representative worldwide airlines 
2. Set-up an industry working-group to refine system requirements and 
identify the system "owner" 
3. Identify linking systems and agencies 
4. Draft legislative requirements 
5. Database design 
6. Detail network system design, costs and timescales for introduction 
7. Prototype system tests 
8. Commence upload of existing data from other systems 
9. Identify participants in initial trials 
10. Install system for trial 
11. User training 
12. One year trial and report 
13. Review system and refine as required 
14. Full-scale promotion and implementation 
15. Feedback and review 
16. Introduction of legislation 
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17. On-going review and feedback 
Participants in the one-year development trial should include at least one: 
" 
Industry body, such as ATA, IATA, ICAO, etc. 
" 
International safety agency, such as FSF, GAIN, IFA 
" 
National carrier 
" 
Low-cost carrier 
" 
Charter carrier 
" 
Fractional ownership company, such as NetJets 
" 
Sole-user business aircraft operator 
" 
Military air arm 
" 
MRO 
" 
Aircraft manufacturer 
" 
Tier I aircraft system supplier, i. e. one which interfaces directly with the 
aircraft manufacturer 
" 
Tier 2 aircraft system supplier, i. e. one which does not have a direct 
interface with the aircraft manufacturer 
" 
Component supplier 
Existing in-service data system company 
- 
although this is likely to be 
difficult given that SSCM is designed to replace their system 
" 
Regulator 
" 
SAE 
Reliability and safety analysis specialists 
it is anticipated that the overall timescale to full implementation at step 14 could 
take up to five years, with perhaps a further two before legislation could 
reasonably be expected to be in place. 
5.10 DATA READ-ACROSS FROM EXISTING SYSTEMS 
Although SSCM is intended to eventually replace a whole host of existing 
systems, this will not be at the expense of the vast amount of valuable data 
already embedded within them. There are three principle areas to consider 
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here, reliability databases, other in-service data monitoring systems and the 
overall database software compatibility. 
5.10.1 Reliability Databases 
Starting a new reliability database from scratch is obviously undesirable, for the 
simple reason that it will take a very long time indeed to build up sufficient data 
to start being useful. Therefore it is essential that the maximum possible use is 
made of the many years data contained in the existing databases. 
However, as has been shown, many of these contain much data that is either 
hopelessly inadequate, out of date or just simply wrong, and deciding which 
data to use and which to reject will not be an easy task. Ideally of course, it 
would be nice to think that an existing compatible database could simply be 
linked electronically to SSCM, but the reality is that there is very little chance of 
any of them having sufficiently robust and trustworthy data for this to be 
permitted. Therefore, a small working group of reliability consultants and other 
experts in the field will be established to draft the procedure for the task of data 
identification for upload. 
Ultimately, but certainly well before the SSCM trial period commences, 
incorporation of existing parts databases will gradually start as they are sense 
checked for relevance and currency. As SSCM starts adding to this data, sense 
checks will be carried out to ensure compatibility and that no sudden trend 
changes indicate a data mismatch. Some way into the implementation process, 
a point will be reached at which the old database has yielded all its useful data. 
Then a recommendation can then be made to the SSCM Working Group to 
,, switch it off", provided of course, that the change over to the new system has 
been clearly signalled to every user of the old database. 
5.10.2 Other In-Service Data Monitoring Systems 
In many ways, this will be a similar process to that just described for reliability 
databases, with the important exception that many 
- 
even most 
- 
of these 
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monitoring systems will continue after the introduction of SSCM. They will 
however, feed into and be able to retrieve data from, the new system. 
Once again, a working group will identify desirable data sources and make 
recommendations for either direct upload into SSCM or database links. 
5.10.3 SSCM Database Software 
Obviously at an early stage, the choice of which proprietary database software 
package to use as the framework for SSCM must be made. In view of the 
potential for the system to ultimately become very large indeed, with a high data 
storage requirement, the answer will lie in the use of linked or relational 
databases. 
Work will need to be done to assess the probability of error within the chosen 
database software itself, and this error-proneness will be the deciding factor in 
the final selection. In order to address this properly, it is proposed that an 
established reliability software consultant company would be contracted to 
design the database using their expertise to select the most appropriate 
software to run under all Microsoft Windows Operating Systems. 
5.11 FUNDING 
Until such time as the first four steps in the implementation road-map have been 
completed, the detailed funding requirements cannot be identified. The 
question remains though, who is going to be expected to pay for it? 
Apart from the need to educate the industry about the need for the system to 
ensure longer-term maximum take-up by users, some key players can be 
expected to be potential sponsors during the early stages. Perhaps initial 
investigation, design, trial and set-up costs might be financed by the initial 
working group (including of course the eventual system owner), with further 
support coming from other interested parties including aircraft manufacturers 
and tier I system suppliers. The annual running costs will be levied equally 
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across all users through the usual commercial mechanisms of licences and 
annual renewal charges. 
Based on earlier work in industry, it is estimated that the initial database design 
and formatting, contracted out to an established reliability database specialist 
will cost in the order of $8,000 - $10,000. 
5.12 REGULATORY ISSUES 
Finally therefore, we come back to the question of regulation. For SSCM to be 
acceptable to the industry, it must of course go hand-in-glove with legislation, 
whether that comes from EASA or some other body. In an environment already 
controlled by far more legislation than any other transport industry, there will 
undoubtedly be resistance. Nevertheless, the need for more stringent 
legislation in the whole area of aircraft system safety analysis and on-going In- 
service monitoring has been amply demonstrated, but how can the regulators 
be persuaded? 
Currently, the exact role of EASA within the continued airworthiness domain 
remains unknown. It is time for IATA, ICAO or one of the existing legislating 
organisations to make the case for an SSCM-type system direct to the EASA 
rule-makers. 
5.13 WILL IT WORK? 
- 
CASE STUDY 
In order to demonstrate the potential effectives of SSCM, let us look at another 
case study. In late 1999 through to the middle of 2000, the BAE Advanced 
TurboProp (ATP) airliner fleet began to suffer a sudden alarming increase in the 
removal rate of its engine-mounted AC generators. Over a period of several 
months, generators were failing on engine start-up on a regular basis, ultimately 
doing so at the rate of almost once a week. 
it soon became apparent to the OEM, who was receiving the generators for 
repair, that just one operator was suffering the problem. Furthermore, every 
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single generator returned was found on investigation to have failed due to some 
unknown external cause. 
However, the investigation by the OEM's repair shop was severely hampered 
by the poor quality data coming from the operator, who quite evidently had no 
system for capturing aircraft event information. For example, documentation 
accompanying the equipment on return was sparse in terms of meaningful 
information, with statements such as "Not Known" in proliferation. 
Furthermore, although attempts to get additional information directly were made 
by both the OEM and the aircraft manufacturer, it was simply a case that no 
meaningful data gathering existed within the airline. 
Meanwhile, the operator continued to try and understand the nature of the 
problem, primarily through the use of on-the-spot discussion as each failure 
occurred, and by reliance on engineering memory to tie in with previous events. 
One highly significant point, which did finally come to the OEM's attention, was 
the fact that all the failures were occurring on just one aeroplane in the fleet, 
something not properly recorded by the operator. A sequence of 
uncoordinated, almost desperate engineering fixes were tried, which included 
combinations of engine changes, swapping generators over from one side of 
the aircraft to the other, and so on. 
Eventually, the source of the problem was found through detailed investigation 
by the aircraft manufacturer, which included extensive searches through 
uncoordinated engineering records and pilot reports at the operator. This 
revealed that for some time prior to the start of the sequence of apparent 
generator failures, crews had been suffering from unexplained ground power 
connection problems with the same aircraft, but in the absence of a robust audit 
trail of information, these problem indicators were missed. Thus the link 
between aircrew reports and apparently unrelated engineering actions on 
"failing" main generators was never made, and the actual failure mode, which 
was ground power overload damage to the main generator windings took far 
longer to identify than it should. 
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The elapsed time from the realisation that a significant problem occurred to the 
final discovery and repair of the cause, took almost six months. This was 
obviously very costly for all parties concerned, not least the airline who had to 
frequently take the aircraft out of service or seriously delay its dispatch. Had 
the airline had SSCM in place, it is highly probable that, with regular and 
coordinated data analysis, the following sequence would have occurred: 
1. Increasing incidences of ground power problems seen, related to one 
particular aircraft. This in itself would have lead to an early engineering 
investigation and the discovery of a faulty ground power control unit. 
2. Even if point 1 had not yet on its own brought about an investigation, 
incoming data revealing a sudden spate of generator changes on the 
same aircraft, at the same phase of operation, i. e. on the ground before 
flight, would certainly have done so. 
3. Trend analysis would easily have triggered the requirement to take action 
far sooner than actually occurred, and this would have resulted in the 
early realisation of the link between the 1 and 2, facilitating a much 
quicker resolution of the problem. 
It is estimated that in this case, SSCM would have saved approximately three 
months of investigation manhours and in the order of seven or eight generator 
replacements and repairs. Each repair on its own cost the airline approximately 
$60,000. This case, although thankfully not as extreme as the Alaskan MD-80 
discussed earlier, shows remarkable similarities in a failure to recognise the 
need for robust procedures for data capture. Both cases would thus have 
benefited from SSCM. 
5.14 WILL IT WORK? 
- 
CURRENT SYSTEM FLAWS 
In Chapter 4, the current analytical system was described and illustrated and 
the five fundamental flaws which act to significantly reduce its effectives, were 
shown to be: 
1. Feedback from maintenance to PDS. 
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2. Retrieval of event data from maintenance into a PDS analytical 
database. 
3. Dataflow from PDS to lessons-learned. 
4. Interrogation of POS databases by design teams. 
5. Feedback from operator to design team. 
The automated, linked database nature of SSCM, which covers all areas of the 
system from operator right back to. component reliability databases, will mean 
that all these flaws are corrected, indeed items 1,2 3 and 5 in the list above are 
embedded as automatic functions within SSCM. The only required human 
action item is number 4, but the very fact that the model will become the main 
driver for corrective action and that events will require action before they can be 
closed off, can only serve to keep design teams alert to the information 
available to them to reduce their workload and shorten development and 
modification timescales and cost. 
5.15 ANALYSIS OF THE BENEFITS OF SSCM 
So, apart from the overall aims and objectives of the SSCM system, how can 
the benefits be measured? The answer comes in five parts; 
1. An overview of the cost of an accident or major incident to the Industry 
2. The results of two surveys of air transport industry students attending the 
MSc Air Transport Management and Air Safety Management 
programmes at City University 
3. Conclusions drawn from a survey of airline flight safety personnel, 
carried out by GAIN during their 2003 World Conference in Rome 
4. Direct quotes drawn from students coursework for the MSc module on 
Safety Analysis and Statistics 
5. Estimation of possible time and cost savings in a specific case study 
5.15.1 The Cost Of An Accident 
The cost of a hull loss accident to the air transport industry is huge. The figure 
below shows just how expensive it is in real terms, showing the combined 
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annual cost of the aircraft loss and the accident liability to the world airline 
industry. 
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Figure 19 
- 
Hull and Liability Costs 1980 
- 
2002 
Two years ago, the National Aerospace Laboratory in the Netherlands, in 
association with Airclaims in the UK, produced a document [75] which analyses 
the cost benefits of effective safety measures to the air transport industry. Their 
work shows that the average cost to the industry of a catastrophic hull loss 
accident is now $3.05 million for every passenger killed. 
Beneath that stark figure lies a very detailed breakdown of the various cost 
elements incurred by the industry in the case of such an event, or indeed when 
a lesser incident occurs, and these bring into sharp focus the potential savings 
that SSCM can be expected to bring. These cost elements are shown in table 
10 below. 
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COST ELEMENT AVERAGE COST 
Aircraft physical Minor accident 15% of value, catastrophic 100%. 
damage Example new 
-build aircraft costs; Airbus A3250 $56M, Boeing 747-400 $185M, 
Canadair RJ $27M, Embraer RJ135 $17M 
Loss of aircraft resale Partial loss 5% 
- 
10% of market value 
value 
Loss of aircraft use Monthly lease cost of replacement x number of months 
required to purchase new aircraft. Typical monthly 
lease rates; Airbus A320 $230,000, Boeing 757-200 
$320,000, Boeing 777 $760,000 
Loss of investment 
return 
Accident site For a widebody aircraft, typically $2.3M 
contamination and 
clearance 
Delays, diversions, $25 per passenger seat per hour 
passenger 
mana ement, etc. 
Airport closure For a minor accident up to 2 days, for a catastrophic 
accident up to 5 days 
Passenger and crew $3.05M each 
deaths and / or 
injuries 
Loss of staff Training cost of a replacement pilot $55,000 
investment, training, 
etc 
Loss of cargo and / or Baggage may be up to $52,000 
baggage 
Search and rescue Average $693,000 
costs, plus emergency 
services 
Airline immediate Average $3.4M 
response activities 
Accident investigation Minimum $2.4M 
Third a damage As for assen ers 
Loss of investment To insurers on monies paid out 
income 
Increased cost of Loss of 20% discount 
insurance 
Loss of income Passengers avoid the airline 
Loss of reputation Felt by both the airline and the aircraft manufacturer 
Loss of company Share price decline 
value 
Social costs Road closures, delays, loss of power, and so on 
Loss to society Loss of tax, personal skills, etc 
Emergency remedial Airworthiness Directives, modifications, etc 
actions 
Legal costs Fines, punitive damages, criminal proceedings 
Table 10 
- 
Cost Elements Of An Aircraft Accident Or incident 
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Once again, we find similar indicators of cost benefits when looking at the 
potential for a reduction in the levels of unscheduled maintenance brought 
about by early or unexpected system failures. 
A breakdown of an airline's operating costs shows that on average, 
maintenance currently contributes around 8% of the total, as shown in figure 20. 
Insurance l 
Admin 4°/aß 
Promotion 30 
I 
Commission 811 
Reservations 5% 
Passenger sales 6% 
Handling 4- 
Station cots 15°/ 
pay 9% 
-Fuel 6% 
Airport charges 12% 
En-route 4% 
Maintenance 8% 
Depreciation 3% 
Aircraft rental 12% 
Figure 20 
- 
Typical Airline Operating Costs (ICAO) 
Driving down this cost is of course, a perpetual aim within any airline, especially 
when you consider that a single Airbus A320 flying a typical 2,650 hours a year, 
costs on average, getting on for $11 million to operate. This sum breaks down 
as follows: 
Leasing $2,650,000 
Insurance $400,000 
Fuel $1,854,676 
Flight crew $850,560 
Cabin crew $584,760 
Maintenance $1,501,128 
Navigation $161,172 
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. 
Landing $484,659 
. 
Handling $816,710 
" 
Sales & reservations $290,160 
. 
Commission $1,322,259 
. 
General & administration $631,184 
0 Total $10,696,708 
Multiply this sum by the number of A320s in a fleet, and the potential for 
substantial savings with even a modest reduction in maintenance costs per 
aircraft as a result of SSCM data analysis is self-evident. 
5.15.2 Survey Of Air Transport Industry Professionals 
A number of industry professionals attending the City University MSc degree 
programmes in Air Transport Management and Air Safety Management, were 
asked to complete a questionnaire designed to solicit their views on the subject 
of how good the industry currently is with regard to incident and event reporting, 
data sharing, and so on. The questionnaire was circulated twice to all current 
students, and produced a good level of response, with the main messages 
being sufficiently consistent to give confidence in the use of the data. 
39 students responded, including: 
AAIB safety investigator 
Air traffic controller working for NATS 
Air traffic controller in Malta 
Air traffic controllers (2) with the Royal Air Force 
Aviation consultant specializing in asset management 
Commercial pilots (11) working for national airlines, two of whom are 
also Quality / Safety Auditors, and another is a Flight Safety Officer 
Flight crew training officer with a national airline 
Commercial pilots with regional airlines (5), one of whom is also an 
international consultant in airline operations at higher management 
level 
Business aviation pilot 
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. 
Engineer working for an aircraft & systems manufacturer 
. 
Engineers (3) working for national carriers 
. 
Engineer working for a UK charter airline 
. 
Engineer working fora WIP flight 
. 
Helicopter operator Commercial Manager (Engineering) 
. 
Helicopter pilot and Safety Manager in the Middle East 
" 
Operations manager with a national airline 
Royal Air Force fast jet pilots (2) 
Royal Air Force transport pilot 
Safety Managers (2) for UK airlines 
Safety Officer for a national airline 
The results are tabulated below. 
Question Response Remarks 
1 What is your role? See above 
2 (pilots & Do you have any Yes x 15 52% of those 
engineers concerns about the No x 14 who answered 
only) reliability of your this question 
aircraft systems? are concerned 
If you answered yes, See responses 
please ive examples 
3 (pilots How often, in 60% (B747-200) See responses 
only) percentage terms, do >50% x1 
you have to refer to the 30% 
- 
40% x2 (both 
MEL prior to dispatch. 747-400) 
(Please indicate aircraft 1%x2( B737-800, 
type(s)) Falcon 20, King Air) 
"Hardly ever" 
(A3301A340,737- 
800) 
2% (757,767) 
5% x4 (including 
very new Airbus 
fleet and 737-300 
fleet) 
10% x4 (including 
very new 
Airbus/Boeing fleet 
and Bell helicopter 
fleet 
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Question Response Remarks 
15% xI (new A320 
fleet) 
"Most flights" (0- 
130 
Have systems ever Yes x 15 65% experience 
failed in an unexpected No x8 unexpected 
way? failure modes 
If yes, have they ever Yes x 11 73% experience 
done so in a way that No x4 dangerous 
you considered to be unexpected 
dangerous? failures 
4 Does your company Yes x 37 97% have 
have an incident / No xI reporting 
event reporting system systems 
(confidential or 
otherwise)? 
If you said yes, does Yes x 20 See responses 
the system capture No x 13 
input from all areas of 
the business? 
Does the system allow Yes x 25 26% cannot 
you to enter all the No x9 enter all the 
information you would information they 
like to? would like to 
Is the system easy to Yes x 29 86% say their 
use? No x5 existing system 
is easy to use 
5 If you said yes to Yes x 21 38% say their 
question 4, is the No x 13 systems are not 
system effective? effective. 
See responses 
If you said no, why is it See responses 
not effective? 
g When you enter Always x9 Only 25% 
something on the Usually x 14 always get 
system, do you get Rarely x 10 feedback 
effective feedback? Never x2 
7 Do you have access to Yes x 20 46% have no 
general reporting No x 17 access to 
systems such as general 
BASIS? reporting 
systems 
If you said yes, do you Yes x 17 One respondent 
find it useful? No x2 said *yes and no" 
If no, why not? See res onses 
8 Do you know if other Yes x 13 See responses 
operators of the same No x 14 
aircraft types share 
your problems and 
issues? 
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Question Res onse Remarks 
If no, why do you think 
that is? 
I :j See responses 
Table 11 
- 
Student Survey Results 
Written responses, with added comments to show the links in to SSCM, are 
detailed below. 
Question 2- do you have any concerns about the reliability of your 
aircraft systems? 
"Yes. Increasing (apparent? ) incidence of Tornado engine problems 
- 
particularly vibration captions. " (RAF pilot) 
"Yes. IFE is unreliable and prone to fire. ' (Captain with national airline) 
The use of the word "apparent" is a clear indication that in-service arising 
feedback to the operator is not as it should be. SSCM addresses this. 
"Yes. No specific types. " (AAIB safety investigator) 
"Yes. Manufacturers insistence upon bringing into service an FMS upgrade 
(A320 FMS2) which is known and documented by themselves to contain many 
serious 'bugs'. " (UK airline Safety Manager) 
"Yes. 
1. I fly Airbus FBW aircraft. They are entirely dependant on software to 
function. In a period of terrorist activity how much security is placed on 
this software? 
2. The Airbus product has defined limits of speed, G, etc., that the pilot 
cannot exceed. It may be necessary to exceed some limits one day to 
avoid an accident. Boeing allows this in the 777 flight control laws. 
3. Finally, the Airbus control systems make their own control inputs on top 
of pilots inputs to manual flight. This makes the aircraft 
unpredictable/unpleasant and perhaps unsafe in some conditions. This 
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is particularly so in gusty conditions near the ground. " (Long-haul pilot 
with a national carrier) 
This seems to indicate an unsatisfactory design feature which is not being 
feedback to the industry strongly enough to generate action. SSCM will 
facilitate this. 
"Yes. We are getting a lot of Flight Management Computer (FMC) resets 
including a number of dual latches. " 
"Yes. Trent 700 and Trent 800 FADEC systems and engine compressors. " 
(Engineer with a national carrier) 
"Yes. Poor reliability of reversers on A330, poor corrosion resistance on the 
A320, fuel control on Boeing 757. " (Engineer working fora UK charter airline) 
"There are always systems that fail. " (Long-haul pilot with a national carrier) 
"Yes. Leading edge flap light on/off intermittently in flight. " (B747-200 pilot) 
"Yes. The aircraft onboard entertainment system electrical wiring is a big 
concern where many electrical sparking and other anomalies are taking place in 
many international airlines without proper action or follow up by either the 
authorities or the aircraft manufacturers. Another concern is the aircraft cabin 
fire extinguishing system, where statistically most cabin smoke or fires can be 
disastrous, for both human and technical reasons. " (Long-haul pilot) 
General comment on question 2: It is obvious, but not surprising, that there are 
still many concerns over system reliability within the user community. 
Increasing the awareness levels of such issues, hopefully leading to corrective 
action being taken, is one of the principal aims of SSCM. 
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Question 3- how often, in percentage terms, do you have to refer to the 
MEL prior to dispatch? (Please indicate aircraft type(s)) 
"On all operational missions; for peacetime training, list of acceptable defects is 
more subjective, open to -flexible interpretation depending upon scenario. 
Tornado F. 3. " (RAF pilot) 
"Always when there is an entry of deferred defect in the logbook. " (Long-haul 
pilot with a national carrier) 
"The MEL can be difficult to interpret" (Captain with national airline) 
The question of subjective interpretation of MEL requirements may at first 
glance appear specific to the military environment, but several MSc students 
have said off the record, that they come under considerable commercial 
pressure to accept aircraft faults that they would not normally do. This appears 
to be particularly true in the short-haul, low-cost world. SSCM would not allow 
such events (when reported) that result in safety alert levels being triggered, 
being ignored. 
Question 4- does the reporting system capture Input from all areas of the 
business? 
"Yes. Integral part of overall safety management system. " (Helicopter company 
manager) 
"Yes, as far as JAR requires it. " (Regional airline pilot) 
"No, pilots only. " (Engineer with national airline) 
"Yes, but some faults go unregistered. " (Captain with national airline) 
"No, people are afraid of reporting. " (Long-haul pilot with a national carrier) 
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A very familiar story, providing evidence of an appalling safety culture in this 
case. Legislated confidential reporting will help, but the cultural change here is 
key. 
I believe it does. " (Short-haul pilot with national carrier) 
A communication breakdown here, he should know. 
"The system in place only captures from the operational side of the airline. ' 
(Captain and Quality Auditor) 
"No access to it except a written report that will be taken into account or not. " 
(Regional airline pilot) 
Is the system easy to use? "Yes, I tell the engineer what is wrong 
- 
he takes 
care of the paperwork. " (RAF transport pilot) 
,, Its supposed to; however pilots seem to be the most likely to complete incident 
forms, " (Helicopter pilot and Safety Manager) 
"Yes, but not without chasing. " (Engineer working for a UK charter airline) 
Another cultural issue, where either the importance of event reporting has 
probably not been communicated well, or perhaps the system is not easy to 
use. SSCM addresses this latter point. 
I am only familiar with the ATC and aircrew reporting systems, but I am aware 
of the engineering ones that exist. " (Air traffic controller with the Royal Air 
Force) 
"No. The system only concentrates on the technical part of any incident or 
accident, neglecting other important aspects in the airline operations. " (Long- 
haul pilot)"Yes. Engineering Operations, Flight Dispatch, Ground Operations, 
Training. " (Engineer with a national carrier) 
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"No, flight ops and ground handling. " (Pilot with a national airline) 
"No. System concentrates on operational formal reporting, although it is being 
developed to encourage informal reporting from other areas of the business 
such as R&D". (NATS air traffic controller) 
"No, only from the techs involved with the actual problem, which is then 
evaluated by the quality department. " (Engineer working for aircraft & systems 
manufacturer) 
A very narrow view in this company of the need for event reporting, which areas 
of the business should be doing so, and even more alarmingly, evaluation is 
performed by one department in isolation rather than in regular multi-skilled 
forums. 
"Airport services, flight ops, engineering, cabin safety. " (6747-200 pilot) 
Does the system capture input from all areas of the business? I can't really tell, 
but I suspect it does not. " (Regional airline pilot) 
Does the system allow you to enter all the information you would like to? "Don't 
know, its the engineer's domain. " (RAF transport pilot) 
"No, human factors elements are not captured effectively yet. " (RAF fast jet 
pilot) 
Question 5- Is the system effective? 
"Yes, but it took a lot of work to achieve employee/shop floor "buy-in" which is 
essential, prior to employee buy-in the system was very much reactive (i. e. not 
reacting to cited maintenance errors, MOR, Voyage Reports, etc), post buy-in 
the system is proactive, and has become a true Safety System. " (Helicopter 
company manager) 
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A success story of change in a company culture. This is vital in understanding 
how safely they are performing. 
«lt is as effective as the user makes it (Flight Safety Department). " (Pilot with a 
national airline) 
"No, not very effective because you rarely get feedback. " (Pilot with a national 
airline) 
"No. The system is via a paper form that goes through the military system and, 
whilst it is a report to primarily warn other controllers of areas, controllers are 
concerned that it could lead to disciplinary action. " (Air traffic controller with the 
Royal Air Force) 
"No, because there is no way to assess it and we crew members suspect it 
could be used as a personal penalty tool rather than a safety improvement one. " 
(Regional airline pilot) 
"Incredible but true, the 'no blame' culture although promised, does not truly 
exist. Hence controllers are reluctant to report occurrences in the first place. 
Secondly, there is a general feeling that when 'errors' are committed by pilots, 
investigations are rarely initiated or given due importance, unlike those when a 
controller is thought to be at fault. The latter might be more a cultural and/or 
political influence. " (Air traffic controller) 
"Yes, within boundaries. " (Captain with national airline) 
"In most cases, very little is done quickly. There are many issues that have 
needed changing for in excess of five years that affect flight safety. " (RAF 
transport pilot) 
"Probably because it is so easy to use, it lends itself to a lot of information being 
reported that is not of a safety nature. This adds a lot of work to sift through. " 
(Engineer with national airline) 
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'No. My company has two systems, one incident/event reporting system that is 
compulsory to fill out, and one confidential reporting system directed to the head 
of the flight operations department for any deviations or other safety matters. 
Both systems, although good in their layout, are rarely followed with effective 
feedback or even action. " (Long-haul pilot) 
"No. I believe that in some cases it may be sanitised. " (Long-haul pilot with a 
national carrier) 
"No. More robust follow-up required. " (B747-200 pilot) 
"No, because it was implemented only to fulfill the legal obligations regarding 
safety, and people are not used to the system, it is not useful. " (Long-haul pilot 
with a national carrier) 
"No. It is not an open system and tends to be opinionated by a selected few. 
On occasions opinions/conclusions are made before the completion of an 
investigation. " (Engineer working for a WIP flight) 
"No. Needs controlled and flagged to personnel when action required. " 
(Engineer working for a UK charter airline) 
"We have a new web based system that does not work 
- 
yet. " (Captain with 
national airline) 
"The safety system currently in use is still under development. The system is 
aimed at capturing the current incident reporting forms and therefore should 
allow all relevant data to be captured if it is on the forms. The company is 
currently looking at making a web based front end for pilot wake-vortex incident 
reporting to allow capture of both pilot and ATC concerns. " (NATS air traffic 
controller) 
General comments on question 5: It is clear that reporting system effectiveness 
is being seriously compromised by: 
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. 
Poor company cultures 
The desire to protect data 
A lack of recognition of the need for appropriate review, follow-up and 
feedback 
SSCM addresses these last two points. 
Question 6- do you get effective feedback? 
"It has to be chased up on the Internet. " (Captain with national airline) 
"Feedback can be requested. " (Pilot with regional airline). 
Not a good example of an effective safety culture in this case. 
"We have to follow it up to find out the analysis and result. " (RAF transport pilot) 
°Always 
- 
it is part of the system to give feedback to all reporters. * (Helicopter 
company manager) 
This comment again comes from a company that has made substantial 
advances in changing its safety culture. 
Question 7- are general reporting systems such as BASIS useful? 
"System is designed for fixed wing airline operations and not helicopter North 
Sea operations. " (Helicopter company manager) 
As SSCM evolves, one of the key aims will be to ensure continuous 
improvement of the model through adapting to both new and changing 
requirements in response to the needs of customers in all areas of the aviation 
industry. 
"It's got restricted use. " (Captain with national airline) 
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"Although useful, it is used to report totally non-safety related things, causing 
the database to fill up. Sifting through these items to find the relevant ones is 
time consuming. " (Engineer with national airline) 
"BASIS can be useful but is very dependant on the way that a report is entered 
into the system. Some of the assigned categories are very subjective. ' (Pilot 
with a national airline) 
"I don't know much about BASIS, or its contents. " (NATS air traffic controller) 
"I don't know what BASIS is. " (Air traffic controller) 
"I acknowledge the usefulness as such. However I experience WinBASIS (at 
least the version used by my airline) as very user unfriendly. " (Engineer with 
national airline) 
"No, because only the people in the Safety Department have access to the 
system. " (Long-haul pilot with a national carrier) 
"Limited to use by flight safety manager and flight safety officer. " (Captain and 
Quality Auditor) 
Yet again, an example of a poor safety culture. SSCM addresses this. 
in my company we have a bulletin published by the safety department and the 
information given is mostly articles taken from magazines or the Internet. If one 
needs more information, it has to be by personal relations or favours. " (Long- 
haul pilot) 
"The organisation has not yet adopted such a system, but it is thinking about it. " 
(Engineer working for a WIP flight) 
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Question 8- do you know if other operators of the same aircraft types 
share your problems and Issues? 
"No. No idea if they have problems. " (Engineer working for a UK charter airline) 
"No. Limited information available on these types of aircraft. " (Business aircraft 
pilot). 
"No. I am not privy within my job function to have access to that sort of data. " 
(Flight Crew Training Officer with a national airline, and therefore a very 
worrying answer indeed). 
°Companies are not very good at sharing negative information, especially if it 
could put them in a bad light. " (Pilot with a national airline) 
I have no idea. " (Pilot with a national airline) 
"No. Only receive internal company reports. " (B747-200 pilots) 
"As the 'hands-on' operator, my visibility of manufacturers engineering 
information is very limited and I only find out what is deemed necessary by the 
design authority. " (RAF transport pilot) 
"No, no information exchange. " (Captain and Quality Auditor) 
"Part of the reason is a perceived concern that sharing information may cause a 
company to lose a competitive advantage. If we are talking about aircraft 
system malfunctions, that's one issue that it would seem that most operators 
are comfortable sharing 
.... 
I think many companies are reticent to expose their 
'dirty laundry' outside of their companies. " (Helicopter pilot and Safety Manager) 
SSCM addresses these points through data security and de-identification, and 
industry-wide adoption at all levels of the business. 
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"Yes, in some cases more so than us, could be due to shortages in manpower. " 
(Engineer working for a national carrier) 
The students were asked two further questions: 
1. Any other comments about the understanding of aircraft system 
behaviour and reliability that you would like to make 
Responses: 
"pilots are taught less now about system behaviour but more specifics about 
system operation. That's OK, but there is a danger that this will go too far and 
result in a deficiency in understanding of system behaviour. " 
This view clearly reinforces what has already been said in this area. 
"Very little appears to be being investigated and reported. " (Engineer working 
for a UK charter airline) 
A poor safety culture again. 
,, AAIB experience is that, in general, aircraft system behaviour and reliability is 
relatively good compared with the operators' perception as to what they are 
doing and how they actually work. " (AAIB safety investigator) 
"The RAF aircrew operating the C-130K take great pride in keeping the aircraft 
going. That is our downfall as we define the lowest operating standard of the 
aircraft based upon our skill rather than putting our foot down and requiring a 
minimum equipment level that would enhance our skill. " (RAF transport pilot) 
"With the new technology and systems interactions modem aircraft have these 
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technical systems behaviour especially during anomalies, rather than 
depending solely on electronic monitoring, ignoring the fact that such systems 
may fail themselves. No system is completely reliable. " (Long-haul pilot) 
"Technical training is inadequate. Many systems are misunderstood e. g. 
windshear, EGPWS/GPS. The aircraft technical log has problems. Failure 
indications are a potential problem. " (Captain with national airline) 
"The RAF has recently operated its Tornados for protracted periods on sortie 
profiles and under conditions which were never previously anticipated (cf hot 
and high desert ops at medium altitude, vice low level ops in Central Region). 
This will inevitably disrupt predicted failure modes and rates, and calls for a 
flexible and proactive approach to risk management and mitigation. " (RAF pilot) 
A clear need here for SSCM's environmental analysis capabilities to feedback 
into the original design model and reliability models to ensure safety levels are 
not being compromised. 
"Airbus is getting much better at sharing system problems with operators. I 
have just started an initiative to improve pilottengineer problem sharing within 
my company. " (UK airline Safety Manager) 
"Modem electronic flight control systems have brought with them many 
tremendous safety advantages. The down side is the manufacturers apparent 
inability to explain how they work and what the limitations are. An example of 
this was a recent run of incidents where actual or imminent Mach overspeed 
events resulted in momentary loss of control because a `normal law flight 
control mode' protection was activating with no indication to the pilot that it had 
done so. As a result the pilots ended up fighting the aeroplane for control and 
minimal risk overspeed events turned into major risk altitude deviations in 
RVSM airspace 
- 
including one TCAS event during the recovery. ' (UK airline 
Safety Manager) 
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"Computerisation of aircraft systems is advancing by leaps and bounds. 
However, this is creating a gap between the designers and the engineers who 
have to maintain the product/systems. There is not enough published 
information to understand the logic of the systems as compared to the previous 
analogue or hybrid systems. " (Engineer with a national carrier) 
"Systems that fail in flight often test satisfactorily on the ground, then fail again 
in flight, giving little confidence in ground tests. " (B747-200 pilot) 
Possibly examples of 
Poor or ineffective built-in test 
Poor fault diagnosis 
Incomplete information in Fault Isolation Manuals 
Poor communication/feedback 
No reporting system feeding into a lessons learned system 
SSCM addresses all these points. 
2. The air transport industry is concentrating its flight safety efforts 
almost exclusively on addressing what are known as "human factors" 
accident causes, such as CFIT, approach and landing, loss of control, 
etc. Do you think system behaviours and failures should also be 
addressed? 
Responses: 
, Yes" x 29. (AAIB safety investigator, engineer working for aircraft & systems 
manufacturer, Air traffic controller with the Royal Air Force, three engineers with 
national carriers, flight crew training officer with a national airline, engineer 
working for a UK charter airline, NATS air traffic controller, Maltese air traffic 
controller, nine long-haul pilots with national carriers, three short-haul pilots 
(one also a quality auditor), two RAF pilots, three airline Safety Managers, 
engineer working for a WIP flight 
"For sure' (Captain with national airline) 
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"Yes, but given that varying statistics attribute up to 90% of all hull losses to 
human factors, it would seem prudent to concentrate upon that particular area. " 
(Helicopter company manager) 
"The man/machine interface is prone to breaking down under pressure, and 
may cause loss of spatial awareness. Inherent systems failures, and system 
behaviour in differing autoflight modes should be addressed. " (Flight crew 
training officer with a national airline) 
"lt seems right that we should be focusing the bulk of our efforts to improve 
safety on the critical interfaces between man and machine. " (Aviation 
consultant) 
"Everything fails at some time but the human element is the easiest (and most 
difficult) to control. " (RAF transport pilot) 
"They are addressed. This is particularly done by the manufacturers, the 
regulators and the engineering maintenance companies. However, the 
communications between these organisations and airlines' Flight Ops 
departments are not as good as they should be (cuts both ways). Its a mistake 
to equate the 'air transport industry' with airline flight ops, which are only a part 
of the business. " (AAI B safety investigator) 
Almost every respondent agreed that system issues must be considered 
alongside the human factors events. The results clearly show that there are 
some serious concerns among end-users regarding the safety and predictability 
of aircraft systems, and that the use of event reporting systems, while 
improving, is still not as it should be. Of particular concern is the apparent low 
degree of access to existing database systems such as BASIS, and in 
particular, evidence of persisting poor safety cultures. 
The objective of SSCM is to overcome many of these issues, not only by being 
legislated, but also through its data protection protocols and by the use of an 
independent organisation to host the system. 
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5.15.3 GAIN Survey Of Airline Flight Safety Personnel 
In the summer of 2003, GAIN approached flight safety personnel from five 
major airlines who had indicated they were willing to share lessons learned and 
corrective action data, and questioned them about their requirements for such a 
system. The key results are listed below, and serve to reinforce the need for 
SSCM. In each case, the respondent was given the option of assigning a high, 
medium or low priority to the need, and in every case, each item was identified 
as having a high priority. 
Provide an automated system for sharing lessons learned and corrective 
actions among airlines 
The system must be simple, user-friendly, easy, readily available, and 
inexpensive to work with 
The system must provide information in a timely manner such that it is 
communicated to those who can use it before it loses its value 
Identify trends based on incidents in the data so they can be addressed 
before an accident happens 
. 
Support identification of... issues with specific aircraft systems... 
. 
Users must be able to query, sort and trend information 
. 
The system should automatically disseminate periodic safety summaries 
to airlines 
. 
The system must provide a user-friendly search engine with drill down 
capability 
. 
The system should include a web-enabled database application 
. 
The organisation operating and maintaining the system must have no 
direct interest in the outcome, other than sharing of safety information 
. 
The system must store and provide access to safety lessons learned and 
corrective actions 
All names must be removed from the data 
Include pilot anecdotal information 
Data categorisations must include aircraft types, types of flight 
operations, carrier size, etc. 
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Types of data and information to be stored or referenced include: specific 
aircraft system discrepancies.. 
Information stored in the system should be well-documented 
recommendations by the airlines for incidents experienced and the 
associated corrective actions 
Establish policies for data quality, data security, dissemination and de- 
identification 
Include dictionaries describing information issue areas in the system 
Sources of information should include... hazard reports, incident and 
accident reports, airfield audits, ramp safety audits... 
SSCM as proposed, addresses all these issues and concerns. 
5.15.4 Further Industry Professional Statements 
In 2003, the MSc Air Safety Management module on Safety Analysis and 
Statistics, included coursework which asked the students to comment on a 
number of aspects of the airline industry's current safety performance. One 
question posed was: 
What action would you take to improve the number and quality of incident 
reports within your company? What are the main barriers to successful data 
sharing between operators of similar equipments? 
Responses included the following; 
"Error must be accepted as a normal component of any system where humans 
and technology closely interact. Because it cannot be eliminated, effective 
measures must be employed to minimise its effects on aviation safety. But as 
the saying goes, 'You don't know what you don't know. ' For us in the airline 
business this means that we may believe that we are aware of everything 
concerning our operation. But how can we be certain? " (Commercial airline 
pilot) 
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"Today our airline's data scope is limited because the only data guaranteed to 
be collected is that related to accidents or major incidents. A more proactive 
approach is needed if we are to move forward. We must create basic solutions 
instead of short term fixes. ' (Commercial airline pilot) 
uThe problem of civil litigation (in data sharing) is probably the most significant. 
The only possible solution would be to de-identify the information before sharing 
it.,, (Commercial airline pilot) 
"Currently one of the greatest barriers to increasing the amount of data that is 
collected is the fact that there is a misconception that Air Safety Reports are 
purely a job for the pilots. To correct this problem a similar system would have 
to be made available to all employees within the company. These schemes 
could be an extension of the Air Safety Reporting programme with simplified 
forms, used for such groups as cabin crew and ground staff. " (Commercial 
airline pilot) 
"Care must be taken when comparing data derived from operators subject to 
different operating patterns and constraints, which may lead to the drawing of 
invalid conclusions. For example, fleets of similar aircraft operated under 
different conditions 
- 
e. g. multiple sectors versus fewer, but longer routes flown 
daily 
- 
may yield potentially widely differing arising rates. Similarly, climatic and 
local terrain conditions must also be taken into account when comparing 
results. " (Senior Royal Air Force officer and pilot) 
Thus it comes as no surprise that many of the same issues and concerns 
discussed in this document are in the forefront of the minds of people working at 
the coalface. It is also apparent that the SSCM system addresses all the 
concerns and suggested functionality raised by these students. 
5.15.6 Cost Benefit Case Study 
In section 3.23 the power generation problem on the Airbus A330 and A340 
fleets was discussed. As stated, the engineering investigation needed to 
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identify the causes of the declining reliability took well over a year. This 
timescale was due to a number of factors: 
1. The complex nature of the failure mechanisms being experienced, which 
had several causal factors 
2. Some failures were occurring which had not been predicted in the design 
analysis stage to have such severe consequences or fail as often as they 
actually did 
3. A high percentage of the failing units were not being returned to the OEM 
for repair, as they had passed out of warranty and were being repaired 
elsewhere by other organisations who did not share their findings with 
the OEM 
4. Incomplete event data available to the OEM, whose FRACAS system 
relied on paper-based reporting. This meant that there was an over-long 
audit trail with the documentation typically passing through four or five 
pairs of hands before reaching the reliability and safety analysis team 
5. Data lag due to the documentation system described above, resulting in 
delays of anything between one week and three months before all the 
details of a failure event were available for analysis 
6. Data lag due to the aircraft flying hours, necessary for reliability 
calculation, only being issued by the manufacturer on at best a monthly 
basis, with some operators reporting quarterly, and others not reporting 
at all 
So how could a fully implemented SSCM have improved this situation? The 
company concerned used a standard engineer's overheaded time cost figure of 
approximately $50 per hour. The average number of engineers involved in the 
defect investigation and modification design J testing at any one time was 
approximately five. Assuming their full availability for work was 20 hours per 
week for 46 weeks, or 920 hours a year, this equates to a total actual 
investigation cost of: 
5 engineers x 920 hours x $50 = $230,000 
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Setting aside the possibility that a more robust design process may well have 
avoided problems 1 and 2 anyway, and concentrating on items 3 to 6, it is 
estimated that the time saving from a complete and near-instantaneous SSCM 
analysis capability could have alerted the team to the scale of the problem 
approximately three months earlier than was the case. Furthermore, the more 
detailed nature of the information flow from SSCM into the parts reliability 
database and the original FMEA, may well have taken a month out of the 
investigation effort. 
From this it can be conservatively projected that the two full-time investigation 
and data analysis engineers in the process may have been able to complete 
their work in one month less than they did, thus saving around 20 hours a week 
for four weeks each, which equals 160 hours. The investigation cost now looks 
like this: 
Actual cost = $230,000 
Less savings due to SSCM, 160 hours x$50 = $8,000 
Projected investigation cost = $220,000 
It must be emphasised that these costs are for the investigation, design and test 
efforts only, and take no account of the potential for further savings In such 
areas as staff travel costs, involvement of additional part-time team members 
for review meetings, etc., etc. Further work on the cost benefit of an SSCM 
system is presented later on in this chapter. 
Therefore, not only could a substantial saving have been made on the 
investigation, but also the modified equipment would have been brought to 
market and the fleet retrofitted and returned to acceptable levels of reliability 
much earlier than was the case. Furthermore, the team would have had the 
confidence to know that the lessons from the investigation had been adequately 
recorded for future reference in order to hopefully avoid a similar problem re- 
occurring in future. 
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5.16 SYSTEM SUMMARY 
Several potential initiatives to assist the industry in its drive towards improved 
safety have already been highlighted. Of these, SSCM takes existing standards 
in event, incident and accident data capture and analysis, and takes them to 
entirely new levels of data intensity, functionality, feedback and alerting. It 
achieves this through completely new areas of data capture, interlinking with 
both existing databases and manufacturers design analysis, plus independence 
in ownership and support from legislation. 
A roadmap for introduction has been produced, and in addition to its potential 
for accident and incident reduction, there are clear cost and time benefits to be 
had in both time-to-market of new designs and reduced operating cost in 
service through minimised unscheduled maintenance requirements. 
5.17 THE NEED FOR A BUSINESS CASE 
I would contend that a major aircraft accident would not only cost the carrier 
infinitely more than any hoped-for saving, it could have the same detrimental 
effect on the aviation industry as another terrorist attack, We must allocate our 
funds wisely. Safety is not a disposable commodity. " ß'e1 
If operators are required to introduce the SSCM system, then logic suggests 
that the result is likely to be a reduction in the rate of undesirable occurrences at 
least, and possible even catastrophic events. However, in order to present 
SSCM as a viable business tool, it is necessary to demonstrate to the industry 
that the cost of implementation and long-term operation of the system can be 
significantly outweighed, by the potential cost saving through incident and 
accident prevention. 
5.18 AUSTRALIAN STUDIES 
Although there appear to be no available figures for a similar cost-benefit 
analysis, which is hardly surprising given the innovative nature of the proposal, 
some comparisons can be drawn with analysis carried out by the Civil Aviation 
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Safety Authority (CASA) in Australia. This work rr7l assessed the potential for 
accident rate reduction following the introduction of Safety Management 
Systems (SMS) by air operators. The study looked at accident rates in New 
Zealand over the periods 1994 to 1998 and 1998 to 2000, which showed an 
approximate decline of between 10% and 20% dependent on aircraft category. 
An assumption was made that some of the difference was due to 
implementation of SMS and that their progressive implementation may reduce 
risk by somewhere between 5% and 20% per year. It further assumed that it 
may take between five and six years for SMS to achieve its full effect in a 
carrier, and that it may therefore reduce risk overall by 25% to 75%. This wide 
range of effects was categorised as varying from minor to profound. 
5.18.1 Economic Benefits Of Aircraft Accident Reduction 
The Australian Bureau of Transport Economics estimated the cost of aviation 
accidents in that country to be AU$112 million (US$82 million) in 1996, and 
regarded this as the lower figure of an unknown range. There were 39 
accidents in the country that year, and the Bureau broke the cost figures down 
further to estimate a cost per accident for high capacity category aircraft of 
AU$2.25 million, which in US dollars terms equates to $1.7 million. 
The Bureau then looked at the 25% lower end potential for accident reduction 
and estimated a possible saving of AU$16 million per year (US$11.8 million). 
5.18.2 Implementation Costs For SMS 
Finally, the Bureau produced a breakdown of the estimated cost of 
implementing an SMS in an airline as summarised below. 
Item Notes Major carrier cost 
AU$M (US$M) 
Cost of employing a Salary (includes 65% on 150 (110) 
safety manager costs for insurance, 
lighting, rental, furniture, 
etc. 
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Item Notes Major carrier cost 
AU$M (US$M) 
Training costs Approx $1,000 per day 20 (15) 
for 7-30 days 
Facilities Office, training aids, PCs 20 (15) 
etc 
Management costs Management time 100 (75) 
setting objectives and 
procedures 
Ongoing costs Stationery etc, staff costs 60 (45) 
Upgrading or revising Will very greatly between 100 
manuals operators 
Cost of employing Salary of airworthiness Already employed 
controllers officer 
TOTAL 450 (329) 
Table 12 
- 
Estimated SMS Implementation Costs 
5.19 APPLYING BENEFIT FIGURES TO SSCM 
Taking the Australian experience as being representative of a mature air 
transport system and applying the generally accepted belief that approximately 
10% of global total-loss aircraft accidents have technical faults as a principal 
causal factor, it can be shown that at the lower, pessimistic end of the benefit 
scale (25%), there is already a potential saving of US$1.8 million in prevented 
accidents in that country in one year by SMS implementation. What now needs 
to be considered is the additional saving that SSCM can make. 
Some help in this direction comes from the increasing use of FDM and FOQA 
programmes. One major operator already using a FOQA programme has 
gone on record as saying that they have calculated the programme has 
prevented one catastrophic engine failure and seven unnecessary engine 
changes every year, and one hull loss accident every 12 years. 
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In 2002, American Airlines took part in a proof-of-concept trial of an 
experimental safety data mining tool in order to assess its usefulness. As a 
result of this, the airline drew the following conclusions: 
Data mining can provide unexpected correlations of data from different 
sources that call for further investigation 
This type of tool is much quicker than other systems in identifying 
specific areas of interest. The airline considered this point alone to 
provide an increase in efficiency and productivity that was critical to their 
safety analysis work. 
American went on to comment that such a system could show various 
apparently sporadic deviations from expected performance, highlighting areas 
requiring review. Trends identified validated the accuracy and usefulness of the 
tool, drawing the comment that the tool "produced indications and graphic 
products in seconds that had (previously) taken days of work. " 
In 2002, GAIN surveyed airline flight safety departments to identify the 
analytical methods they had in place in support of safety management. The 
results Indicated that while most have some sort of data collection and analysis 
system, thus recognising the need, the tools used were a direct reflection of the 
type and amount of data gathered. Beyond the basic analysis of air safety 
reports, flight data and human factors reports, there were almost no other 
capabilities in place. 
GAIN commented that the reporting and investigation of safety related events 
was "fundamental to the safety management process" and that the analysis of 
past events is vital to undertake proactive safety management activities. The 
airlines are increasingly recognising that effective safety management rests on 
the collection and analysis of relevant data obtained during the day-to-day 
conduct of flight operations. Required analytical improvements identified (both 
contained within SSCM) were: 
Better integration between existing tools to interface with airline data 
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Customised tools to perform standard analytical procedures that 
commonly arise in airline flight safety management 
The survey concluded that there was considerable need for better integration of 
safety information, "even among those airlines that already have fairly well- 
developed flight safety management programmes. 
GAIN is repeating the survey, in expanded format, to a larger selection of 
operators (see Appendix B). The results will also be used to assist In the future 
development of SSCM trials models. 
5.20 ILLUSTRATION OF POTENTIAL SAVINGS 
A number of individual aircraft accidents, and series of accidents, that had 
technical failure issues as primary causal factors were analysed to demonstrate 
the potential for financial savings to the industry through SSCM implementation. 
5.20.1 Hellas Jet Boeing 737 Accident 
On 8 August 2005, a Boeing 737-300 operated by the Cypriot airline Hellas Jet, 
crashed on the Greek mainland with the loss of all those on board. It had 
apparently suffered total cabin pressurisation failure in the cruise, followed by 
incapacitation of the flight crew. The aircraft subsequently ran out of fuel. Initial 
investigations revealed that the cabin air conditioning system had required 
rectification five times in the preceding two months, and that questions had 
been raised by the airline's own engineers about the aircraft's fitness to fly. This 
inevitably leads to questions about how they may have voiced their concerns. 
Given the repetitiveness of related issues with this aircraft, it can be argued that 
had the company had SSCM in place, there would have been a much higher 
chance of the problem being brought to their attention than appears to have 
been the case. Furthermore, it is also contended that such frequent anomalies 
with the cabin conditioning system would have been likely to trigger an FHA 
non-compliance alert requiring corrective action to be taken, and thus potentially 
preventing the accident. Quite apart from all the human costs, the current 
market value of a Boeing 737 of this variant is around $7 million. 
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5.20.2 King Air Undercarriage Failures 
Over a four-month period in the first half of 2004, there were no fewer than five 
non-fatal accidents to public transport category Beech King Air aircraft, involving 
either failure of the undercarriage to extend or its partial collapse on landing. 
The events demonstrate remarkable similarities and in at least one case, a 
component failure was identified as the primary cause. Had an SSCM system 
been in place, it is arguable that King Air operators could have been alerted to 
the prevalence of undercarriage issues and a technical investigation instigated. 
If, as a result, just one of these incidents could have been avoided, the potential 
saving to the operator through not suffering an undercarriage collapse and 
subsequent repair, is estimated to be in the region of $43,000. This is based on 
average overhaul figures for undercarriage and propellers and takes no account 
(78J of any additional secondary damage 
. 
5.20.3 Cessna Caravan Engine Failures 
The single-engine Cessna Caravan utility aircraft suffered a total of six engine 
failures during 2004. Its Pratt and Whitney Canada PT-6A 
-engine had 
previously built up a high reputation for reliability in several other applications. 
Examination of the 2004 incidents showed potentially significant issues with the 
aircraft operating environment, with five of the six occurring outside the United 
States and in parts of the world where extremes of climate and harsh operating 
conditions prevail. Discussion with one of the operators concerned revealed 
that they had lost confidence in the aircraft to such an extent that they had 
completely withdrawn the type from their operations. It was added that the 
aircraft manufacturer had been less than helpful in attempting to resolve the 
engine-related problems and - were not sharing the experiences among 
operators. Here again, an SSCM system with feedback direct from the 
operators to the engine manufacturer may well have alerted them earlier to the 
problems being experienced and enabled a more rapid investigation and 
potential avoidance of one or more of the later events. 
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5.20.4 Domier Do. 328 Inadvertent Door Opening 
In March 2002 a Domier 328 aircraft was forced to abort its take-off when a 
"Doors" warning caption was illuminated on he flight deck. The probable cause 
was the cabin attendant grasping the inner door handle to restrain herself 
during the rapid acceleration, since it was discovered that the ergonomics of the 
cabin crew seat and door handle made such an involuntary action readily 
conceivable. The door became unlatched and opened rapidly, with the 
subsequent overtravel causing substantial damage to the door attachment 
arms. The remaining attachment strength of the door and airstairs was such 
that both would almost certainly have separated had the aircraft become 
airborne, with a potentially catastrophic outcome. 
The investigation report commented that while the door design was technically 
compliant with the certification requirements, it lacked the necessary Integrity to 
prevent a hazardous occurrence to the aircraft such as inadvertent opening. As 
a result, it was recommended that the door design should be reviewed. This 
event, while isolated as far as can be ascertained, illustrates the role of cabin 
crew in the SSCM system. It Is postulated that the potential need to grab the 
door handle during acceleration must have been well known, and that more 
than one alert crew member would have recognised the potential problem and, 
given access to a suitable reporting system, brought it to the attention of the 
company. 
6.21 SUMMARY OF COST SAVINGS 
The cost of commercial aircraft hull losses averaged over all flight sectors, is 
estimated to be approximately US$75 per flight cycle t'81. This figure 
represents a very significant cost burden on the entire air transport industry, and 
it must be remembered that it takes no account of the cost of lesser events. 
The case studies presented throughout this thesis have demonstrated the clear 
potential for SSCM to make produce significant financial benefits to operators, 
over and above those to be gained from the current drive towards global SMS 
implementation. In Chapter 1 it was shown that study of fatal accidents over a 
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20-year period contended that 3,303 lives were lost in accidents for which a 
design fault was the primary causal factor, while a further 2,465 people died in 
those where maintenance was the key factor. Based on the Australian 
experience discussed in this chapter, and making a conservative estimate that 
SSCM could reduce these losses by just 5%, with each death currently costing 
the industry US$3.2 million, there are annual savings of US$923 million to be 
made. Furthermore, there will be substantial additional financial benefits for the 
manufacturing industry through more accurate component reliability data, earlier 
warning of emerging problems and direct technical interface with the operators. 
In the 1970s, a noticeable step-change improvement in the commercial aircraft 
accident and incident rate was seen. There were a number of reasons for this, 
including technological advances leading to improved reliability and aircraft and 
their systems. However, another significant factor was the introduction of the 
MSG system for maintenance task analysis, based on optimising scheduled 
maintenance by basing it on reliability and failure consequences, rather than the 
previous system of maintenance almost for its own sake. It is contended that 
the global introduction of SSCM is likely to result in a similarly significant 
reduction in accident and incident rates. 
Due to the complexities of implementing such a system retrospectively, it is 
suggested that the first stage would be to introduce SSCM into a new aircraft 
project, such as the Airbus A350 or Boeing 787. In relative terms, 
implementation costs would be modest, and once proven, confidence would be 
gained in rolling out the model to earlier fleets. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
- 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
6.0 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter summarises the issues raised throughout the thesis, the range of 
proposals to improve the current system safety process and the advantages of 
the SSCM process. It also details planned future progress towards 
implementation. 
6.1 WHERE SHOULD THE INDUSTRY GO? 
Today's air transport industry is undoubtedly a very safe one. Major accidents 
as a percentage of total scheduled airliner departures are thankfully very small 
indeed, and this is the result of a great deal of hard work by all sections of the 
industry. Despite the recent global airline recession, which had a major impact 
in almost every sector (with the exception of the burgeoning low-cost carrier 
network), it is now clear that recovery is well underway, and gaining strength. 
In recent months, Airbus, Boeing and Embraer all issued their own forecasts of 
how they saw the market developing over the next twenty years. Not 
surprisingly they all differ in some respects with regard to which particular 
categories of aircraft will do well in terms of future sales and which will not. 
Nevertheless, the overall message is clear and common to all three 
manufacturers; they all predict that the size of the world jet transport fleet will 
approximately double to somewhere around 35,000 aircraft. 
As illustrated in chapter one, unless the current accident rate is significantly 
reduced, this doubling of the fleet size and the commensurate major increase in 
the number of scheduled aircraft departures, will inevitably lead to a much 
higher number of total hull loss accidents each year. If that is the case, then the 
possible deaths of several hundred people in air crashes each week, would 
have a disastrous effect on the airlines. Such an accident rate would possibly 
result in a major collapse in public confidence and the resultant drop in 
passenger numbers as people declined to fly, would hit the airlines finances 
very hard indeed. Many operators, especially those in the short-haul and 
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medium-haul sectors where alternative methods of transport are easier would 
not survive. 
Even the low-cost carriers, who are today's success story, would not escape. 
Purely by virtue of the high percentage of total scheduled departures for which 
they now account, it is statistically inevitable that they will start to have 
accidents. This is already their greatest worry, as the underlying suspicion in 
many peoples' minds that low cost equals low safety, would instantly surface. 
Indeed at least one major European budget airline is already known to be 
investing very heavily in safety management processes and projecting 
themselves as always putting safety first, in a deliberate effort to distance 
themselves in the public's perception from their rivals, since one of them in 
particular is considered to be at significant risk of having the first budget airline 
catastrophic accident in Europe. 
So, the underlying accident rate must come down still further from the historic 
low levels enjoyed for some years now, or the airline industry will not survive in 
anything like its current form. Much effort is being put into understanding and 
addressing the major human factors related causes of fatal accidents, including 
CFIT, approach and landing, loss of control and runway incursions. Relying 
again on statistics this is of course understandable, since such accident 
categories account for somewhere between 70% and 80% of all hull loss 
accidents. The problem is that we now take our eye off the ball with regard to 
the remaining 20%, which includes other human factors causes, weather 
related accidents and technical failures. Should we be ignoring the last 
category? This document has presented ample evidence that we should not. 
So, what can be done to ensure a reduction in technical failures plays its part in 
the overall effort to bring the total accident rate down as the airline industry 
grows? Although the proposed SSCM is by no means the total answer to the 
problem of aircraft system safety, it clearly addresses most of the basic issues. 
Nevertheless, it has been shown that other changes need to be made across 
the industry, and made fast. As the upswing in airline fortunes gathers strength, 
there may be surprisingly little time to address these issues before the accident 
numbers start to increase. Indeed 2005, with its unfortunate increase in hull 
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losses, may have provided the first piece of hard evidence to support this; time 
is not on our side. 
The introduction of an SSCM system is just one part of a package of six 
measures that need to be taken if significant advances in aircraft system safety 
performance are to be achieved. They are all of equal importance and the 
remaining five are summarised below. 
6.2 A MANDATORY SAFETY ANALYSIS PROCESS 
It has been shown that while a fundamentally sound process (ARP4761) 
already exists for much of the system safety analysis work, the one big problem 
with it is that the regulatory authorities still do not mandate Its use. This despite 
the many years it has been around, and the clear benefits it has brought for 
those sections of the industry who have been conscientious enough to use it 
properly, especially with regard to accepting the need for independence in 
design safety assessment. A joint FAR / JAR / EASA safety analysis process 
regulation, incorporating ARP4761, issued and mandated by both the FAA and 
EASA is one possible answer. 
In the meantime, aircraft and system manufacturers should be required to enter 
their system design analyses, (with suitable proprietary data and access 
safeguards to protect commercial confidentiality), directly into the SSCM system 
for instant assessment of FHA compliance, and compatibility with the parts 
catalogue data. Any parts reliability assessments used in safety assessments 
which are not based on the SSCM database will require the manufacturer to 
input an acceptable justification statement before system certification can be 
achieved. 
6.3 RELIABILITY DATABASES 
The continued use of MIL-HDBK-217F, NPRD 95, Bellcore and all the other 
non-aerospace specific component reliability databases must cease at the 
earliest possible opportunity, although of course first there must be something 
to replace them. The SSCM component reliability database will gradually build 
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into the standard repository of such information, since it will be aerospace 
specific, take full account of environmental and operational variances, and 
contain a much higher percentage of events for calculation purposes than has 
been the case previously. 
Until such time as SSCM comes fully on line and can be implemented globally, 
the manufacturing industry will still have to rely on existing databases and / or 
their own empirical data, this is unavoidable. However, the regulatory 
authorities should change the existing certification requirements for failure rate 
justification statements in safety cases, by making them far more stringent For 
example, it should no longer be acceptable to justify rates solely by quoting 
MIL-HDBK-217F as a source. Analysts should be required to make statements 
including, but not necessarily limited to: 
No other suitable source data is available 
" 
Due regard has been given to the possible effects on the data of 
environmental and operational variations by means of sensitivity analysis 
" 
Confidence levels in the data are at or above 90% 
" 
Empirical data will be gathered to check data confidence, starting with 
system testing prior to certification and will continue following service 
entry 
6.4 EVENT ANALYSIS AND LESSONS LEARNED SYSTEMS 
Remember the words of the FAA's Commercial Airplane Certification Process 
Study discussed previously; 
"Adequate processes do not exist within the FAA or in most segments of the 
commercial aviation industry to ensure that the lessons learned from specific 
experiences in aircraft design, manufacturing, maintenance, and flight 
operations are captured permanently and made readily available to the aviation 
industry. The failure to capture and disseminate lessons learned has allowed 
aircraft accidents to occur for causes similar to those of past accidents. " 
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A major problem with existing databases, is that they can only be searched 
separately, there is no cohesion or attempt to make them interface with each 
other. There is also widespread concern about just how little is currently being 
learned from operational feedback, but: 
9 Who owns the database? 
" 
Who pays for it? 
" Who has access to it, both for input and for data analysis? 
" 
How can the industry as a whole be persuaded to use it? 
Although all these points are addressed in full by SSCM, there is still much 
good non-statistical information already out there, just waiting to be harvested. 
The commercial sensitivity argument that has prevented manufacturers of 
similar equipments sharing with each other the lessons they have learned, will 
always be a barrier. But, the independent ownership of SSCM can be exploited 
to provide an independent review forum with no regard to such matters. 
Any such issues discovered during SSCM data review that should be shared 
between different manufacturers can result, at the very least, in the two 
companies being advised to talk to each other! 
6.5 TRAINING SAFETY PRACTITIONERS 
System safety analysis is a highly complex process and requires a much 
broader and deeper range of education options to compliment what we already 
have, including courses offering Certificate, Diploma and Degree level 
qualifications for safety professionals - of whom there are still pitifully few. 
What is required is an appreciation of the need to combine basic reliability data, 
physical elements, statistical and other analytical skills, and engineering 
judgment, while still producing results that are both understood and traceable. 
The last statement on its own, makes clear the need for independence in safety 
assessment by trained analysts, since neither they nor the equipment designers 
can be expected to possess all these skills. They must work as a well-educated 
team. 
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6.6 EDUCATING THE INDUSTRY 
Despite statements to the contrary, it is an inescapable fact that safety remains 
a trade-off in the aviation industry, especially in the current climate of extreme 
financial constraint. Market pressures including cost, time to market, 
competitiveness, the desire to protect the sales after-market of spares and 
repairs, will always be present. This situation can only get worse as times of 
economic downturn drive down manufacturers margins as they fight to remain 
competitive. Awareness of the need to fully appreciate the importance of 
system safety issues through a cultural change that really does give safety a 
priority, is the key to changing this view, but it will obviously take time. 
There is no easy answer to how this can be achieved. However, new legislative 
initiatives such as EASA, are already forcing the industry into taking the 
understanding and management of risk much more seriously. The introduction 
of Safety Management Systems (SMS), is starting to gather pace in the 
operators, especially so since publication by the CAA of Civil Air Publication 
(CAP712), which is the best guidance document around for SMS In aviation. As 
a result, airlines, maintenance organisations and the armed forces are starting 
to seek education in SMS principles, but as yet the word has not got through to 
the manufacturers, certainly at system level. Perhaps the answer here is for the 
aircraft manufacturers to embed safety management and safety assessment 
requirements more clearly in the system and equipment contractual 
specifications they send out to their suppliers. 
6.7 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE WORK 
The main stages in the development and introduction of SSCM are defined in 
the implementation roadmap shown in section 5.9. The next steps to take the 
proposal forward are: 
. 
Detailed discussions with potential partners and database hosts. 
Software selection and error-proneness testing, leading to preliminary 
database design including interlink functionality with existing database 
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systems. This work to be carried out in consultation with experienced 
reliability database consultants. 
Detailed cost estimates at least up to and including the proposed field 
trial. 
Identification of trial participants through a series of field presentations to 
potentially interested groups. 
Continuing adaptation and refinement of the SSCM data elements to 
incorporate feedback from presentations and draft discussion papers. 
One of the principal aims must be to ensure all aspects of the industry 
are covered, such as the helicopter environment Issue Identified in the 
survey as being a shortcoming with existing data systems. 
During the development of this proposal, preliminary discussions have been 
held with both Operational Monitoring and Human Factors, and senior Flight 
Safety specialists at Airbus, with excellent feedback resulting. These 
discussions will continue and expand as the SSCM proposal matures. 
A draft paper based on this document has been sent for comment to the Human 
Factors Specialist in Maintenance Engineering Technical Services at the Boeing 
Company in Seattle. It is also intended that as SSCM development continues 
and matures, further work can be undertaken to introduce mathematical 
modeling as data subjectivity decreases. 
6.8 END PIECE 
It is now time for the whole aviation industry, including aircraft, system and 
component manufacturers, operators, maintenance organisations, steering 
bodies and not least the legislators, to take the system safety Issue on-board 
and act. It can no longer be acceptable to assume that an aircraft system is 
safe because an accident that includes a failure of that system as a contributing 
factor has not yet happened. Similarly, the potential for undesirable Interaction 
between different systems on the same aircraft must be better understood 
through better defined processes such as enhanced zonal analysis, 
assessment of external events and so on. 
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For some time now, the relatively stable failure rate of aircraft systems has been 
the excuse for the industry to concentrate its efforts solely on human factors 
causes, but recent accidents such as the Alaskan MD-80, the Lauda Air 767 
and the Hellas Jet 737, must be seen as a clear warning to pay more attention 
to technical problems. 
As has already been stated in the introduction, the two primary issues that need 
to be addressed are: 
The reliance by industry on obsolete, irrelevant or incomplete reliability 
date when building their safety cases for certification 
The unsatisfactory level of feedback from actual in-service equipment 
performance in order to validate the safety level assumptions made at 
the design stage 
The use of out-of-date databases, which are still viewed as "industry standards", 
must cease. Too many design safety cases continue to be built on reliability 
assumptions using failure rate data from such sources. Although other 
commercial databases have since come along in an attempt to fill the gap left 
by the withdrawal of support for the earlier models, they tend not to be 
aerospace specific and in any event, are no true substitute for true empirical 
data from like equipments in service. 
The industry as a whole has to recognise the desirability, not just from the 
safety standpoint, but also commercially, of adopting effective data capture, 
analysis and sharing systems. This is especially true once equipment goes out 
of manufacturers warranty. Up to that point, OEMs tend to see the vast majority 
of in-service events, for the obvious reason that operators know the OEMs will 
pay for the investigation and repair. It is later, when alternative repair 
arrangements may be made, that the data stream slows or even dries up 
altogether. 
Currently, unless some drastic event occurs, safety cases tend to be left on the 
shelf once certification is granted. The operators and manufacturers have little 
visibility of actual safety levels and therefore, no opportunity to identify possible 
252 
AIRCRAFT SYSTEM SAFETY ASSESSMENT 
-A NEW APPROACH 
safety non-compliances before they can potentially lead to an accident. Far 
better then, to have a system that will automatically highlight such non- 
compliances and force action to be taken. 
SSCM takes the whole analytical process a long way forward from where it is 
today, in a manner that will bring genuine benefits to the industry in terms of 
improved safety and financial performance. This is true not just of the initial 
design analysis, but also of the in-service phase, which so far has been poorly 
addressed and is frankly, not well understood. It is time for the Industry as a 
whole, including the regulatory agencies, to take advantage of the opportunity to 
tackle the technical safety issues in a more robust fashion. 
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APPENDIX A- FAR I JAR 25 SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS 
AIRCRAFT ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM 
`The equipment, systems, and installations whose functioning is required by this 
subchapter, must be designed to ensure that they perform their intended 
functions under any foreseeable operating condition. 
(b) The aircraft systems and associated components, considered separately 
and in relation to other systems, must be designed so that- 
(1) The occurrence of any failure condition which would prevent the continued 
safe flight and landing of the aircraft is extremely improbable, and 
[(2) The occurrence of any other failure condition which would reduce the 
capability of the aircraft or the ability of the crew to cope with adverse operating 
conditions is improbable. 
(c) Warning information must be provided to alert the crew to unsafe system 
operating conditions, and to enable them to take appropriate corrective action. 
Systems, controls, and associated monitoring and warning means must be 
designed to minimise crew errors, which could create additional hazards. 
(d) Compliance with the requirements of paragraph (b) of this section must be 
shown by analysis, and where necessary, by appropriate ground, flight, or 
simulator tests. The analysis must consider- 
(1) Possible modes of failure, including malfunctions and damage from external 
sources. 
(2) The probability of multiple failures and undetected failures. 
(3) The resulting effects on the aircraft and occupants, considering the stage of 
flight and operating conditions, and 
(4) The crew warning cues, corrective action required, and the capability of 
detecting faults. 
(e) Each installation whose functioning is required by this subchapter, and that 
requires a power supply, is an "essential load" on the power supply. The power 
sources and the system must be able to supply the following power loads in 
probable operating combinations and for probable durations: 
(1) Loads connected to the system with the system functioning normally. 
(2) Essential loads, after failure of any one prime mover, power converter, or 
energy storage device. 
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[(3) Essential loads after failure of- 
(i) Any one engine on two-engine aircraft; and 
(ii) Any two engines on three-or-more engine aircraft. 
(4) Essential loads for which an alternate source of power is required by this 
chapter, after any failure or malfunction in any one power supply system, 
distribution system, or other utilization system. 
[(0 In determining compliance with paragraphs (e)(2) and (3) of this section, the 
power loads may be assumed to be reduced under a monitoring procedure 
consistent with safety in the kinds of operation authorized. Loads not required in 
controlled flight need not be considered for the two-engine-inoperative condition 
on aircrafts with three or more engines. 
(g) In showing compliance with paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section with 
regard to the electrical system and equipment design and installation, critical 
environmental conditions must be considered. For electrical generation, 
distribution, and utilization equipment required by or used in complying with this 
chapter, except equipment covered by Technical Standard Orders containing 
environmental test procedures, the ability to provide continuous, safe service 
under foreseeable environmental conditions may be shown by environmental 
tests, design analysis, or reference to previous comparable service experience 
on other aircraft. " 
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APPENDIX B- ACCIDENT MATRIX 
Event type Date Aircraft Registration Circumstances Findings Category 
Mechanical 2 5105/2 002 Boeing 747- B-18255 While climbing through Break-up due to structural Maintenance 
failure 
- 
209B 1 
, 
600 feet the crew f ailure In aft lower lobe e rror; Ineffective 
airframe r eceived clearance to section of fuselage. In r epair and poor 
c limb to and maintain February 1980. the oversight 
FL260. The Flight was aircraft suffered a tall 
hen cleared to climb strike, was ferried back to 
a nd maintain FL350. Taiwan un-pressurized 
13 minutes later, while and temporary repair was 
approaching 35,000 conducted the day after. 
eet, the aircraft Permanent repair was 
disappeared off radar conducted In May 1980, 
screens. Wreckage but was not accomplished 
and bodies were found i n accordance with the 
at sea. The flight Boeing SRM, In that the 
probably disintegrated area of damaged skin In 
at high attitude since Section 46 was not 
other debris was found removed (trimmed) and 
about 45 kilometers the repair doubler did not 
from the crash site. extend sufficiently beyond 
the entire damaged area 
to restore the structural 
strength. Evidence of 
fatigue damage was 
found. Maintenance 
inspection did not detect 
ineffective repair & fatigue 
cracks that were 
developing under the 
repair doubler. Safety 
recommendations 
addressed possible 
improper repairs to 
pressure vessel which 
may be hiding damage, 
allowing the development 
of multiple-site fatigue 
damage and fatigue 
fracturing that could lead 
to structural failure 
17/06/2002 Lockheed C- N130HP After dumping fire In-Hight failure of right Maintenance 
130A retardant, both wings wing due to fatigue error; Inadequate 
separated In an cracking In centre wing procedures 
upward motion. The lower skin and underlying 
right wing Immediately structural members. 
separated from the Contributory factor 
uselage at low inadequate maintenance 
attitude. The plane procedures to detect 
hen lost control and fatigue cracking. NTSB 
rolled left. During this determined that 
manoeuvre the left maintenance and 
nil fell from the Inspection programmes 
aircraft as well and the applicable to firefighting 
aircraft nose-dived into aircraft did not adequately 
he ground. In April account for Increased 
1998 two one-Inch safety risks as a result of 
cracks were found on advanced aircraft age and 
he bottom of a wing severe stresses of (the service difficulty firefighting, 
report does not state Recommended that 
which wing), at Outer Department of Agriculture 
Wing Station 33. which and Department of interior 
is 33 Inch (83cm) from develop maintenance and 
he wing joint. These Inspection programmes 
cracks were repaired. for firefighting aircraft that 
include consideration of 
original design, age, and 
operational stresses, as 
well as engineering 
evaluations to predict and 
prevent fatigue crackina. 
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18107/2002 Consolidated N7620C Turned for firefighting The In-flight failure of the Maintenance 
PB4Y-2 drop In a smooth 15 to l eft wing due to fatigue error, Inadequate 
20 degree bank turn. cracking In the left wing's procedures 
Left wing separated forward spar and wing 
i nboard of number 2 skin. A factor contributing 
engine. Pitched nose to the accident was 
down and plunged Into Inadequate maintenance 
ground vertically. procedures to detect 
Widespread fatigue fatigue cracking 
as not evident over 
he entire wing but In 
some locations current 
crack detection 
echniques may have 
been unreliable 
07/05/2004 Douglas DC- N44911 crew started No. 1 
4 engine, there was an 
explosion In the wing 
area between Nos. 1 
and 2, and the 
outboard section of the 
n broke away 
06/03/2005 Airbus A310- C-GPAT cruising altitude of On March 18 The French Maintenance 
308 35,000 feet, the rudder DGAC Issued Emergency error, procedures 
separated from the Airworthiness Directive not followed 
vertical stabiliser. Safe DGAC AD UF-2005-048. 
landing The AD asked for an 
inspection of the of 
composite-fibre-reirdorced 
plastic rudders on certain 
A. 310 and A. 300.600 
aircraft. The FAA 
consequently Issued AD 
2005-07-07 on March 28. 
Airbus consider failure 
due to water ingress 
undetected through poor 
maintenance procedures. 
08/05/2005 Boeing 747- JA8072 Decompression 
400 Inbound to Japan. 
Diverted 
13/05/2005 McDonnell Cabin depressurisation 
MD-88 In the climb 
01/08/2005 Canadair F- Rear section separated No evidence of fatigue. 
CL415 from aircraft after corrosion or mechanical 
dumping fire retardant failure. No AD, SB or 
load procedural change 
recommended. Pilot error 
sus cted 
14/08/2005 Boeing 737- 5B-DBY Apparent Air conditioning system Possible 
300 pressurisation failure In had required rectification maintenance 
he cruise, followed by 5 times In previous 2 error 
Incapacitation of flight months. Questions raised 
crew. Aircraft ran out by company engineers 
of fuel and crashed about the aircraft's fitness 
to fly 
Mechanical 01/01/2004 Douglas MD- JA8297 Left main gear 
failure 
- 
81 collapsed towards the 
undercarriage end of the landing roll 
03/01/2004 Airbus A320 CS-TQE Nose gear collapsed 
hortly after tug 
disconnect following 
ushback 
15/01/2004 Boeing EP-IAC Hydraulic problem after Retract actuator ram on Component 
747SP ake-off. landed with right main undercarriage failure 
nose gear retracted had fractured, resulting In 
a hydraulic leak and a 
total loss of pressure on 
one hydraulic system 
20/01/2004 Beech King C-FDOS After take-off 
Air undercarriage in 
ransir light stayed on, 
recycling had no effect. 
Undercarriage selected 
down but nose red light 
stayed on and 
calla sect on landirr 
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31/01/2004 Fairchild EC-HCU Nose undercarriage Aircraft had race" Possible 
Metro II collapsed during take- undergone some maintenance 
off roll maintenance and was error 
positioning for further 
work 
04/02/2004 Ilyushin 11.18 EX-005 Nose undercarriage 
would not extend. 
Aircraft successfully 
landed on main gear 
assemblies 
20/02/2004 Douglas MD- LV-WPY Shortly after take-off, Possible 
81 outer wheel on left maintenance 
main gear fell away. error 
During landing, 
remaining tyre on that 
side failed 
01/03/2004 Airbus AP-BBA Unusual vibration Front two wheels on left 
A300B4 during take-off, main undercarriage had 
ollowed by loud bang broken up and forward 
and aircraft settled to end of left bogie partly 
he left. Take-off worn away 
aborted 
04/03/2004 Beech King N30SE Nose undercarriage Rod end of right main Component 
Air Indicator light not on. gear actuator separated failure 
gear appeared to be 
own. During landing, 
when nose gear 
ouched down, right 
main gear collapsed 
1310312004 Beech King N11FL Unsafe Indication for 
Air left main gear when 
selected down. 
Collapsed during 
landing roll 
01/04/2004 Beech King N740GL When undercarriage 
Air selected down left gear 
did not extend. Landed 
with left gear retracted 
02/04/2004 da Havilland YV-184CP Unspecified technical 
Twin Otter problem on route, 
leading to diversion. 
Nose gear failed on 
Iandin 
29/04/2004 Lockheed C- 96-1005 Undercarriage problem 
130H in flight, requiring 
manual extension. 
Right gear collapsed 
on landing 
18/05/2004 Beech King N500KA Following electrical 
Air power failure. 
undercarriage lowered 
on emergency system. 
Main gear collapsed on 
ouchdown 
01/06/2004 Antonov 9XR-SN Loud bang on take-off 
An. 32 and right gear bogie 
all away. During 
landing, gear stub dug 
in and aircraft left the 
runway 
16/07/2004 Commander YV-733P Undercarriage would 
690A not extend, belly 
landing carried out 
25/07/2004 Fokker 100 TC-IEC Left main gear 
collapsed on landirr 
19/09/2004 Airbus A320 S7-ASD Severe vibration during Tyre on RH gear had FOD 
landing roll, ECAM failed (possibly due to 
messages landing FOD), with debris 
gear not downlocked' damaging undercarriage 
and 'nose wheel downlock brace and 
steering'. Aircraft actuator 
could not be turned off 
runway__ 
21/09/2004 Fairchild C-FIFW Left main 
Metro 111 undercarriage 
collapsed after 
touchdown. Aircraft ran 
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ff the side of the 
r unway 
23/10/2004 Boeing 707- PP-BSE Loud crack heard at Right main gear Component 
320C start of take-off roll and attachment fractured failure 
r ight wing dropped. 
Take-of aborted 
07/11/2004 Boeing 747- TF-ARR Loud bang heard One or more tyres failed Component 
200F approaching V1, and on RH side. Debris failure 
TC advised smoke including part of the brake 
coming from beneath assembly found on the 
he aircraft. Take-off runway 
aborted but aircraft 
overran 
06/04/2005 BN Islander N29884 Landing gear failure 
used aircraft to veer 
ff runway 
20/04/2005 DHC-8-300 Landing gear problems 
n approach. Landed 
With gear retracted 
20/0412005 Boeing 707- EP-SHE er touchdown, 
3J9C problems with the 
undercarriage (failure 
fa landing gear or 
tyro burst) caused 
ircraft to slide oft the 
runway Into a river 
01/05/2005 DHC-8-103 LN- Suffered right-hand 
main gear collapse on 
landing. Turned right of 
runway 05 and came 
to a stop 20 meters 
from jet fuel pumping 
station 
09/05/2005 Rockwell N972NR During takeoff roll just 
Sabreliner after Vt, flight crew 
80 and passengers heard 
"loud bang" followed 
by swerving to the M. 
Aborted takeoff but 
overran, Impacting a 
once and trees, before 
crossing a road and 
coming to rest upright 
in a fteld, Fuel 
observed leaking from 
left win 
10/06/2005 Hawker- SY-SFE ear failed on landing, 
Siddeley causing aircraft to end 
HS. 748 up on its belly, blocking 
he runway 
12/06/2005 Bombardier N960SW Nose gear problems 
CRJ200 reported after take-off. 
Landed with nose gear 
u 
13/06/2005 Beech N575G Left outboard wheel fell Possible 
1900C off on take-off. Crew maintenance 
unaware until after error 
landing 
28/06/2005 Bombardier N623SR Nose gear collapsed 
CRJ200 as passengers were 
about to disembark 
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Mechanical 31/01/2000 Douglas MD- N963AS FL310 a problem Loss of pitch control Maintenance 
failure 
- 
flying 83 arose with stabiliser resulting from In-flight error, missed 
controls rim. Crew radioed they failure of horizontal procedures. 
were having control stabiliser trim system Non-fall safe 
problems and jackscrew assembly acme design 
descending through nut threads. Failure 
FL260. caused by excessive wear 
Troubleshooting resulting from Insufficient 
ammed stabiliser. lubrication of jackscrew 
Problem maintaining assembly. Contributing to 
altitude and diverted the accident were 
towards Los Angeles. extended lubrication 
During descent crew interval Increasing 
as also talking to likelihood that missed or 
Alaska Airlines Inadequate lubrication 
maintenance would result In excessive 
personnel to wear, and extended end 
roubleshoot stabiliser play check Interval which 
rim problem. Out-of- allowed excessive wear of 
rim condition became acme nut threads to 
worse, causing aircraft progress to failure with no 
to pitch nose-down. opportunity for detection. 
When preparing for Also contributing was 
landing control was absence on MD-80 of fall- 
lost and aircraft seen safe mechanism to 
tumbling, spinning, prevent catastrophic 
nose down, continuous effects of total acme nut 
roll, corkscrewing and thread loss " single point 
inverted', Crashed In failure 
650 feet of water 
16/02/2000 Douglas DC- N8079U Just departed when Loss of pitch control Maintenance 
8-71F crew reported balance resulting from error 
problems. Crashed left disconnection of right 
wing low, nose low elevator control tab. 
attitude. Disconnection caused by 
failure to properly secure 
and Inspect attachment 
bolt 
20/05/2002 Cessna N13VP During takeoff roll Elevator trim system 12 Maintenance 
Citation 11 when pulling aft on degrees out of trim In error 
control yoke, pilot nose down direction. Pilot 
noticed nose landing failed to We Improper 
gear was not coming setting prior to takeoff 
off of runway at 120 
knots with full aft 
control input. Aborted 
akeoff, but aircraft left 
he runway 
28/07/2002 Ilyushin 1186 RA-86060 Lost control after Stabiliser spontaneously 
akeof, crashed Into shifted to full down (-12 
orest just outside degrees) position two 
airport and burst Into seconds after takeoff. Six 
flames. seconds after the shift, 
captain tried to 
compensate by thrusting 
control stick forward as far 
as possible, but was 
unable to rs ain control 
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0810112003 Beech N233YV After takeoff the nose Two days prior to Maintenance 
1900D pitched up from 7 accident, maintenance error 
degrees to 52 degrees had been performed on 
by the time It reached elevator tab. Loss of pitch 
1,200 feet. Aircraft control resulted from 
rolled and struck Incorrect rigging of 
corner of a hangar elevator control system 
compounded by aft centre 
of gravity, substantially aft 
of certified limit. 
Contributing was, (1) 
operator's lack of 
oversight of work; (2) 
maintenance procedures 
and documentation; (3) 
weight and balance 
programme; (4) quality 
assurance Inspector's 
failure to detect Incorrect 
rigging; (5) FAA's average 
weight assumptions In Its 
weight and balance 
programme guidance; (6) 
FAN s lack of oversight of 
maintenance programme 
and weight and balance 
programme 
23104/2003 Beech 99A C-FDYF 4,000 feet crew During flight, horizontal Maintenance 
selected flaps for stabiliser trim actuator error 
approach, bang heard worked free of mounting 
from rear of fuselage. structure, and flight crew 
Aircraft commenced lost pitch control. During 
uncommanded pitch- replacement of horizontal 
up to near-vertical stabiliser trim actuator, 
attitude, stalled, nosed upper attachment bolls 
over, and began spin were Inserted through 
to the left. Crew airframe structure but did 
countered the spin but not pass through upper 
aircraft continued to mounting lugs of trim 
descend in near- actuator. Improperly 
vertical dive. Through Installed bolts trapped 
application of full-up actuator mounting lug 
elevator and assemblies, suspending 
manipulation of power weight of actuator and 
settings, pilots able to giving false Impression 
bring aircraft to near- that bolts had been 
horizontal attitude. correctly Installed. Dual 
Forced landing carried inspections, ground 
out testing, and flight testing 
did not reveal faulty 
attachment 
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24/06/2003 Tupolev RA-65929 In May and June 2003 Poor quality of work Maintenance Tu. 134 maintenance work was during replacement & error 
performed and rudder adjustment of hydraulic 
actuators replaced. amplifier; unsatisfactory 
Immediately after flying & technical 
installation deflection operation after completion 
speed for right rudder of replacement of 
input decreased from hydraulic amplifier, during 
38.2 degrees per which Incorrectly installed 
second to 18.3 rudder actuator was not degrees on day of discovered; decision to 
accident. More continue takeoff despite 
pressure necessary for significant efforts needed 
ull rudder deflection, for deflection of right Afthough captain rudder pedal already 
noticed this prior to noted during pre-flight departure, he decided checks; We rejection of 
to continue anyway, takeoff 
During takeoff aircraft 
began to deviate to left 
of centreline. This 
movement could not 
be countered by 
applying rudder, so 
captain decided to use 
nosewheel steering. 
One of the nosegear 
yres failed. At 250 
km/h takeoff was 
abandoned. Neither 
spoilers nor 
emergency brakes 
were used, aircraft 
could not be brought to 
a halt on 2,530m long 
runway and overran 
577 metres. Nosegear 
collapsed and aircraft 
sustained substantial 
dame e 
12/03/2004 Cessna D-IMMM When pilot attempted 
CitationJet I to rotate the aircraft did 
not respond. Take-off 
aborted and aircraft 
overran 
16/04/2004 Beech King F-OHJL Immediately after litt- Post maintenance test Possible 
Air ff the aircraft yawed flight maintenance to the left and ditched error 12/05/2005 Boeing 717 N910ME Control system Lightning strike thought to External event 
warnings in the climb. have played a part 
rcraft went into 
uncommanded pitching 
ascent from 23,000 ft 
to 13,000 ft. where 
control was regained. 
Diverted and landed 
safely 
Mechanical 03/02/2004 Beech king LX KTY Being ferried for 
failure 
- 
Air maintenance and 
instruments made overnight 
echnical stop. During 
preparation for 
departure, co-pilot 
smelt fumes and saw 
smoke coming from 
under the Instrument 
panel. Fire gutted 
cockpit and cabin 
before it could be put 
out. Aircraft was 
connected to GPU with 
electrical power on 
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Mechanical 09111/2000 Swearingen N731AC truck trees, crashed Indicated failure of right Component 
failure 
- 
Metro II a nd caught fire after hand AC bus during failure 
systems t akeoff in IMC takeoff with low ceiling. 
conditions The factors were the low 
ceiling, night, and the 
excessive workload the 
pilot experienced on 
akeoff with an electrical 
failure without a second In 
command 
16/04/2002 Hawker- ZS-OLE Developed a hydraulic Leak from UH engine Maintenance 
Siddeley problem, resulting In a hydraulic pump, which error 
HS. 748 complete hydraulic as not dealt with 
allure. A safe landing properly. Contributing to 
was carried out, but this was an Incomplete 
eered off and entered emergency checklist 
a ditch 
26/03/2003 Boeing 717- N957AT On final approach, the Failure of the left power Component 
2BD aircraft suffered control distribution unit failure 
multiple electrical (PCDU) 
problems. The pilot lost 
some electrical 
systems and computer 
screens In the cockpit 
malfunctioned. The 
plane was about three 
miles from the airport 
at the time. The pilot 
landed the plane safely 
21/11/2003 HS. 125 D2-EXR In-flight hydraulic 
ailure forced the crew 
to return to Luanda for 
an emergency landing. 
Intentionally belly 
landed between 
runways 25 & 23 
23/07/2004 Basler DC-3 FAS117 Hydraulic problem on 
Turbo route. Overran on 
landin 
08/02/2005 Airbus A340- G-VATL No. 1 engine lost Fuel control computer Design fault 
600 power, shortly followed system had design logic 
by No. 4. Fuel cross fault causing It not to 
fed manually and transfer fuel automatically 
aircraft diverted between tanks 
03/02/2005 llyushin ST-EWB Pilot stated aircraft had 
11.76TD developed problems 
with the fuel system. 
Crashed during 
attempted emergency 
landing 
10/05/2005 Douglas DC- N763NC Loss of right hydraulic Right hydraulic reservoir Component 
9-51 system fluid quantity empty, but cockpit gauge failure, or 
during a climb to did not show lt possible 
cruise. The flight and maintenance landing was made error 
without incident but 
aircraft then run away 
into A319 seriously 
damaging both 
10/06/2005 BAE Avro N530XJ Hydraulic fluid spraying 
RJ85 into cabin during taxy 
in. Emergency 
evacuation 
Mechanical 15103! 2001 Douglas C- N842MB During cruise at 5,000 Failure and separation of Component 
failure 
- 
47 feet, pilot heard a loud No. 12 cylinder from the failure 
engines bang'. RH engine on engine case that resulted fire and shut down. in an In-flight oil fed fire; 
Propeller would not and the subsequent 
eather. On pulling separation of the right 
extinguisher handle the engine from airframe 
engine separated from 
he aircraft. Aircraft lost 
hydraulic pressure. 
Emergency landing 
hout further Incident 
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05/06/2002 Fokker F. 27 G-CEXF 17 seconds after lift off, Minimal fatigue strength Unpredicted 
irst officer requested margin of HPT disc, failure mode 
climb power' and susceptible to rapid 
commander proceeded cracking If subjected to 
t o reduce fuel trimmers vibratory excitation, such 
t owards climb power as resonance. Abutment 
setting. Crew heard a between HPT and IPT 
l oud'bang' and LH discs resulted In small gap 
engine Fire Warning being present between 
activated. Commander seal arms while engine 
shut down the engine, operating. Allowed 
eathered the propeller sufficient reduction In 
and activated the fire natural frequency of 
extinguishers. Landed turbine disc vibratory 
safely mode for it to be excited 
while operating within 
normal speed range of 
engine. Protracted time 
taken following an earlier 
event, due to nature of 
tests required, to 
understand cause of 
failure, precluded timely 
Introduction of suitable 
preventative action aimed 
at avoiding recurrence 
prior to the HPT disc 
failure on this aircraft. 
Fuel leakage from 
severed low pressure 
pipe, part of engine bay 
fuel system, led to major 
tiro external to nacelle 
25/06/2001 Embraer VH-OZG In cruise at 10,000 feet Vibration from worn Component 
Bandeirante RH generator warning armature shaft of right failure 
illuminated. Reset and starter generator resulted 
monitored output. 5 to in fractured fuel return 
10 minutes later line. Armature shaft failed 
warning again in-flight. Sparks or 
illuminated. frictional heat generated 
Simultaneously, RH by failed starter generator 
engine fire warning Ignited fuellair mixture In 
activated. Several RH engine accessory 
circuit breakers compartment 
ripped. Unable to 
select engine fuel cut 
off with condition lever 
and could not feather 
propeller. MAYDAY 
due to smoke in cabin. 
Diverted, selected gear 
down but did not get 
any Indication. 
Touched down on 
extended right main 
gear and skidded 
along runway. Came to 
rest with fire In right 
engine nacelle still 
burning 
30108/2002 Fokker 100 PT-MQN cruising altitude, Fuel line to No. 2 engine Component 
crew noted 'fuel fiker' fuel pump snapped, failure 
and "fuel low press' causing fuel leak 
warnings for No. 2 
engine. Fuel Imbalance 
developed & aircraft 
losing fuel quickly. 
Diverted, but both 
engines stopped due 
to fuel exhaustion 
when still 16 miles 
from airport. 
Emergency landing In 
a field 
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11/11/2002 F okker F. 27 R P-C6888 S hortly after takeoff 
e ngine trouble 
d eveloped in one 
e ngine. Pilot declared 
e mergency and tried to 
l and in a reclamation 
a rea, but decided at 
he last minute to ditch 
i n the sea. Aircraft 
broke u and sank 
08/12/2002 Boeing 767- ZK-NBC Climbing through I nitiation & growth of Maintenance 
219ER FLI 10, crew heard f atigue cracking from rear error 
l oud 'bang' and fell bottom corner of turbine I nappropriate 
ircraft move right, blade fir tree slot. All repair and 
ollowed by cracked fir tree slots &I nspection 
progressive yaw left. several other uncracked process 
No. 1 engine failure, slots showed surface 
but down. Emergency microstructural flow & 
declared, aircraft damage attributable to 
l anded safely. Large shot peening operation In 
rupture of outboard a 1998 repair. Changes to 
core cowl and severe manufacturing 3 repair 
gouging and scoring of shot peening processes. 
utboard side of Revised Inspection 
engine strut. LE flap requirements to include 
panel extensively more thorough 
damaged, No. 2 canoe examination 
airing behind engine 
ustained debris 
impact and puncture 
damage. First-stage 
HPT disk failure, 
releasing large 
segment of disk rim 
and outer web. Engine 
casing around disk 
completely severed & 
central shaft fractured 
between stage-one 
and stage-two high- 
pressure turbine disks 
05/01/2004 Fokker 70 OE-LFO Severe engine LP compressor case ice Component 
vibration, loss of Impact panels on both failure 
power, landed In engines had come may 
undershoot In flight and become 
caught In front of the fan 
outlet guide vanes, 
resulting In by-pass duct 
blockage and significant 
loss of thrust 
21/01/2004 Dassault N200JE Following touchdown, Left thrust reverser 
Falcon 20 directional control was deployed, but right 
lost Immediately after remained stowed 
hrust reversers were 
deployed. Aircraft ran 
off side of runway 
10102/2004 Fokker 50 EP-LCA Lost control and 
crashed on final 
approach. Both props 
rant into reverse 2.5 
miles from runway 
08/02/2004 Cessna VH-CYC During training flight, 
Caravan engine power reduced 
to Idle and propeller 
eathered to simulate 
engine failure. Engine 
hen flamed out and 
aircraft ditched 
07/03/2004 Cessna XA-TBJ Forced landing 
Caravan following loss of engine 
ower 
17/03/2004 Cessna 5H-M UA Shortly after take-off a 
Caravan loud 'buff* sound from 
he engine and a 
heavy splash of oil hit 
he windscreen. The 
engine then failed, and 
he aircraft forced 
272 
AIRCRAFT SYSTEM SAFETY ASSESSMENT 
-A NEW APPROACH 
l anded on a road 
20/03/2004 Cessna V 3-HGB F ive minutes after 
Caravan t ake-off the engine lost 
p ower. Aircraft ditched 
27/03/2004 Mitsubishi N81MF During descent, RH 
Mu-2B e ngine torque meter 
as reading zero. 
Pilot later stated this 
h ad happened before 
a nd that the torque 
ould come back lt he 
manipulated the 
hrottle. However, he 
pparently took no 
ction, the aircraft 
ouched down hard 
and bounced leading 
o undercarriage failure 
04/04/2004 Antonov UN-26582 Right propeller 
An. 26 detached in the cruise 
and Impacted the 
uselage. Emergency 
descent and safe 
landin 
27/04/2004 Cessna N738FX Engine failed an route. 
Caravan Forced landing on road 
12/05/2004 Cessna HK-2708 Crashed an route 
Caravan following an engine 
problem. Aircraft 
reportedly overloaded 
08/06/2004 Hawker- TR-LFW On climb out, crew 
Siddeley noticed loss of oil 
HS. 748 pressure to No. 2, 
which was shut down 
and feathered. 
Hydraulic pressure 
was then lost and gear 
ailed to extend. 
Aircraft crashed Into 
rees during attempted 
ditchin 
20/06/2004 Douglas DC- HK-1212 Immediately after take- 
3 off No. 2 engine began 
to backfire and lost 
power. Aircraft lost 
height and hit trees 
26/06/2004 Lisunov U. 2 RA-1300K Lost power on one Investigation found lack of Possible 
engine shortly after fuel In left tank maintenance 
take-off. Lost height error 
and hit a house 
30/06/2004 Beech King N432FA Loss of engine power 
Air in the Initial climb. 
Undercarriage 
collapsed on landing 
12/07/2004 Convair 440 N4826C En route No. 2 engine 
high cylinder head and 
oil temperatures. 
Engine developed 
vibration and caught 
ire, which the fire 
bottles failed to 
extinguish and aircraft 
ditched 
16/07/2004 Boeing 767- EI-CXO Fire warning In No. 2 Flexible fuel hose Component 
300ER engine Just after V1. connected to Turbine failure 
Take-off continued, Cooling Control had failed 
engine shutdown and close to a connector, 
se bottle discharged. allowing fuel to spray out 
Fire not extinguished under pressure 
and emergency Ilanding 
carried out 
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21/07/2004 Fairchild N84GA n line-up, left engine Sensor wire to CAWI Component 
Merlin IIIB hesitated at 75% system on LH engine was failure and 
orque, then Increased broken and RH engine maintenance 
o 90%. During take-off was misrigged resulting in error 
r oll at 70kt, CAWI delay when reverse thrust 
system on LH engine was selected 
ailed and it lost power. 
Aircraft veered left and 
ake-off aborted, right 
engine surged during 
deceleration 
27/07/2004 Boeing 767- 5Y-QQQ No. 1 fire warning Failure of No. 3 bearing Component 
300ER shortly after take-of. between LP and HP failure 
Shutdown and turbines, allowing hot 
extinguishers fired. oiVair mixture to escape 
Landed safety under pressure. Spray 
entered area between 
engine and cowls and 
ignited. Bearing had been 
subjected to high 
temperatures for some 
time 
09/06/2004 Avro RJ100 HB-IXU En route, excessive 
vibration from No. 2 
engine, quickly 
ollowed by 
uncontained failure. 
Debris ingested by 
No. 1, resulting In fire 
warning. Both engines 
shut down 
16/08/2004 Cessna HP- Engine failure 
Caravan 1397APP immediately after take- 
off. Forced landing on 
road 
09/09/2004 Cessna 
-KOX Loss of power 11 Propeller assembly found 
21 ON minutes after take-off. 5 nm from crash site 
Crashed during 
attempted forced 
landing 
14/09/2004 Ilyushin 4K AZ1 No. 3 fire warning No. 3 engine suffered Component 
11.76T climbing through uncontalned failure of LPT failure 
FL110, almost section, with debris 
immediately followed impacting No. 4, cutting 
by No. 4 fire warning. fuel lines and leading to a Safe overweight fierce fire. Debris also 
landing impacted wing and 
fuselage 
05/10/2004 Antonov ST-SAF Engine failure In the Evidence that none of the 
An. 12 cruise. Crashed during engines were developing 
diversion power at the time of 
impact 
17/1012004 Boeing 777- F-OPAR During taxy, overtemp Hydraulic teak from Component 
200ER warning on No. 2 flexible hose igniting, failure 
engine. AFS possibly, when reverse 
extinguished fire In thrust was engaged 
upper RH area of during landing 
cowling 
20/10/2004 Boeing 747- N709CK After take-off. No. 1 
100F engine and pylon 
broke away. Safe 
landing 
22/1012004 Beech N79YV ne engine lost power 
19000 during descent, quickly 
followed by second 
engine. Aircraft 
ditched 
01/12/2004 Boeing 777- B-HNI Shortly after take-off. Heat from the engine Induced 
300 he D duct, part of the caused delamination of component hrust reverser on No. 1 the duct, leading to its failure 
engine, detached and failure 
ell away 
01/12/2004 GA G-GMAC Failed to slow on Crew could not activate 
Gulfstream landing and ran off the thrust reversers or ground IV side of the runway s ilers 
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08/01/2005 A ntonov 9 Q-CIH E ngine failure after No AOC, not Insured, no 
A n. 12 t ake-off, failed to c rew qualification or 
m aintain height and t raining records, no 
rashed maintenance records, 
a ircraft 8.5 tonnes over 
MTOW 
19/02/2005 B oeing 747- G-BNLG N o. 2 surged & suffered Second engine shut down 
4 36 i nternal damage after I n the cruise on same 
ake-off. Aircraft aircraft 6 days later 
c ontinued across the 
lantic on 3 engines 
b ut had to divert due to 2h 
fuel burn 
22/02/2005 CASA P-2032 Crashed into the sea 
Aviocar 1 00 metres offshore, 
approx. 400 metres 
f rom the runway. 
Engine trouble 
r eportedly preceded 
he accident 
22/02/2005 Convair FAB-73 Crashed shortly after 
CV. 580 t ake-off following 
engine problems 
08/04/2005 McDonnell N Take-off aborted due Component 
MD-88 to contained engine failure 
failure 
19/04/2005 Embraer N814HK Uncontained failure of Component 
ERJ145 LH engine. Landed failure 
safely 
02106/2005 AMonov ST-WAL Crashed on takeoff. A 
An. 24B ire erupted in the nr. 1 
engine, causing severe 
damage to the engine 
and the left-hand side 
of the fuselage. 
06/06/2005 Douglas DC- HK-3462 The aircraft crash- 
3 landed while 
attempting to return to 
he airport following 
ngine problems. The 
aircraft caught fke after 
it had been evacuated. 
13/06/2005 Douglas N3906J ust after take-off at Propeller pitch control Component 
R4D-8 about 300 feet, the mechanism failure, crew failure 
NO engine caught could not feather it 
re. Aircraft crashed In 
a residential area 
06/08/2005 EADS ATR- TS-LBB ne engine failed In Aircraft. Rad been fitted Maintenance 
72-202 he cruise, quickly with wrong fuel gauge error 
ollowed by the (intended for ATR42) 
second. Aircraft which over read fuel 
itched contents 1800k 
Mechanical 11/05/2004 Airbus A320 EC-HTD Nfter take-off, fan First take-off after Maintenance 
failure 
- 
cowls on both engines overnight ramp error 
miscellaneous came open and were maintenance 
torn off by slipstream, 
striking the aircraft, 
which landed safely 
13/07/2004 Airbus A320 N95ILF During take-off, No. 1 Possible 
ngine cowling maintenance 
outboard section error 
opened and separated. 
Later No. 1 engine oil 
quantity amber light 
on. Landed safe) 
04/12/2004 Convair 580 N161 FL Post-maintenance test Possible 
fight after work on left maintenance 
propeller. Crew shut error 
down and feathered 
left engine, but after re 
- 
start the propeller was 
not operating correctly. 
During approach, the 
flaps failed to travel, 
alternator light was on 
and hydraulic gauge 
Indicated zero. No 
nosewheel steering or 
Z/5 
AIRCRAFT SYSTEM SAFETY ASSESSMENT 
-A NEW APPROACH 
brakes, aircraft ran off 
he runway 
24/05/2005 McDonnell N91 ODN Slide deployed just 
MD-90 after take-off. 
Emergency landing 
Mechanical 24102/2005 Rockwell Jet XC-COL 18 minutes after 
failure 
- 
Commander takeoff, the pilot 
unspecified radioed that he had 
some problems and 
that they were 
diverting. Disappeared 
from radar and was 
later found to have 
rashed In a 
mountainous area. 
26/0312005 Let 410 HK-4146 Failed to climb and hit Initial reports suggest 
hills close to runway technical fault 
02/0512005 Swearingen K-POA Crashed In rural 
Metro III farmland Following 
midair break-up. Fire 
believed to have 
erupted prior to the 
accident. Landing gear 
xtended as it crashed, 
ich could Indicate a 
is in the area of a 
main gear wheel well 
02/0612005 Let 41 OUVP- TG-TAG Crashed white 
E3 returning to the airport 
after developing 
echnical problems 
after takeoff. 
Design error 0610312002 Dornier G-SWIR During take-off roll at The door and airstair Design faux 
Do. 328 100 kts, red'Doors' design, though technically 
ming caption complying with the 
illuminate. Rejected certification requiremert$, 
he takeoff, bringing lacked the necessary 
he aircraft to a Integrity to prevent a 
complete hat on the hazardous occurrence to 
runway. Probable the aircraft. Follow-up / 
cause was senior safety actions: Safety 
bin attendant Recommendation 2003- 
rasping Inner door 109: It Is recommended 
handle to restrain that the European 
ersetf during rapid Aviation Safety Agency 
acceleration. The review the design 
rgonomics of the characteristics of the door 
bin crew seat and operating, attachment and 
door handle made restraint mechanisms of 
such an involuntary the Dornier 328 aircraft 
action readily type, in order to minimise 
conceivable. Such the possibility of 
action led to the door Inadvertent door operation 
unlatching and opening and to ensure that there is 
rapidly. Failure of the sufficient residual strength 
damper attachments In the door/airstair 
and disruption of the attachments to prevent 
banister mechanism separation of the door In 
hen slowed forcible the event of a door 
over-travel, leading to coming open during 
failure of the airstair takeoff or initial climb 
attachment arms. The 
remaining attachment 
strength of the door 
and airstairs was such 
that both would almost 
certainly have 
separated had the 
aircraft become 
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a irborne. Had 
s eparation occurred, 
he port propeller and 
other critical parts of 
he aircraft would 
probably have been 
struck. A catastrophic 
outcome could not be 
ruled out. 
20/12/2004 Lockheed- Control lost shortly The aircraft was lost due FCS 
Martin F/A- after take-off. Pilot to the failure of all three momentarily lost 
22 ejected safely rate sensor assembles, power, known 
which provide feedback system anomaly, 
on yaw, roll and pitch programmed to 
status to the Flight Control interpret 
System (FCS). The plot momentary 
had Inadvertently power loss as 
triggered the failures instruction to 
during his pre-flight enter test mode. 
preparations when he which or latches 
shutdown the engines for the unit. FCS 
a maintenance check, unable to warn 
believing the FCS was pilot. 20 control 
continuously powered by units returned to 
the APU SAE by this time 
for Investigation 
of suspected 
latching events, 
resulting In a 
design change 
and Metwide 
embodiment of a 
new standard 
unk 
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APPENDIX C- SSCM EVENT CODES TABLE 
DATA CODE EVENT CODE ACTION CODE FINDINGS CODE 
SOURCE CATEGORY TAKEN 
Crew report C Fault 1 None A Confirmed F 
indication Fault 
Induced 
fault 
Monitor M 
No fault N 
found 
Human H 
factor 
event 
Reset B Confirmed F 
Fault 
Induced I 
fault 
Monitor M 
No fault N 
found 
Human H 
factor 
event 
Other X Confirmed F 
Fault 
Induced I 
fault 
No fault N 
found 
Human H 
factor 
event 
Failure 2 None A Confirmed F 
Fault 
Induced I 
fault 
No fault N 
found 
Human H 
factor 
event 
Reset B Confirmed F 
Fault 
Induced I 
fault 
No fault N 
found 
Human H 
factor 
event 
Other X Confirmed F 
Fault 
Induced 
fault 
No fault N 
found 
Human H 
factor 
event 
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DATA CODE EVENT CODE ACTION CODE FINDINGS CODE 
SOURCE CATEGORY TAKEN 
Crew report C Parameter 3 None A Confirmed F 
(continued) exceedance Fault 
Induced I 
fault 
Monitor M 
No fault N 
found 
Human H 
factor 
event 
Reset B Confirmed F 
Fault 
Induced 
fault 
Monitor M 
No fault N 
found 
Human H 
factor 
event 
Other X Confirmed F 
Fault 
Induced I 
fault 
No fault N 
found 
X Human H 
factor 
event 
Flight data F Fault 1 None A Confirmed F 
indication Fault 
Induced 
fault 
Monitor M 
No fault N 
found 
Human H 
factor 
event 
Reset B Confirmed F 
Fault 
Induced I 
fault 
Monitor M 
No fault N 
found 
Human H 
factor 
event 
Other X Confirmed F 
Fault 
Induced I 
fault 
No fault N 
found 
Human H 
factor 
event 
Failure 2 None A Confirmed F 
Fault 
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DATA CODE EVENT CODE ACTION CODE FINDINGS CODE 
SOURCE CATEGORY TAKEN 
Flight data F Failure 2 None A Induced 
continued (continued) (continued) fault No fault N 
found 
Human H 
factor 
event 
Reset B Confirmed F 
Fault 
Induced 
fault 
No fault N 
found 
Human H 
factor 
event 
Other X Confirmed F 
Fault 
Induced I 
fault 
No fault N 
found 
Human H 
factor 
event 
Parameter 3 None A Confirmed F 
exceedance Fault 
Induced 
fault 
Monitor M 
No fault N 
found 
Human H 
factor 
event 
Reset B Confirmed F 
Fault 
Induced I 
fault 
Monitor M 
No fault N 
found 
Human H 
factor 
event 
Other X Confirmed F 
Fault 
Induced 
fault 
No fault N 
found 
Human H 
factor 
event 
on-board D Fault 1 None A Confirmed F 
dia nostics indication Fault Induced I 
fault 
Monitor M 
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DATA CODE EVENT CODE ACTION CODE FINDINGS CODE 
SOURCE CATEGORY TAKEN 
On-board D Fault 1 None A No fault N 
diagnostics indication (continued) found 
continued (continued) 
Human H 
factor 
event 
Reset B Confirmed F 
Fault 
Induced 
fault 
Monitor M 
No fault N 
found 
Human H 
factor 
event 
Other Confirmed F 
Fault 
Induced I 
fault 
No fault N 
found 
Human H 
factor 
event 
Failure 2 None A Confirmed F 
Fault 
Induced 
fault 
No fault N 
found 
Human H 
factor 
event 
Reset B Confirmed F 
Fault 
Induced 
fault 
No fault N 
found 
Human H 
factor 
event 
Other X Confirmed F 
Fault 
Induced 
fault 
No fault N 
found 
Human H 
factor 
event 
Parameter 3 None A Confirmed F 
exceedance Fault 
Induced 
fault 
Monitor M 
No fault N 
I found 
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DATA CODE EVENT CODE ACTION CODE FINDINGS CODE 
SOURCE CATEGORY TAKEN 
On-board D Parameter 3 Reset B Confirmed F 
diagnostics exceedance Fault 
continued (continued) Human H 
factor 
event 
Induced I 
fault 
Monitor M 
No fault N 
found 
Other X Confirmed F 
Fault 
Induced 
fault 
No fault N 
found 
Human H 
factor 
event 
line E Fault 1 None A Confirmed F 
engineer indication Fault Induced I 
fault 
Monitor M 
No fault N 
found 
Human H 
factor 
event 
Reset B Confirmed F 
Fault 
Induced I 
fault 
Monitor M 
No fault N 
found 
Human H 
factor 
event 
Replace D Confirmed F 
Fault 
Induced I 
fault 
No fault N 
found 
Human H 
factor 
event 
Other X Confirmed F 
Fault 
Induced I 
fault 
No fault N 
found 
Human H 
factor 
event 
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DATA CODE EVENT CODE ACTION CODE FINDINGS CODE 
SOURCE CATEGORY TAKEN 
1 line E Failure 2 None A Confirmed F 
engineer Fault 
continued Induced I 
fault 
No fault N 
found 
Human H 
factor 
event 
Repair E Confirmed F 
Fault 
Induced I 
fault 
Human H 
factor 
event 
Replace D Confirmed F 
Fault 
Induced I 
fault 
No fault N 
found 
Human H 
factor 
event 
Other X Confirmed F 
Fault 
Induced 
fault 
No fault N 
found 
Human H 
factor 
event 
Parameter 3 None A Confirmed F 
exceedance Fault 
Induced 
fault 
Monitor M 
No fault N 
found 
Human H 
factor 
event 
Repair E Confirmed F 
Fault 
Induced I 
fault 
Human H 
factor 
event 
Replace D Confirmed F 
Fault 
Induced I 
fault 
No fault N 
found 
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DATA CODE EVENT CODE ACTION CODE FINDINGS CODE 
SOURCE CATEGORY TAKEN 
1 line E Parameter 3 Human H 
engineer exceedance factor 
continued (continued) event 
Other X Confirmed F 
Fault 
Induced 
fault 
No fault N 
found 
Human H 
factor 
event 
Scheduled 4 On-aircraft F Condition / S 
maintenance maintenance status 
re rt 
Replace D Condition / S 
status 
report 
2 line F Unscheduled 5 Repair E Confirmed F 
engineer maintenance Fault 
Induced 
fault 
No fault N 
found 
Human H 
factor 
event 
Replace D Confirmed F 
Fault 
Induced 
fault 
No fault N 
found 
Human H 
factor 
event Scheduled 4 Overhaul G Condition / S 
maintenance status 
report 
Replace D Condition / S 
status 
report 
Depot! MRO G Unscheduled 5 Repair E Confirmed F 
repair maintenance Fault 
Induced 
fault 
No fault N 
found 
Human H 
factor 
event 
Replace D Confirmed F 
Fault 
Induced 
fault 
No fault N 
found 
Human H 
factor 
event 
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DATA CODE EVENT CODE ACTION CODE FINDINGS CODE 
SOURCE CATEGORY TAKEN 
Depot / MRO G Scheduled 4 Overhaul G Condition / S 
repair maintenance status (continued) report 
Replace D Condition / S 
status 
report 
Investigation H Fault 1 None A Confirmed F 
indication Fault 
Induced 
fault 
Monitor M 
A No fault N 
found 
Human H 
factor 
event 
Reset B Confirmed F 
Fault 
Induced 1 
fault 
Monitor M 
No fault N 
found 
Human H 
factor 
event 
Other X Confirmed F 
Fault 
Induced I 
fault 
No fault N 
found 
Human H 
factor 
event 
Failure 2 None A Confirmed F 
Fault 
Induced I 
fault 
No fault N 
found 
Human H 
factor 
event 
Reset B Confirmed F 
Fault 
Induced 1 
fault 
No fault N 
found 
Human H 
factor 
event 
Other X Confirmed F 
Fault 
Induced I 
fault 
No fault N 
found 
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DATA CODE EVENT CODE ACTION CODE FINDINGS CODE 
SOURCE CATEGORY TAKEN 
investigation H Failure 2 Other X Human H 
(continued) (continued) (continued) factor 
event 
Parameter 3 None A Confirmed F 
exceedance Fault 
Induced 
fault 
Monitor M 
No fault N 
found 
Human H 
factor 
event 
Reset B Confirmed F 
Fault 
Induced 
fault 
Monitor M 
No fault N 
found 
Human H 
factor 
event 
Other X Confirmed F 
Fault 
Induced I 
fault 
No fault N 
found 
Human H 
factor 
event 
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APPENDIX D- GAIN AIRLINE FLIGHT SAFETY MANAGEMENT 
SURVEY 
AIRLINE FLIGHT SAFETY MANAGEMENT SURVEY 
As part of the current GAIN Action Plan, Working Group B Analy lcal Methods 
and Tools is undertaking this survey of airline flight safety management processes and 
requirements to guide GAIN in its future activities to address airline needs for analytical 
methods and tools. 
The intent of this survey is to understand and document how airline flight safety 
management processes and procedures are currently practiced, and the resources 
available to support the analysis of flight safety data. The survey will collect data on 
staffing levels, training and experience, and how flight safety duties are generally 
performed. It also asks about what data sources and analytical techniques are being 
utilised by flight safety offices. Opinions about enhancements to analytical methods 
and tools and additional training opportunities which would help improve safety 
management within an organisation are also requested. 
Survey responses will be confidential and the information will be de-identified 
in presenting the survey findings. Participating airlines will not be identified, except in 
terms of their general size and scope of operations (e. g. a large European carrier with 
worldwide services). 
Q. 1 Current aircraft fleet 
Enter number of aircraft in each category 
Wide-body jet aircraft 
Narrow-body jet aircraft 
Regional jet aircraft 
Turboprop aircraft 
Q. 2 Flight safety staffing levels 
(a) Flight safety department 
Enter number offlight safety department staff in each category 
Full-time personnel 
Part-time personnel with flying duties (average hours per month: 
Other part-time personnel (average hours per month: 
Enter number of staff positions N11-time equivalent) with the followingJUght 
safety duties in the flight safety department 
Flight safety programme management 
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Incident and safety report investigation 
Internal and external audits 
Flight data management / flight operational quality assurance 
Other (describe) 
b) Other departments 
Enter number of staff with designated fight safety responsibilities In other 
departments (e. g. fight operations) in each category 
Full-time personnel 
Part-time personnel with flying duties (average hours per month: 
_) 
Other part-time personnel (average hours per month: 
_____, 
Enter number of staff positions (full-time equivalent) with the following flight 
safety duties in other departments 
Flight safety programme management 
Incident and safety report investigation 
Internal and external audits 
Flight data management / flight operational quality assurance 
Other (describe) 
Q. 3 Flight safety department staff background, experience and training 
Enter the number offlight safety department staff with the following 
background, experience and training. 
(a) Background/experience 
Line pilot 
Flight instructor / check pilot 
Maintenance inspector 
Flight attendant 
Other (describe) 
(b) Flight safety trainingtqualifications 
Count each individual once on the basis of their most extensive formal training. 
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_ 
Degree/certificate in safety management [MOST EXTENSIVE] 
Military safety officer school 
Safety auditor credentials 
1-2 week short courses 
2-4 day short courses 
Attend workshops, seminars, etc. [LEAST EXTENSIVE] 
Q. 4 Flight safety department staff training 
(a) How many different courses have flight safety department staff taken in 
the past three years? 
List each course, the organisation that offered it, and how many staff have taken 
the course during that time: 
Course: 
Organisation: 
Staff: 
Course: 
Organisation: 
Staff: 
Course: 
Organisation: 
Staff: 
Course: 
Organisation: 
Staff: 
(b) How many other courses have flight safety department staff taken more 
than three years ago? 
List each course, the organisation that offered it, and how many staff have taken 
the course: 
Course: 
Organisation: 
Staff'. 
Course: 
289 
AIRCRAFT SYSTEM SAFETY ASSESSMENT 
-A NEW APPROACH 
Organisation: 
Staff. 
Course: 
Organisation: 
Staff: 
Course: 
Organisation: 
Staff: 
Q. 5 What guidance do flight safety department staff get on how to manage safety? 
Tick all that apply and provide associated information 
Company safety manual with detailed procedures to be followed 
Recommendations from company Safety Committee 
Interaction with senior management on a regular basis (How often? 
_) 
Interaction with flight safety staff at parent company or code-share 
partners 
Information from industry associations, civil aviation authority, etc. 
Training on the use of in-house analytical tools 
Other (describe) 
Q. 6 How would you describe your company's flight safety management strategy? 
Tick all that apply and provide associated information 
Monitor safety reports, identify risks, and implement corrective actions 
Analyse flight data from quick access recorders, identify exceedences 
from nominal performance, and implement follow-up actions 
Preserve confidentiality and foster a non-punitive safety culture 
Conduct regular safety meetings with flight crews (How often? 
___) 
Other (describe) 
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Q. 7 What safety data or information does the flight safety department collect and 
analyze on a routine basis? 
Tick all that apply and provide additional information where indicated 
Air safety reports (U. S. carriers: tick if included in ASAP programme) 
Confidential human factors reports 
Cabin safety reports 
Ground damage reports 
Hazard identification reports 
Safety hot line 
Aircraft flight data (FDM/FOQA) 
Aircraft technical log 
Other (describe) 
Q. 8 What other sources of information does the flight safety department make use 
of? 
Tick all that apply and provide associated information 
Line Operations Safety Audits (date last performed: 
Internal evaluation assessments (how often performed: 
Consolidated safety information from other airlines (e. g. STEADES) 
Informal reports from flight crew or other personnel 
Feedback from flight crew during training or safety briefings 
Information from civil aviation authority 
Information from manufacturers or industry associations 
Safety bulletins and magazines 
Internet, e-news 
Conferences, seminars, workshops (approx number in past year) 
Other (describe) 
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Q. 9 Which analytical tools does the flight safety department use? 
Tick all that apply and provide associated information. If used in the past but 
no longer used, enter "P ". 
Microsoft Excel or similar spreadsheet program 
Microsoft Access or similar database management software 
AQD 
AvSIS 
BASIS/ASR 
Other BASIS modules (list) 
Other commercial air safety reporting system (which? )
Internal company air safety reporting system 
FDM/FOQA analysis tools (which? ) 
Aircrew Incident Reporting System (AIRS) 
Procedural Event Analysis Tool (PEAT) 
Risk analysis tool (which? ) 
Other (which? ) 
Q. 10 Which aspects of the work in your flight safety department could benefit from 
increased automation or better integration between existing systems and tools? 
Tick all that apply and provide additional information where indicated 
Getting information from flight crew and others 
Data entry 
Correcting reports in database 
Preparing routine reports 
Transferring data between different analysis programmes or reformatting 
data to match the requirements of specific analysis software 
Other (which? ) 
Q. 11 What are the outputs of the flight safety department 
Tick all that apply and provide associated information 
Regular briefings to senior management (about how many per year? ) 
` 
Briefings to the Board Safety Committee (about how many per year? ) 
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Periodic safety report or incident digest (about how many per year? ) 
_ 
Periodic safety summary (about how many per year? ) 
Flight crew briefings (about how many per year? ) 
Presentations at training courses (about haw many per year? ) 
Articles in company safety magazine 
Pilot and department bulletins(about how many per year? ) 
Exchange of information with other airlines 
Other (which? )
Q. 12 Do you attempt to measure the overall safety level in your airline? Yes / No (circle one) 
If so, how? 
Q. 13 Do you share flight safety information with other airlines? Yes / No (circle 
one) If so: 
(a) What type of information? 
(b) How is the information shared? 
What types of information would it be helpful to obtain from other airlines, if it 
could be made available? 
THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS ARE DESIGNED TO PROVIDE INFORMATION 
ON FLIGHT SAFETY TRAINING NEEDS AND CONSTRAINTS 
Q. 14 In which areas would you like the flight safety staff to be able to obtain 
additional training or education? 
Tick all that apply and provide additional information where indicated 
Incident investigation 
Human factors analysis 
Statistical analysis 
Risk assessment 
Root cause analysis 
Use of specific analysis tools (which? ) 
Other (describe) 
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Q. 15 What impediments (if any) limit the ability of the flight safety staff to get needed 
training or education? 
Tick all that apply and provide additional information where indicated 
Lack of appropriate courses 
Cost of attending courses 
Too much workload to permit time away from the office 
Other (describe) 
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APPENDIX E- STUDENT QUESTIONNAIRE 
MSc AIR TRANSPORT MANAGEMENT / AIR SAFETY MANAGEMENT 
AIRCRAFT SYSTEM SAFETY QUESTIONNAIRE 
As part of our research programme into aircraft system safety, we would like 
your views on a number of related issues. 
Whatever your role in the industry, your feedback would be greatly appreciated. Please spend 
a few minutes answering the questions below, and return this paper to Steve Bond at 
s. j. bond@city. ac. uk 
Many thanksl 
Question 1 
What is your role? Pilot / engineer / ground handler / operations / ATC / 
Other (please specify) 
.................................................................. 
Question 2 (for pilots and engineers only) 
Do you have any concerns about the reliability of your aircraft systems? 
Yes / No 
If "yes", please give an example(s) 
Question 3 (for pilots only) 
How often, in percentage terms, do you have to refer to the MEL prior to dispatch? (Please 
indicate aircraft type(s) 
...................................................................................................... 
Have systems ever failed in an unexpected way? Yes I No 
if 'yes' have they ever done so in a way that you considered to be dangerous? Yes/No 
Question 4 
Does your company have an incident / event reporting system (confidential or otherwise)? 
Yes / No 
If you said "yes', does the system capture Input from all areas of the business? 
...................................................................................................... 
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...................................................................................................... 
Does the system allow you to enter all the Information you would like to? 
Yes / No 
Is the system easy to use? Yes / No 
Question 5 
If you said 'yes" to Q4, is the system effective? Yes/No 
If you said'no' 
, 
why is it not effective? 
Question 6 
When you enter something on the system, do you get effective feedback? 
Always / Usually / Rarely / Never 
Question 7 
Do you have access to general reporting systems such as BASIS? Yes / No 
If you said'yes', do you find It useful? Yes/No 
If now, why not? 
Question 8 
Do you know if other operators of the same aircraft types share your problems and Issues? 
Yes / No 
if 'no', why do you think that is? 
Question 9 
Any other comments about the understanding of aircraft system behaviour and reliability that 
you would like to make 
...................................................................................................... 
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Question 10 
The air transport industry is concentrating its flight safety efforts almost exclusively on 
addressing what are known as "human factors' accident causes, such as CFIT, approach and 
landing, loss of control, etc. Do you think system behaviours and failures should also be 
addressed? 
Yes / No 
Thanks for your time 
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